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Competitive strategies and barriers to achieving competitive advantage:




This study focuses on how organisations achieve and sustain competitive
advantage and the possible barriers to this advantage. It first deals with a
theoretical framework by examining related literature on developing a better
understanding of competitive advantage and generic strategies, as well as the
important aspects that may affect a firm's achievement and the sustainability of
its competitive advantage. This study extends the strategic management
literature on competitive advantage and generic strategies mainly based on
Porter's (1980, 1985) work. In particular, instead of the two generic strategies
(differentiation and cost leadership) put forward by Porter, four competitive
strategies are developed. These are (1) price leadership, (2) low cost
differentiation, (3) imitation and (4) differentiation.
Barriers to competitive advantage are conceptionalised in terms of
"strategic coherence" model, which has three aspects. Competitive strategies
require internal consistency referred to as 'competitive coherence'. In addition,
'organisational coherence' needs to be built, involving the structure of internal
and external elements affecting an organisation's ability to achieve its
competitive advantage. The creation of this structure is not automatic. The
difficulties increase with growing dynamism and complexity of the environment
in which an organisation is operating. While competitive and organisational
coherence might exist accidentally, the third aspect developed in this study is
called 'cognitive coherence'. The lack of coherence in one or more of these
aspects is a barrier to a firm achieving and sustaining its competitive advantage.
Secondly, this study reports empirical evidence on the validity of the theoretical
framework. This study takes the case of two different industries (petrochemical
and food) in Saudi Arabia.
Results indicate that all four competitive strategies are possible and
statistically defined. In addition, high-performing firms, in both industries, have
more strategic coherence than lower performing firms. The results suggest that
high-performing firms are able not only to achieve their competitive advantage
but also to sustain it over time. Moreover, in each industry, firms with different
competitive strategies have different barriers to achieving their competitive
advantage. These results are consistent with those found in the existing
literature, lending support to the view that western strategy models seem to be
applicable to developing countries such as Saudi Arabia.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objectives of the research
The constant changing of the internal and external environments of an
organisation suggests that the stronger the firm the longer it can sustain a
superior level of performance compared to competitors. A known important
variable that determines a firm's success and viability in a market is its
competitive advantage. It can be argued that each organisation within any
industry is expected to have some advantage over its competitors in order to
maintain its position over time. Thus the achievement and sustainability of
competitive advantage is the means which gives the firm its ability to stay
longer in the market. However, there might be potential barriers that prevent
firms from achieving and sustaining their competitive advantage. These barriers
are applicable to developed as well as developing nations. It is therefore
essential for firms (either in industrialised or in developing countries such as
Saudi Arabia) to consider such barriers in order to accelerate the development of
their nation as well as to achieve their primary objectives.
This research has two main objectives: the first theoretical objective
develops an understanding of competitive advantage and generic strategies as
well as the major barriers that may prevent a firm from achieving and sustaining
its competitive advantage. The second objective deals with reporting empirical
evidence on the validity of this theoretical framework. This study takes the case
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of two different industries (petrochemical and food) in Saudi Arabia for the
empirical investigation.
There appear to be two contrasting views in the relevant literature about
the question of the transferability of generic strategy theories developed in an
industrialised countries to a developing country. The first view is that such
theories are not applicable to developing countries. Kiggundu et al. (1983) view
different studies on organisation in developing countries and conclude that
theories grounded in data from industrialised countries appear to be useful for
understanding problems in the technical core of organisations in developing
countries but were not so useful for understanding organisation-environment
relationships. The second view supports the argument that some theories related
to organisation-environment are transferable to developing countries. Kim's
(1980) study of electronic firms in Korea found that firms with an organic
structure were more innovative than those with a mechanistic structure. This
supports the results of previous studies in industrialised countries (e.g. Burns
and Stalker, 1961; Hage and Aiken, 1967). Similarly, Kim and Lim's (1988)
study of environment, generic strategies and performance found that the
characteristics of the different generic strategies identified in the existing
literature, based on the data obtained from industrialised countries, are generally
consistent with those they found in their study. They also conclude that such
findings help to identify theories unique to developing countries and increase
the external validity of theories developed in industrialised countries.
The theoretical framework developed in this study is based on the
literature which is mainly grounded in industrialised countries. However, the
empirical part of this study will be applied to one of the developing countries,
namely Saudi Arabia, to examine the extent to which such a framework can be
applied to a developing country.
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In order to achieve the major objectives of this research, the theory of
competitive advantage and generic (competitive) strategies has been developed
from previous work in this field as well as merging and classifying those related
aspects in the literature. The central issue is to answer the question of what the
major barriers are that may prevent firms from achieving their competitive
advantage. Providing appropriate and convincing answers to this question
requires a broad investigation and evaluation of other questions regarding the
identification of competitive strategies and the links between competitive
strategies and internal and external factors which will be discussed when
appropriate.
1.2 Competitive strategies and barriers to
competitive advantage
Different competitive strategies as well as barriers to competitive
advantage will be discussed in detail in later chapters. The purpose of this
section is to introduce briefly the development of .‘different competitive
strategies and the barriers to achieving competitive advantage.
1.2.1 Competitive strategies
Developing an appropriate competitive strategy is vital for an
organisation in order to formulate a broad procedure of how it is going to
compete, what should be appropriate goals, and how to achieve and sustain its
competitive advantage. Strategy is generally viewed as a pattern of important
decisions that (1) guides the organisation in its relationships with its
environment, (2) affects the internal structure and processes of an organisation,
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and (3) certainly affects an organisation's performance (Hambrick, 1980).
Competitive strategy has been defined in different ways. For example, it has
been defined as how to position a company in its competitive environment in a
way that allows it to gain advantage against its competitors (Porter, 1980 and
1985). It has also been defined as how firms choose to compete through the
combination of a large number of functional area decisions (Aaker, 1992).
To manage current and future competition and to gain superior
performance, a firm needs an appropriate competitive strategy. In this study,
different competitive strategies have been developed. The development of these
strategies is based on a review and discussion of the existing literature related to
the two competing approaches of sustainable competitive advantage. These are
market position and the resource-based approaches. Both of these approaches
are needed for current and future competition. As will be clear from the
following brief introduction and the detailed discussions of these two
approaches in later chapters, the market position approach deals mainly with the
position of the firm in its market and currently existing competition, while the
resource-based approach emphasises the long-term development of the firm's
resources and distinctive competencies for future competition.
In the market position approaches, the work of Michael Porter (1980) on
competitive strategy, followed up in a later study of competitive advantage
(Porter, 1985) where he develops the basic ideas introduced in the earlier work,
has considerably advanced the debate in the business policy field in terms of
setting and orienting discussion around the idea of competitive strategies. Porter
clearly sees the essence of formulating competitive strategy as relating a
company to its environment and that the key aspect of the firm's environment is
the industry or industries in which the firm competes (Porter, 1980). The major
contribution was to point out that there are two routes to superior performance:
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where a firm either is (1) a cost leader in its industry or (2) differentiates its
product/service. The firm may choose to apply either of these strategies to a
broad market, or to a narrow-focused market. The works of Porter are widely
discussed, reviewed and empirically tested in the literature (e.g. Bamberger,
1989; Miller and Dess, 1993; Bowman, 1990 and 1992; Day 1984; Hambrick
1983b; Dess and Davis 1984; Hill 1988; Mathur 1988; Miller and Friesen
1986a, 1986b; Miller, 1988 and 1992; Phillips, Change and Bn7zell 1983;
Murray, 1988).
The resource-based approach views competitive advantage from the
perspective of possible "distinctive competency" that gives a firm an edge over
its rivals (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Teece, 1984; Hitt and Ireland, 1985;
Barney, 1986a, 1986b; Ghemawat, 1986; Day and Wensley, 1988; Fahey, 1989;
Reed and DeFillippi, 1990 and Lado et al., 1992). In this approach, the firm is
viewed as a nexus or bundle of specialised resources that are deployed to create
a privileged market position (see Rumelt, 1984, 1987; Wernerfelt, 1984;
Barney, 1988; Diericicx and Cool, 1989). These resources are what Rumelt
(1984) terms "isolating mechanisms" - those hidden core capabilities or assets,
such as proprietary knowledge, company reputation and so on, which are often
not directly associated with a product or a service, that sustains competitive
advantage. Teece (1986) has termed such things "complementary assets" -
resources that allow an organisation to capture profits from innovation.
However, even though innovation can give a company a competitive advantage
and profits, nothing lasts for ever (Williams, 1992). Thus any competitive
advantage needs to be sustained. Therefore, different characteristics and specific
conditions under which resources are valuable, and competitive advantage is
sustainable, will be discussed on the basis of the review of literature (e.g. Grant,
1991; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Ghemawat, 1991).
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Since firms need to secure current as well as future market position and
since competitive advantage can stem from either resource and competency
deployment or a product/market position, both of these views will be considered
in this research. However, in practice, the emphasis on either one of these
sources depends on many factors. Resource bases and end products can be
viewed as two sides of one coin, as organisation and environment are
inseparable. But for analytical purposes, this study discusses the organisation or
"resource and competencies" and the environment or "product/market" as
separated sources of competitive advantage.
Following on the review of the strategic management literature, the
issues of the conceptionalisation of competitive advantage and generic strategies
will be analysed, and then the work of Porter will be developed. One problem
with Porter's 'position' school of thought in strategic management (see
Mintzberg 1990) is that to be strictly appropriate it must be based on a set of ex-
ante well specified demand and supply side characteristics from which strategy
is 'read off. There is no real room for forward thinking or creative activity. But
the possibility of learning, involved with a defensive' or leading strategy,
suggests a more dynamic and creative organisational activity (Dietrich and Al-
Awadh, 1993). This learning and creativity, however, does not occur in a
vacuum but is environmentally contingent.
The framework developed in this thesis accommodates this critique of
market position theory and identifies four competitive strategies, rather than
Porter's two generic strategies. These competitive strategies are: price leadership
(PL), low cost differentiation (LCD), imitation (IMT) and differentiation (DIF).
The development of these competitive strategies, as will be discussed later in
this thesis, is based on appropriate links of particular foundations of competitive
advantage.
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1.2.2 Barriers to achieving competitive advantage
It is important at this stage to emphasise that an appropriate competitive
strategy is important for a firm to achieve its competitive advantage and as a
consequence achieve higher performance; therefore, the immediate determinant
of competitive advantage is an effective competitive strategy. However, the
potential of such a strategy is conditioned by organisational functioning (that
creates, builds or crafts more or less appropriate internal and external
environmental links) and individual perceptions. Hence it is argued in this study
that a firm has to maintain "strategic coherence" in order to achieve and sustain
its competitive advantage. Different aspects of strategic coherence will be
defined and discussed later in this section. Before doing so, a review of the
existing literature on the strategic coherence concept will be presented.
Hofer and Schendel (1978) argue that strategies at different levels need
to be coherent to ensure competitive advantage. Coherence (also termed "link",
"fit", "match" or "consistency") is emerging as an important concept in strategic
management research (e.g. Aldrich, 1979; Hambrick, 1988; Venkatraman and
Prescott, 1990; Miller, 1988; Hofer, 1975; Nath and Sudharshan, 1994;
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1994; Jauch, Osborn and Gluck, 1980; Lorange and
Vancil, 1977; Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978; Iles, 1993; Chandler, 1962;
Rumelt, 1974; Gupta and Govindaraj an, 1984; Grinyer et al, 1980).
The concept of coherence has been an enduring aspect of strategic
management research. It has received various definitions in the literature. For
example, early in the life of the subject, Ansoff (1965), Andrews (1971) and
Chandler (1962) referred to "fitting", "matching" or "aligning" organisational
resources with environmental opportunities and threats. Strategic coherence,
however, has been discussed in the management strategy literature with
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different variables. It can be seen in Ansoffs (1965) strategic portfolio which
consists of four components, namely geographical growth, competitive
advantage, synergy, and strategic flexibility. It can also be seen in Mintzberg's
(1987) definition of strategy, or in Peters and Waterman's (1982) loose-tight
control management. A logical development by Porter (1985) in this tradition is
that internally coherent "generic strategies", that are difficult to imitate, can
promote sustainable competitive advantage.
These differing perspectives were generalised by Venkatraman and
Camillus (1984) in their discussion of different aspects of "fit" or "coherence",
in strategic management. These perspectives are based on whether the elements
to be linked are: (1) external to the firm (based on this view, a firm's
performance in the marketplace is critically dependent on the characteristics of
the industry environment in which it competes); (2) internal to the firm (they
suggest that the focus of this view is on the alignment between strategy and
internal elements, with almost no direct reference to the influences external to
the organisation; the dominant theme in this perspective is the strategy-structure
fit), and (3) an integrated combination of 1 and 2. VenkAraman and Camillus
(1984) argued that the body of empirical studies in the third perspective was
recent, limited and of an exploratory nature. This limited progress was,
however, significant because five years earlier Galbraith and Nathanson (1978,
p.266) argued that 'although the concept of fit is a useful one, it lacks the precise
definition needed to test and recognise whether an organisation has it or not'.
Similarly Van de Ven (1979, p. 324) observed that 'considerably more
theoretical work is needed to incorporate "fit" into a theory of organisation'.
Since the early 1980s the idea of coherence has been further developed
and refined (see, for example, Hambrick, 1988; Miller, 1988; Venkatraman and
Prescott, 1990; Iles, 1993). Of particular importance has been the emphasis
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placed on Venkatraman and Camillus' second and third categories. For example,
Porter (1985) links competitive strategies to environmental factors. Mintzberg
(1979, 1987) links different organisational structures to competitive strategies.
Nath and Sudharshan (1994) find that higher performing firms have strategies
that are more internally consistent or coherent. Moreover, the "resource-based"
strategy theorists (e.g. Grant 1991b and Collis 1991), argue that market
imperfection inhibits the opportunity-maximising strategies proposed by writers
such as Porter. Therefore, they see that the origin of the firm's competitive
advantage lies in what is unique and embedded in its resources which
constitutes its core, distinctive competence. Shorten, Morrison, and Robbin
(1985) state that it is important to note that marketing, financial and human
resource functions and strategies are interdependent and, indeed, in high
performing organisations one would expect to find these functional strategies to
be consistent with each other in the support of a given corporate or business
strategy. Iles (1993) argues that strategic coherence in human resource
development can be achieved through competence-management and
organisation development. Whipp, Rosenfeld, and Pettigrew (1989a) also
suggest that coherence between strategic and operational issues is a fundamental
attribute visible in more successful firms. This thesis takes the third theme
suggested by Venkatraman and Camillus (1984), and also considers the
arguments raised by Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) and Van de Ven (1979) to
develop and empirically test the idea of coherence.
The concept of strategy has also been discussed and defined in different
ways in the management literature. Whittington (1993), for example, discusses
four generic approaches to strategy which are: classical, evolutionary,
processual and systemic. Each approach will be discussed, very briefly, and
related to the concept of strategic coherence; a few examples of the existing
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empirical work will then be related to these approaches. For the classical
approach, strategy is a rational process of deliberate calculation and analysis,
designed to maximise long-term advantage. Therefore, strategy is best made
through rational analysis undertaken at one remove from the hurly-burly of the
business battlefield itself (Ansoff, 1965, 1991; Porter, 1980, 1985). Sloan
(1963) defined the fundamental strategic problem as positioning the firm in
those markets in which maximum profits could be earned. Thus, the classical
approach to strategy places great confidence in the readiness and capacity of
managers to adopt profit-maximising strategies through rational long-term
planning. The concept of strategic coherence, in this approach, can be seen in
the links between the firm's strategy and its competitive environment.
Rather than relying on managers, Evolutionary approaches expect
markets to secure profit maximisation (Hannan and Freeman, 1988; Williamson,
1991). Stressing the competitive processes of natural selection, Evolutionary
theorists do not necessarily prescribe rational planning methods; rather, they
argue that whatever methods managers adopt, only the best performance
survives. Aldrich (1979) argues that environmental fit is More likely to be the
result of chance and good fortune, even error, than the outcome of deliberate
strategic choice. The Evolutionary advice, then, is that in searching for the best
strategy, it is best to let the environment do the selecting, not the managers.
Dietrich (1994) argues that the evolutionary approach to the firm is limited in
that it sees decision-making in terms of responses to exogenous change, which
leaves no role for learning and proactive behaviour. The concept of strategic
coherence, in this approach, can be seen in the links between strategy and the
competitive pressures.
The Processualists also challenge the detached approach of the
classicists, seeing effective strategies as emerging directly from intimate
involvement in everyday operations. The foundations for the Processual
approach were laid by the innovative work of the American Carnegie School -
most prominently, R. Cyert, J. March and Nobel Prize-winner H. Simon.
Rejecting the specious unit of rational economic man on the one hand and the
perfection of competitive markets on the other, they were led to take the internal
complexity of organisations seriously (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and
March, 1963). Here they uncovered two of the themes that have now become
fundamentals of Processual thought: the cognitive limits on rational action,
since extended by Mintzberg (1978, 1987) in particular, and the micro-politics
of organisations, developed by Pettigrew (1973, 1985). The strategic coherence
in this approach, therefore, can be seen in the links between the firm's strategy
and its internal factors.
Finally, Systemic approaches argue that strategies must be
"institutionally efficient", appropriate to particular social and economic contexts
(Granovetter, 1985). Systemic theorists insist that the rationales underlying
strategy are peculiar to particular sociological, institutional and economic
contexts. Therefore, firms differ according to the social and economic systems
in which they are embedded. The variables of the systemic perspective include
class and professions, nations and states, families and gender. The concept of
strategic coherence in this approach can be seen in the links between the
strategy and the different institutions in the general environment.
It can be seen from the previous discussion that these different
approaches to strategy (as suggested by Whittington, 1993) require a strategic
coherence that has been viewed differently. Two approaches, the Classical and
Processual, have been used in this study. It can therefore be seen that each
approach to strategy has different views as to what constitutes strategic
coherence. But each view postulates that higher performing firms have strategic
coherence of some sort.
Strategic coherence will be defined in this study in terms of three linked
aspects: "competitive", "organisational" and "cognitive". The central
proposition is that effective exploitation of competitive advantages, and hence
achieved performance and the extent to which this is sustained over time, is
positively related to the degree of coherence at all three levels. In other words,
the lack of coherence in one or more of these aspects is considered as a barrier
that may prevent firms from achieving and sustaining their competitive
advantage. The way that these aspects are linked is illustrated in Figure 1.1 (see
Dietrich and Al-Awadh (1995)). Two types of links are presented in a general
competitive advantage and strategic coherence model, as illustrated in figure
1.1. Although this model represents these two different ways to achieve
competitive advantage and strategic coherence (i.e. real and analytical links)
both aim to achieve high performance. In reality, the managers' individual
perceptions and the different organisational functioning will provide the
foundation for defining the means (i.e. competitive strategies) by which the
firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage. Therefore, if the managers'
perception of their competitive strategies and the different organisational
functioning have been linked properly with a coherent firm's competitive
strategy then the firm will achieve and sustain its competitive advantage and
consequently enhance its performance. However, for the purpose of analysis,
this study uses the concept of coherence to reach the same conclusion, as
illustrated in Figure 1.1 and discussed in more detail later. Competitive
strategies will be used as the primary analytical element, their internal
consistency will be referred to as "competitive coherence" as will be discussed
next. These competitive strategies will be developed and identified from the
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investigated firms rather than imposed on them as will be discussed in later
chapters. This aspect of coherence is one of the three aspects of "strategic
coherence" which will be discussed next. This study proposes that firms which
maintain a high level of strategic coherence will have a high level of
performance.
The competitive strategies, in this study, have been linked to both the
internal and external environments of an organisation. Studies that relate both
internal and external variables to the firm's strategy tend to use one or just a few
internal variables (mainly organisational structure) and one or just a few
external variables (mainly environmental uncertainty) to the firm's strategy. In
this study, however, strategic coherence is analysed by using ten internal
variables (e.g. formalisation, financial control, authority delegation of authority
and risk avoidance) and five external variables (e.g. environmental stability,
environmental simplicity, related and supported industries and factor





















A model of competitive advantage and strategic coherence
1.2.2.1 Competitive coherence
Competitive coherence, which is the initial analytical element, is defined
in terms of the internal consistency of competitive strategies. Forming an
effective competitive strategy needs both a supply side and a demand side that
are internally consistent. Although the nature of this consistency will be
discussed later in detail, an important issue should be emphasised at this stage.
When the consistency of competitive strategies is derived it invokes the
analytical logic of black box organisation. This logic suggests that optimal
organisational functioning and individual perceptions exist by default.
Therefore, this aspect of strategic coherence is concerned with how strongly (the
measurement of this strength will be discussed later) these competitive
strategies are defined, i.e. their internal consistency. Once these competitive
strategies are defined, they will be used as a benchmark to measure the other
aspects of "strategic coherence", as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1.2.2.2 Organisational coherence
Using the right competitive strategy is not sufficient for a firm to secure
the sustainability of its advantage. Each competitive strategy requires the
creation or crafting (Mintzberg, 1987) of different organisational designs and
environmental links to achieve the advantage offered by any competitive stance.
In this aspect of strategic coherence, competitive strategies at the business level
are viewed as '...integrated actions in the pursuit of competitive advantage' with
functional strategies as the supportive activities essential for translating the core
strategy into an effective guide for action (Day, 1984). To be effective, each
functional strategy must support the competitive advantage sought, through
specific actions (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). Therefore, when an
organisation has a well defined competitive strategy (i.e. high competitive
coherence) and is designed or crafted in such a way as to support this strategy in
terms of its organisational functioning, it is expected that this organisation will
have stronger strategic coherence than an organisation with only competitive
coherence that is not effectively activated at an organisational level. Thus this
aspect of coherence (which will be referred to as "organisational coherence")
will be formed and achieved by appropriate links between different
organisational and environmental (internal and external) factors and the
different competitive strategies. In other words, "organisational coherence" can
be achieved by avoiding potential barriers that may arise with a lack of fit
between the firm's competitive strategy and other organisational and
environmental factors.
1.2.2.3 Cognitive coherence
The way in which managers perceive their organisational strategies is an
important factor that affects the achievement and sustainability of competitive
advantage. It is argued that strategies developed consciously are more effective
than those enacted by accident. Among other things, conscious design facilitates
flexibility and adaptation because of the possibilities offered by the clear and
explicit vision that managers will have. Therefore, the effectiveness of identified
competitive strategies is also linked to individual perceptions to form cognitive
coherence, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. To test this aspect of strategic coherence,
competitive strategies are measured objectively and subjectively (in ways
discussed later). Comparing the congruence between these two methods allows
us to assess the extent of cognitive coherence achieved when managers perceive
their competitive strategies to be the same as they objectively appear.
Thus the different competitive strategies and the strategic coherence
model will be developed in detail and tested later in this study. However, in
reality, building a structure to organise elements affecting organisational ability
to achieve and sustain its competitive advantage seems to be very difficult. The
difficulty increases with the growing dynamism and complexity of the
environment in which the organisation is operating. Thus, from the discussion
and the development made on competitive advantage and barriers to achieving
competitive advantage, the strategic coherence model has been built, which will
help to organise such a complicated environment and related factors that may
prevent a firm from achieving and sustaining its competitive advantage.
Therefore, it can be proposed that firms that have strong strategic coherence
should have a high level of performance but lack of coherence will prevent
lower-performing firms from achieving their competitive advantage.
1.3 The significance of the research
This research makes the following important contributions:
It extends the strategic management literature regarding competitive
advantage and generic strategy. It examines related literature to explain and
develop better understanding of the competitive advantage and generic
strategies, focusing on the important aspects that may affect the firm's
achievement and sustainability of its competitive advantage. It should be
noticed that while this framework is a significant step away from the Porter
tradition this move should be seen in terms of a development rather than a
break. This development involves two aspects: theoretical and empirical. First,
competitive strategies are developed theoretically from possible links of the four
foundations of competitive advantage. Secondly, the competitive strategies are
derived empirically in such a way that any one strategy may be more or less
relevant. In these two ways competitive strategies are derived rather than being
imposed.
It also aims at highlighting the barriers that may prevent firms from
achieving and sustaining their competitive advantage. Based on the discussion
and review of related studies in the strategic management literature, particular
links between the competitive strategies and different organisational and
environmental factors have been developed. These links form organisational
coherence, as discussed earlier. Although this aspect of strategic coherence is a
major concept of this study, two other aspects are also considered; competitive
coherence and cognitive coherence. These aspects have been integrated in this
study into a conceptual framework that is used as a vehicle to understand the
barriers that may prevent firms from achieving their competitive advantage.
This research also empirically tests and identifies the existence of the
different competitive strategies. It also tests and determines the barriers that may
prevent firms (in different industries) from achieving and sustaining their
competitive advantage. Then it seeks to provide a sound empirical basis that
would contribute to the competitive advantage and generic strategy (strategic
management) literature.
The empirical results reported here suggest that, broadly speaking, four
competitive strategies (price leadership, low cost differentiation, imitation and
differentiation) are possible and stable. The results also indicate that high-
performing firms, in food and petrochemical industries, have more strategic
coherence than medium and low-performing firms. The results also suggest that
high-performing firms are able not only to achieve their competitive advantage
but also to sustain it over time. Moreover, in each industry, firms with different
competitive strategies have different barriers to achieving their competitive
advantage. These results are consistent with those reported in the existing
literature, lending support to the view that western strategy models seem to be
applicable to developing countries such as Saudi Arabia.
This research is of special significance to Saudi Arabia. It addresses an
issue that has never been addressed before, namely the study of how
organisations achieve and sustain competitive advantage and the presence of
major barriers that may prevent Saudi Arabian firms from achieving and
sustaining their competitive advantage. It is anticipated that the results of this
study will be especially beneficial to Saudi Arabian firms.
1.4 Organisation of the study
This study is organised in eleven chapters. The first and second chapters
are introductory. The second chapter gives an overview of the Saudi Arabia
economy and its markets. It provides the reader with a better understanding of
the Saudi economic structure and the development of this economy. It also
discusses in more detail the two industries that will be investigated in this study.
The third and fourth chapters discuss the subject of competitive
advantage and competitive strategies. The third chapter discusses the market
link (position) approaches. Then it develops four foundations of competitive
advantage, and links particular foundations to develop the four competitive
strategies. The fourth chapter discusses resource-based approaches. It
emphasises the sustainability of competitive advantage and the characteristics of
competency.
The fifth and sixth chapters discuss the potential barriers to achieving
competitive advantage. The fifth chapter discusses internal factors that may act
as barriers to achieving competitive advantage. The emphasis of this chapter is
on control processes which affect day-to-day actions as well as the formulation
and implementation of the firm's competitive strategy. These control processes
are classified into two general categories: formal and informal. Different
elements are discussed under these general categories. All of these elements
developed in this chapter will be linked to the competitive strategies developed
in the earlier chapters. The sixth chapter discusses the external factors that may
act as barriers to achieving competitive advantage. Different environmental
factors are discussed in this chapter, then linked to the competitive strategies
developed in the earlier chapters.
The seventh chapter discusses the research methodology. It discusses the
procedures that have been used for achieving the research objectives and testing
its framework.
Findings of the empirical work are presented in Chapters eight, nine and
ten. Chapter eight presents an aggregate analysis of the data and the statistical
findings of the survey in three major sections: (1) descriptive results concerning
the response rate and the characteristics of the firms and managers that have
been investigated, (2) the hypotheses to be tested concerning the performance
levels and the competitive strategies and (3) discussion of firms with unclear
competitive strategies. Chapter nine deals with an aggregate analysis (i.e. in the
two investigated industries, food and petrochemical) of the different aspects of
strategic coherence (competitive, cognitive and organisational coherence). At
the same time, it examines barriers to achieving competitive advantage in both
industries. Chapter ten presents a detailed analysis of the different aspects of
strategic coherence as well as the barriers to achieving competitive advantage in
the two industries, i.e. food and petrochemical, which have been investigated in
this research. It examines the different barriers that may exist in each industry
for firms with different competitive strategies; at the same time this chapter
compares these results. The final chapter provides a summary and a conclusion




This chapter will provide the reader with a better understanding of the
Saudi economy in general and the business environment in particular, as well as
the advantages that Saudi Arabia (SA) possesses. It will discuss briefly the
points which are related to the subject of this research. This study takes the case
of two different industries (petrochemical and food) in Saudi Arabia, as will be
discussed later. Therefore, the importance of discussing these points gives a
background and a better understanding of the discussions of later chapters.
The material in this chapter will be presented in three major sections. In
the following section, selected elements of the general environment such as the
stock market, population and labour, and special credit institutions established
by the government will be discussed. The next section will describe and discuss
the Saudi economic structure (oil sector, non-oil government sector, and non-oil
private sector). Finally, two different industries in the non-oil private sector
which are petrochemicals and food will be emphasised in detail in the third
section. The different characteristics of these two industries will provide a good
representation of the Saudi economy.
2.2 General environment factors
A general overview of Saudi economic development will be introduced
in this section. It will then be followed by some examples of selected
environmental factors (stock market, population and labour, and special credit
institution) related to the subject of this study. Reasons for this selection will be
given when appropriate.
The year 1970 marked a new era in the history of development in Saudi
Arabia. In this year the first five-year Development Plan (1970-1975) was
approved. In 1973 a major change took place in Saudi economic and political
development when the oil prices increased sharply. This increase in oil prices
provided the country with an unexpectedly huge income which encouraged the
Saudi government to go ahead with its ambitious plans to expedite the
implementation process of its Development Plans. The domestic planners faced
the challenge of maintaining a steady modernisation programme while reducing
the dependence on foreign manpower. To complete this huge task when oil
revenues remain a viable financial resource, Saudi planners have organised the
development process into a series of five-year plans.
Since 1970, four development plans were implemented, and the fifth
development plan of 1990-1995 is now in process. The first comprehensive
five-year economic development plan was approved. It invested 41.3 billion
Saudi Riyals (SR) between 1970-1975 and provided for building infrastructure,
with high priority being given to improving and expanding the transportation
network, seaports and airports, health care and educational system, and it
established many government projects and facilities (El Mallalch, 1982).
Execution of the development plans between the 1970 and 1990 led to
an economic boom in the country in the 1970's and early-1980's. There are
many advantages that the Saudi market now possesses; for example, the
Kingdom's comparative advantage as a manufacturing base lies in the
availability of cheap energy and low-priced local feedstock already produced at
existing petrochemical plants. The presence of modern infrastructure, wide-
ranging industrial incentives and subsidies, as well as the availability of capital
funding, are added advantages (Azzam, 1993).
Government expenditures multiplied several times, and employment
increased significantly in both the public and private sectors. The Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) has also increased. In this improving economy, many
Saudi Arabian people began new businesses and established new companies
and others expanded their establishments (Ministry of Planning, 1990).
Luqmani et al. (1989) argue that with a stable government and dominant public
sector; the Saudi environment typifies conditions in which a firm's strategy
needs to be in accord with government plans and priorities. Luqmani et al. also
argue that insights are gained by utilising a framework of resource spending; in
this respect they conceptualised the development of the Saudi economy in three
phases: Revenue phase (1973-1981), characterised by enormous funds available
to the government to embark on ambitious projects. Revenue deficit phase
(1981-1986), just as the increase of the oil prices was sudden so was the
decrease starting in 1983, where the government response to this decrease was
by reworking many of its original plans. Finally, the Revenue balance phase
(1986-), where the precipitous decline in oil revenues ended and prices
stabilised.
Finally, NCB Economist (1995) reports that SA is the largest market for
foreign goods and services in the Middle East and one of the top fifteen
importers in the world. In 1994, about SR 88 billion ($23 billion) worth of
goods were imported from the rest of the world. Saudi Arabia also paid for
services rendered by foreign companies working in the Kingdom close to SR 98
billion ($26 billion). Compared with industrial countries, SA imported more
goods and services than Greece, Portugal, Ireland and New Zealand. On the
other hand, total Saudi exports reached SR 156 billion ($41.6) in 1994. The
drop in oil prices, from the average of $17 a barrel for Brent crude in 1993 to an
average of $15.8 a barrel in 1994, brought forth lower oil export revenues at a
time when non-oil exports, mainly petrochemical, surged to SR 16.8 billion
($4.5 billion), from SR 14.2 billion ($3.8 billion) in 1993. Oil, petroleum and
other mineral product constitutes the bulk of Saudi exports, accounting for
91.4% of the total, petrochemical products including plastics account for 5.3%,
reports 0.8%, and other commodities 2.5%. The major market for SA's exports
is Asia (mainly Japan and other South East Asian Countries), which are counts
for 38% of total exports, followed by Western Europe (23%), North America
(18.3%) and the GCC Countries (6.5%).
2.2.1 Stock market
The stock market is an essential pre-requisite for the financial and
economic development of any country. This is specially true for those countries
where the dominant role of the state in economic and corporate life is gradually
being diminished and there are plans, as will be discussed later, for selling off
state companies, as is the case of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, however, has the
largest stock market in the Arab world in terms of capitalisation.
Stock market listing in Saudi Arabia has increased substantially in the
last decade from 37 joint stock companies with combined paid-up capital of SR
21.2 million ($5.7 million) in 1980, to 78 companies by the end of 1992, with a
total capital of SR 65 billion ($17.3 billion). Four banks, one investment
company and two industrial companies tapped the market for additional capital
in the last two years, issuing around 32.7 million of new shares. Electricity
companies accounted for the biggest share of total market capitalisation at 44%,
followed by industrial firms (including cement companies) at 33%, services at
12.3%, banks at 7.9% and agricultural companies at 2.7%.
Of the listed joint stock companies not more than 57 are publicly traded:
8 agricultural companies, 13 services companies, 13 industrial companies, 7
cement companies, 5 utility companies, and 11 financial companies. Shares in
Saudi companies may be traded only by the Saudi citizens, except in some
circumstances, such as the 1984 Saudi Basic Industry Corporation (SABIC)
issue when specified portions were made available to Gulf Co-operation
Council (GCC) citizens.
A decree issued by Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 1985
ruled that all trading in stock had to be done through banks using a cumbersome
system of telex and telephone calls. Also in 1985 the Saudi Share Registration
Company was formed and capitalised at SR 11 million, with equal shares held
by all banks in the Kingdom. The company acts as an integrated central registry
for all shares traded in the market. More recently, SAMA has instituted reform
aimed at boosting trade but its main move, the opening of a central trading hall
in May, 1987, was abruptly cancelled. A new screen trading system (ESIS), was
introduced in 1990. Officially, brokers are not allowed to be active participants
in the Saudi market and banks are forbidden to act as market makers.
The depth of the market, i.e. the value of the shares traded as a
percentage of total market value of shares outstanding, has generally been low
by international standards, averaging less than 5% for many years before rising
to around 10% in 1992. The reasons for the thinness of trading and the
shallowness of the market are varied. For one thing, not more than 38% of the
shares of the joint stock companies are held by individuals and are available for
trading. The rest are held mostly by the government, public sector institutions
and foreign entities (holding mainly bank shares); and most of these shares are
not traded. Another reason is the concentration of ownership of shares in few
hands, with the large Saudi trading families having up to 20% of these shares
held by the Saudi private sector (NCB Economist, 1993).
2.2.2 Population and labour
Even though the population of Saudi Arabia is about 15 million people,
the per capita income is among the highest in the world. Despite the woeful
statistics about declining oil revenue, the Saudi Arabia market, with its
burgeoning middle class of sophisticated consumers, presents a tremendous
chance for all firms (Martin, 1989). Saudi Arabia's social structure is one of the
more homogenous states of the Middle East, virtually all of the native
population is Arab and Muslim.
Azzam (1993) discusses major trends that may shape the Kingdom's
consumer markets during the 1990's, and it may also help firms in formulating
as well as implementing their competitive strategies. Among these are:
(1) the steadily growing range of locally produced goods, especially goods
made by joint ventures between local and international producers, which are
favoured in government purchasing and protected from outside competition
when necessary;
(2) significant socio-economic changes at the family level, such as smaller
family units, and
(3) changing demographic profile of the national population. A high population
growth rate means that Saudi Arabia has a very youthful demographic profile,
with around 50% of the population under 15 years of age, and more citizens
will be entering the labour force in the 1990's. Arguably they will be better
educated, more sophisticated, and better informed about what is available in the
market place.
Education and training programmes play a vital role in building up well-
qualified cadres for the enhancement of the development process. Therefore, the
government devoted considerable attention to promoting the standard of
education services and training programmes to meet the requirements of rapid
developments witnessed by the Kingdom in various fields. This was reflected in
the appropriation for this sector in the Fifth Development Plan (1990-1995)
which amounted to SR 140 billion, or 18% of the total projected expenditure.
The number of students enrolled at various levels of general education
during 1991 stood at three million; about 133,000 students enrolled at the
various institutions of higher education. In addition to general and higher
education there are technical education, vocational education and training
centres and institutes. Each includes different fields. For example, the technical
education includes four fields, namely industrial, commercial, agricultural and
technical assistance education. In the industrial field, for example, there is the
higher technical institute in Riyadh; there are 6 intermediate technical colleges;
there are 8 secondary industrial institutions.
Furthermore, in addition to the availability of manpower qualified to
draw and implement developments plans, Saudi Arabia as a developing country
has its own research and technology centres that contribute to the modernisation
process. For example, King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology
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(KACST) which was established in 1979 has contributed to the development of
SA in terms of research by awarding 315 grants in the field of scientific
research amounting to around SR 267 million.
Another example of the Saudi educational and training programmes is
the Saudi Consulting House which refers back to 1964 when it was established
as an affiliation to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The present
objectives of the SCH aim to provide consultancy services in all aspects of
industrial sectors, beginning from preliminary studies, marketing studies and
economic feasibility studies, and ending up with operation of engineering
designs for new factories or expansions of new ones. Thus, as Hafiz (1982)
noted, the Kingdom's development structure and its complete programme to
train and employ the domestic work force serves as a model other developing
nations could follow.
2.2.3 Special credit institutions
•
The government started special credit institutions and specialised
programmes to provide interest-free loans to the private sector for establishment
and development. All working firms in SA may take advantage of the credit
institutions and specialised programmes that were established by the
government to support the development of the private sector. These institutions
include: Saudi Agricultural Development Fund, SADF (established in 1962),
for providing loans and credit facilities for the development of agriculture and
related activities. Saudi Industrial Development Fund, SIDF (established in
1974) for providing medium or long-term to new or existing industrial
establishments. Saudi Public Investment Fund, SPIF (established in 1971)for
financing and taking equity shares in large-scale public projects in commerce
and industry. Saudi Real Estate Development Fund, SRDF (established in 1974)
for setting up real-estate projects for private and commercial used.
Table 2.1: Loans distributed by SIDF classified by sectors (M. SR)
Sector 1989 % 1990 % 1991 % Cumulative
Total
%
Food commodities 84.8 10.3 21.7 3.3 42.9 4.2 1,024.4 7.3
Beverages 20.0 2.4 15.6	 , 2.4 6.1 0.6 401.0 2.9
Textiles 27.6 3.4 30.4 4.7 71.1 6.9 289.9 2.1
Leather products 4.2 0.5 1.7 0.3 4.5 0.4 34.1 0.2
Wood products -- - -- - -- -- 21.5 0.2
Wood furniture 1.2 0.1 11.9 1.8 16.3 1.6 125.4 0.9
Paper products 18.5 2.3 55.9 8.6 47.3 4.6 447.0 3.2
Printing materials
-- - -- - -- -- 167.7 1.2
Chemical products 431.6 52.6 254.8 39.3 456.2 44.3 2,323.2 16.7
Gas 52.6 6.4 26.1 4.0 3.1 0.3 363.3 2.6
Rubber products
-- - -- - -- - 16.9 0.1
Plastics products 25.2 3.1 35.9 5.5 49.6 4.8 527.3 3.8
Ceramic products 2.1 0.3 2.7 0.4 2.3 0.2 138.5 1.0
Glass products 1.1 0.1 48.3 7.5 61.7 6.0 263.8 1.9
Cement
-- - -- - -- - 3,407.8 24.4
Other construction materials 1.9 0.2 1.5 0.2 1.0 0.1 1,663.0 11.9
Metal products 96.5 11.8 115.1 17.8 194.2 18.9 1,540.6 11.0
Machines 8.3 1.0 5.5 0.8 9.9 1.0 271.2 1.9
Electric equipment 41.8 5.1 13.3 2.1 9.5 0.9 521.5 3.7
Transport equipment
-- -- 2.9 0.4 52.6 5.1 275.7 2.0
Other products 3.9 0.5 4.6 0.7 0.7 0.1 52.4 0.4
Shipping -- - -- - -- - 60.0 0.4
Total 820.9 100 648.0 100 1,029 100 13,945.2 100
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual Report (1991).
Total investment credit disbursed by all public financial institutions
recorded a steep growth from 15 million Saudi Reyal (SR) in 1969 to a peak of
SR 26.6 billion in 1982. In view of the reduced credit needs, and overall
economic situation, disbursements were gradually reduced in subsequent years
and amounted to SR 4.8 billion in 1989. Cumulative loans distributed by the
SIDF, for example, during the 1991 fiscal year stood at SR 1,029 million, as
illustrated in Table 2.1.
Cumulative loans distributed by SIDF up to the end of 1991 fiscal year
exceeded SR 13.9 billion, of which the cement sector accounted for the highest
with 24.4%, followed by chemicals materials 16.7%, construction materials
11.9%, metal products 11%, and foodstuffs 7.3%. Total disbursement to these
sectors constituted 71.2% of cumulative loans distributed by SIDF. The total
investment distributed by SIDF is SR 50.5 billion. The specialised funding
programme which extends loans to Saudi contractors, private hospitals, hotels,
bakeries and newspaper rose from SR 1 million in 1972 to SR 636 million in
1979 and declined to SR 22 million in 1989 (Ministry of Planning, 1990a).
2.3 Structure of the Saudi Economy
The Saudi economy can be divided into three general sectors: oil sector,
non-oil government sector, and non-oil private sector. Since oil is a depletable
natural resource, Saudi Arabia was very concerned to take advantage of this
temporary richness to develop the country through generous spending in the
public sector and its programmes, and in the private sector and its subsectors.
The share of the oil sector's contribution to total real Gross Domestic Fixed
Capital (GDFC) in 1990 was 43.4%. The share of the non-oil government
sector was 2.3% in 1990, while the non-oil private sector increased from 44.9%
in 1961 to 54.3% in 1990 (Ministry of Planning, 1990).
Although the non-oil private sector is more related to the subject of this
study, the other two sectors are related to each other as well as to the non-oil
private sector. Therefore, before discussing the non-oil private sector in detail, a
brief discussion will be given on the oil sector and non-oil government sector.
The discussion of these sectors will provide the reader with a general view of
the Saudi economic structure, related to this study, and the relationships that
exist among all these sectors. It will also show the effect of the oil sector and
the non-oil government sector on the non-oil private sector, as well as the
support and the advantage that these sectors may provide to the non-oil private
sector.
2.3.1 Oil sector
This sector is concerned with oil production. Saudi oil output of crude
oil averaged about 6.5 million b/d from 1962 to 1991. Three oil companies are
involved in oil production in Saudi Arabia: Arabian American Oil Company
(Aramco), Getty Oil Company, and the Arabian Oil Company. The Saudi
Aramco accounted for the bulk of the kingdom's production. Saudi Arabia
constituted about 13% of world production and 25% of world trade in 1991. By
2000, the country will account for as much as 15% of world production and
30% of world trade. The oil industry remains the mainspring of the Saudi
economy, accounting for 35% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990.
This is according to the 1991 Oil Survey released by the US Embassy in Riyadh
(Middle East Executive Reports, 1991).
Before the discovery of oil, Saudi Arabia was a very poor country.
Today, oil income has made SA known in the world as a rich country. The
development of the oil industry in SA actually goes back to 1923, when a
London financial syndicate obtained a concession covering more than 300,000
square miles in the east of SA, but could not persuade any oil company to take
the risk of exploring for the oil. The 1933 contract with SOCAL was more
productive. SOCAL established a new subsidiary by the name of California
Arabian Standard Oil (which later changed to Aramco). In 1939, as oil began to
be discovered in quantities, it was shipped from the Kingdom (Arabian
American Oil Company 'Aramco' handbook, 1968). In 1977 Saudi oil revenue
amounted to $36,540 million, reaching its highest in 1981, at $102,095.2
million, and $31,122.2 in 1991. Therefore, the key to the rapid development of
the Saudi nation in general was oil. However, this natural resource faces many
potential risks, such as the fluctuation of its price, the possibility of synthetic
substitutes, and its slow but sure depletion. Hence, Saudi Arabia has to
industrialise its country quickly to decrease these economic risks.
2.3.2 Non-oil government sector
This sector primarily consists of government ministries, agencies and
public organisations. The government plays a major role in the development of
the country as a whole. Saudi Arabia has been following a new development
strategy in recent years, with the main emphasis on industrialisation and
economic diversification. Consequently, public sector-led growth and
overdependence on oil are gradually giving way to private sector initiatives and
the build-up of a diversified production base (Azzam, 1993). The establishment
by the government of the special credit institutions (as has been discussed
earlier) is one way of supporting the private sector. The huge government
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revenues and expenditure are another indicator of the strength/health of the
Saudi economy.
The involvement of private companies with the non-oil government
sector is through contracting with the government bodies for various projects.
These projects include, but are not necessarily limited to: construction projects
(e.g. building and housing, airports, roads, bridges, dams, seaports, water
supply, and sewage systems), electrical projects (e.g. the construction and
operation of power generators and electrical systems), and mechanical projects
(e.g. the construction and operation of water desalination plants). More projects
covering other areas include service, operating, maintenance and so on.
Due to this huge government revenue and spending, firms in the private
sector may be required to respond to the changes in the government sector;
Luqmani et al. (1989) conclude the Saudi environment typifies conditions in
which a firm's strategies need to be in accord with government plans and
priorities. Emphasising the importance of the government sector, especially
development plans, Anastos et al. (1980) suggest that. Western companies
contemplating doing business in the Kingdom should direct their proposals to
the sectors of the economy stressed in the development plan. However, with the
decline of the oil price in the recent years, private firms may need to diversify
into activities that are independent of government expenditure.
The government plays a major role in strengthening the competitiveness
of Saudi industry through measures that will enable Saudi producers to compete
effectively with imported goods in the domestic market and to increase and
broaden their penetration of export markets. Policies to increase productivity,
such as improving the skill levels of the labour force and introducing more
advanced technology, are a high priority in the government's Fifth Plan (1990-
1995). With the increase of national revenues, the government instituted five-
yearly development plans, the first running from 1970. In 1974, however, when
the oil revenues became available, the government started some funds to
provide interest-free loans for the establishment and development of the
different private sectors.
Moreover, the government states in its Fifth Development Plan (1990-
1995) four major strategies for the development of the private sector in SA:
1 Encourage private sector participation in a broader range of
activities. Government policy is to open progressively to the private
sector areas that are currently in the government domain. This is in
addition to the increased investment that the government will put into
some public services, such as primary and secondary education.
2 Encourage competition among Saudi producers. Programmes will be
introduced in the Fifth Plan to enhance the overall competitive position
of the private sector through macroeconomics and sectoral policies,
including export promotion, encouraging joint veritures, investment to
upgrade the technology base, and expansion of productivity focused on
business services.
3 Develop the domestic financial market. Effectively functioning
financial markets are a prerequisite for achieving the Fifth Plan's
investment objectives, and hence, those of economic development and
diversification. Although the Kingdom's financial system has undergone
some important changes in recent years, the government emphasises that
the existing institutions and markets will need to be expanded.
4	 Strengthen private business capabilities. A strong private sector
depends on both attractive investment opportunities and on the ability of
private sector companies to effectively operate in a competitive
environment to pursue these opportunities. The Kingdom has a number
of large companies that are fully capable of competing with businesses
anywhere in the world. However, the skills and the business
sophistication necessary to do so are not widely spread in the private
sector. Therefore, the policies which will be pursued to strengthen
business capabilities, broadly within the private sector, include: creation
of information programmes to help the business community identify
general opportunities, education programmes to increase knowledge of
business issues and practices, measures to increase the absorption of
technology into the economy, and technical assistance support
programmes for small/medium-scale enterprises (Ministry of Planning,
1990, pp. 142-143).
The Saudi government plan to privatise some of its holdings. The
objectives of the Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000) which started in January
1995 make clear the need to draw the private sector into the management of
public utilities and other basic industries. The Kingdom already has some form
of joint public and private participation in 37 quoted companies, including the
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) in which the government share
70%.
2.3.3 Non-oil private sector
All firms, whether they are Saudi or non -Saudi, working in commerce,
manufacturing, agriculture, services or any other activities excluding the
activities of the previous two sectors, are required to register with the Saudi
commercial registration office which is part of the Ministry of Commerce.
Statistical indicators show that the accumulated number of companies and
establishments operating in the Kingdom and registered with Saudi Ministry of
Commerce at the end of 1991 reached 314,725. They conduct their business in
various towns and cities of the Kingdom; Table 2.2 illustrates their distribution
in the Kingdom's five regions. The increased number of these companies and
establishments seems to reflect the development of the Saudi market; it also
indicates the increase of government spending on the development plans and its
support of the private sectors.
The private sector has traditionally been the focus of economic activity
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In response to the government's planning
initiatives and its firm commitment to private enterprise, the private sector has:
* steadily expanded its role in the economy;
* taken advantage of periods of rapid economic growth;
* demonstrated impressive resilience during times of overall economic
stagnation;
* continued to expand and diversify throughout the past two decades;
* increased its investment sevenfold in real terms, and
* increased its employment by 3.9 million (Fifth Development Plan 1990-95).
Table 2.2: Individual proprietorship and firms registered in the
Kingdom. 
Province 1989 % 1990 % 1991 "A Cumulative
Total
%
Central 5,668 27.3 7,999 30.8 9,661 30.0 96,596 30.7
Western 8,332 40.1 9,773 37.6 13,800 42.9 116,427 37.0
Southern 1,669 8.00 1,736 6.70 2,493 7.70 22,849 7.30
Eastern 3,764 18.1 4,830 18.6 4,223 13.1 50,338 16.0
Northern 1,373 6.60 1,662 6.40 2,020 6.30 28,515 9.10
Total 20,796 100 26,000 100 32,197 100. 314,725 100.
Source: Ministry of Commerce (1991).
In terms of industrial structure, the latest available industrial survey,
carried out in January 1990 by the Saudi Consulting House (SCH), and the
Ministry of Industry and Electricity, covered 1,569 industrial enterprises across
the Kingdom. The distribution of these enterprises by industry and region is
given in Table 2.3. Around half of the industries covered by the survey was
found in three major groups: building material industry (297 enterprises), metal
industry (307 enterprises), and food and beverage industry (250 enterprises).
The table also shows that the largest concentration is in the Central Region
(36.8%), followed respectively by the West Region (30%), the Eastern Region
(26.2%), the Southern Region (4.1%) and the Northern Region (2.3%).
Table 2.3: Number of factories operating in SA.
Type of
products
















101 20.7 53 12.7 12 18.2 10 27.8 250
2 1 13 2.7 5 1.2 -- -- -- -- 39
Wood products &
Furniture
27 4.6 15 3.1 20 4.8 -- -- 2 5.6 64
Paper products &
printing.
43 7.4 40 8.2 21 5.0 4 6.1 3 8.3 111
Basic
petrochemical
40 6.8 45 9.2 57 13.7 2 3.0 1 2.8 145
Tyres and Plastics 33 5.6 41 8.4 30 7.2 4 6.1 6 16.7 114
Ceramics and glass 9 1.5 11 2.2 11 2.6 -- -- -- -- 31
Other Construction
Products
110 18.8 66 13.5 79 18.9 33 50.0 9 25.0 297
Metal Industries
Machinery &
128 21.9 83 17.0 83 19.9 10 15.2 3 8.3 307
Equipment 74 12.6 48 9.8 48 11.5 1 1.5 1 2.8 172
Other Industries 26 4.4 26 5.3 10 2.4 -- -- 1 2.8 63
Total Industries 585 100 489 100 417 100 66 100 36 100 1593
Source: Industrial survey for the year 1990 (1410H) carried out by the Saudi
Consulting House, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Nov. 1991.
In terms of the size of the operating manufacturing firms in Saudi
Arabia, the cumulative number of operating manufacturing industrial firms,
licensed under the Regulation for Protection and Promotion of National
Industries and Foreign Capital Investment Regulation in the Kingdom, reached
2,036 at the end of 1992. The capital investment of these firms stood at SR
138.5 billion. They also provided employment for about 175,000 workers in
various industrial activities (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual Report,
1992). 319 firms from these manufacturing firms are listed under food and
beverage and 342 are listed under petrochemical and plastics, where the
investment was 7877.2 and 90,500.5 million SR, respectively. Based on
published statistics of the Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1994) about
manufacturing firms in these two industries (i.e. food, and petrochemical) in
Saudi Arabia, it has been found that the average number of employees is 100.
The results of this study suggest that 62% of the food and petrochemical firms
have between 100-500 employees and 27% of them have between 500-1000
employees, as discussed in Chapter 8.
2.4 Selected industries in SA
2.4.1 Food and agricultural industry
The food and beverage manufacturing sector is an important growing
area of the economy in SA. It also influences other sectors of industry,
including raw materials and packing. Local food manufacturing and agricultural
production contributed to a sharp reduction in imports of foodstuff into the
Kingdom. As a result, Saudi Arabia is now self-sufficient in a number of
important food items ( Saudi Industrial Development Fund, Annual Report,
1993).
The expansion of agricultural production over the past ten years has
been one of the remarkable successes of the entire development effort in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The importance of establishing a viable agriculture
sector that is capable of self-sustained growth over the long term was
recognised early in the Kingdom's development planning process. Azzam














lies in downstream industries such as high technology, selective consumer
goods, food-related industries, and services.
The Ministry of Industry and Electricity recorded 900 active licences for
food products by the end of 1994, accounting for 17% of all active licences
issued up to the end of 1994. Dairy is the food sector with the largest number of
licences. Other important areas are bakery, confectionery and beverages, as
shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: 
Industrial licences issued to the food manufacturing sector by sub-
sectors until the end of 1994
Source: Saudi Industrial Development Fund, Annual Report, 1993.
During the Fourth Plan period (1985-1990), the value added in
agriculture grew at the high average annual rate of 13.8%, compared to 8.7%
during the Third Plan and the target rate of 6% for the Fourth Plan. As a result,
agriculture's share of GDP increased from 3.4% in 1984-1985 to 8% in 1989,
while its share of the non-oil GDP amounted to 10.4% in 1989.
The production of some food items, especially agricultural products, has
reached a high rate of self-sufficiency in SA. For example:
Total wheat production rose at an annual average rate of 30.1% from 26
thousand tons in 1970 to about 3.3 million tons in 1988. The production of
fruits and vegetables has increased significantly since 1970. The production of
dates grew from 240 thousand tons to 518 thousand tons in 1989, representing
an average annual rate of increase of 4.5%. The production of grapes increased
from 24 thousand tons to 96 thousand tons in the same period. The production
of tomatoes grew at an average annual rate of 7.2%, increasing from 100
thousand tons in 1970 to 437 thousand tons in 1989.
The private sector has responded positively to the range of support
measures introduced by the government, such as the Agriculture Development
Fund support of the private sector in this industry as discussed earlier.
Moreover, the growth of agricultural output has been mainly due to the price
support policy and other incentives provided by the government, as well as the
adoption of modern fanning techniques. The Kingtom has gone from being a
net importer of such basic foods as wheat, dairy product, eggs, poultry, meat,
fish and vegetables to becoming a net exporter of these products.
Firms in food and agricultural production take advantage of interest-free
loans from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF). By the end of 1993,
SIDF has approved 230 food loans for a total of SR 2,560 million, accounting
for 15% of loans by number and 12% by value. Based on the SIDF annual
report (1993), the outlook for the food and beverage industry in the Kingdom is
very encouraging. A growing and increasingly young population will continue a
sizeable year-on-year increase in demand for both staple and added-value food
items. Additionally, the success of the Kingdom's agricultural industry will lead
to demand for more food processing facilities in order to export surplus
production of various commodities. There remain several areas for import
substitution. Food imports amount to almost SR 15,000 million annually and
fall into five distinctive groups: cereals such as rice and barely; horticulture
such as fruit juice, orange and banana; bulk products for processing or
repackaging such as sugar and vegetable oil; livestock such as sheep and beef;
and processed food such as jam and pickles. These categories all offer
opportunities to the Saudi food industry.
2.4.3 Petrochemicals sector
We discussed in previous sections the importance of the oil sector to the
Saudi economy. One of the advantages that Saudi Arabia has is the availability
of the natural resources (specially oil and natural gas) that give the opportunity
to provide and protect the supply of the cheap raw materials for the
petrochemical industry. This opportunity may put the production in the best
competitive position in the international market. The Gulfregion will retain and
probably strengthen this advantage during the 1990s as oil and naphtha price
increases continue to trouble producers in industrialised countries (Young,
1991). The existence of great oil reserves in the country may also protect the
future continuation of petrochemical projects. Moreover, the experience of SA
in the production and industry of oil for more than fifty years, make the
petrochemical projects the heart of the Saudi drive to industrialise and
modernise the economy.
Petrochemicals' rapid expansion of production capacity, together with
successful penetration of foreign export markets, result in real growth rates for
the petrochemicals sector exceeding 50% annually during the period 1985-
1990. Saudi Arabia today is a major supplier to world markets for many
important petrochemical products. The sector entered the Fifth Plan operating at
full capacity. Some expansion of capacity is expected in the early part of the
Plan, but capacity constraints and world market conditions will slow output
growth to a round 8% per year during the next five years (Fifth Development
Plan).
Of total manufacturing value added, petrochemical industries generate
about 22%, petroleum refining accounts for 40% of total manufacturing value-
added, while other manufacturing industries (which include consumer products,
chemicals, cement, building materials, engineering products, and so on) account
for the remaining 38 percent. The industrial sector employs about 6.4% of the
total labour force (Ministry of Planning, 1993).
The Kingdom's basic petrochemical industry has succeeded in gaining
access to world markets, despite the obstacles that were met at its initial stage of
development, in the form of limited national expertise in international
marketing, and other obstacles at the international levels, which this study
intends to investigate further. The Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC)
has brought seven new petrochemical plants into operation. An additional 264
plants in other manufacturing industries were constructed. The Kingdom's
exports of petrochemical products rose from about SR 816 million in 1984 to
over SR 10 billion in 1989. The production of chemical fertilisers, for example,
reached about 3 million tons in 1992, which has grown at an average annual
rate of 16.1% over the period 1970-1992. In Anderson's (1992) interview with
Marketing Director of SABIC, he stated that by the year 2000, the Middle East
will account for 6.5% of the world's ethylene capacity, up from 4.9% in 1990.
In the 1990's, the Marketing Director expects world ethylene capacity to
increase 50%. However, the capacity of the US, Japan, and Western Europe
will rise by less than 1/3, although capacity in the rest of the world will double.
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The Marketing Director believes if a region has the feedstocks, the financial
capability, and the nerve to plunge into previously uncharted waters, then it
should press its economic advantage. Under its current investment strategy,
SABIC hopes to capture a 4% to 5% share of world chemical markets.
The creation of a viable industrial base, which will reduce Kingdom's
reliance on oil revenues as the main source of income, has been a corner stone
in the economic development strategy of SA. For the development of the basic
industries related to oil derivatives, such as petrochemical and minerals, the
Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu established the two major industrial
cities at Jubail and Yanbu. The transformation of desert into these two bustling
cities over the last decade is a testimony to the Government's continuing
commitment to establish a diversified industrial base. Through their activities
SA is expected to meet 5-6% of the world demand for petrochemicals (Ministry
of Planning, 1993).
2.5 Conclusion
This introductory chapter provides the reader with a better understanding
of the Saudi Arabian economy and its structure. Saudi Arabia went through an
accelerating development from the early-1970's when the price of oil increased
sharply. This chapter also provides useful information about the size and some
characteristics of the Saudi market in general and, in particular, in the food and
petrochemical industries.
The Saudi government plays a major role in the development of the
Saudi Arabian economy with special attention to the private sector. In addition
to different facilities (such as free lands, training and others), the government
•
provide the private sector with free of interest loans for their establishment and
development.
The government recognises the importance of establishing a viable food
industry that can make the country self-sufficient in the long term. Large
investment, from the private sectors, took the advantage of the government
support and went to the food industry in the last fifteen years. Taking advantage
of natural resources, the petrochemical industry was also growing in Saudi
Arabia. Many of the Saudi Arabian firms used this advantage to establish their
competitive position both nationally and internationally. These two industries





Each organisation, within any industry, needs to have some competitive
advantage over its competitors, in order to maintain its position successfully
over time. Competitive advantage is defined as a "factor that allows one
business to be more profitable than its competitors" (Hayden, 1986). Day and
Wensley (1988) also observe that the notion that superior performance requires
a business to gain and hold an advantage over competitors is central to
contemporary strategic thinking.
A firm needs an appropriate competitive strategy that provides it with
the ability to achieve and sustain its competitive advantage. Porter's (1980,
1985) definition of competitive strategy is how to position a company in its
competitive environment in a way that allows it to gain advantage against its
competitors. Firms can achieve their competitive advantage by linking strategy
to the internal environment of the organisation and/or to the external
environment. Therefore, the achievement of competitive advantage could be
seen from different angles. Two major approaches to achieving competitive
advantage will be discussed in this study. The first approach takes the view that
the source of the firm's competitive advantage is based on the characteristics of
the industry as well as the firm's position within the industry through the choice
of generic strategies. This approach argues that the firm can gain its competitive
advantage by offering a set of unique products or low cost products, or by
serving a particular segment of the market (customer). Therefore, competitive
advantage in this approach is more ascribed to external characteristics than to
the firm's idiosyncratic competencies and resource-based deployments. The
second approach looks at the firm in terms of its resources and competency as
its sources of competitive advantage (this approach will be discussed in more
details in the next chapter). It is worth noting, however, that the two approaches
are complementary, with one explaining the value of competitive outcomes in
the product market, the other dynamic aspects of the firm's behaviour with
regard to the accumulation and disposition of the firm's resources (Collis, 1991).
For example, most resources can be used in several products and markets; at the
same time, products and markets may require the service of several resources.
These approaches, which are the resource-based and the product market,
represent the internal and external analyses that the earliest researchers
identified as the basis of good strategy formulatidn (Learned et al, 1961;
Andrews, 1971).
This chapter is organised as follows: The next section examines the
nature of generic strategies as usually presented in the strategic management
literature. Then various common elements of this literature are pulled together
which allows an alternative conceptualisation of a generic strategies' framework
to be developed. This development will be based on Porter's (1980, 1985) work
on generic strategies and competitive advantage.
3.2 Generic strategies
During the last decade much strategic management research centred
around work by Porter (1980, 1985). Porter's work has without doubt (and quite
rightfully) been influential in the business policy field in setting and orienting
discussion around the idea of competitive strategies. This attracted the attention
of many strategic management theorists (for example, Hambrick, 1983b;
Phillips, Change and Buzzell, 1983; Day, 1984; Dess and Davis, 1984; Karnani,
1984; Miller and Friesen, 1986a, 1986b; White, 1986; Hill, 1988; Mathur, 1988;
Bowman, 1992; Miller, 1992; Miller and Dess, 1993). Most of these researchers
recognised the importance of Porter's contributions and, at the same time, took a
frequently critical stance towards his work. Porter develops three 'generic
strategies' - cost leadership, differentiation and focused-based approaches - the
appropriate use of which will enable any company to create and defend a market
position and out-perform rivals. He argues that each of these strategies
represents a fundamentally different approach to creating and sustaining a
competitive advantage: a firm must make a choice' between them or it will
become stuck in the middle, i.e. possess no competitive advantage (Porter,
1985).
This chapter builds on this tradition a framework that accommodates the
complexities recognised by most researchers mentioned above. It is argued that
the diversity of business policies must be recognised, as suggested by Kay
(1993), which is not possible within a simple framework. Therefore, the
distinction between foundations of competitive advantage and the ways in
which these are used to develop competitive strategies will be considered in this
chapter. This separation of advantages and strategies (or foundations and
development) helps to avoid oversimplifying the idea of generic strategies.
The rest of this section surveys the literature in the area of generic
strategies. The basic idea is clear: successful competitive strategies link a firm's
products to markets to achieve and sustain a relative competitive advantage,
ensuring higher returns. Most work in this area takes Porter's seminal ideas as a
starting point, an approach that will be adopted here. Therefore, in a survey of
the vast literature in the strategic management field, Porter's three generic
strategies (cost leadership, differentiation and focus) will be discussed. The third
aspect to generic strategies is that of focus which requires a firm to apply either
cost leadership or differentiation to a narrow segment of the market to achieve
advantage. This complexity will be discussed to a lesser extent, which has no
real implications for the conclusions drawn. Moreover, to draw the threads of
the argument together attention will be focused on Porter's idea of "stuck in the
middle".
3.2.1 Cost leadership
According to Porter (1985), cost leadership is one of two broad generic
strategies that a firm might adopt. It involves setting out to become the lowest
cost producer in an industry while maintaining average levels of differentiation.
The means of achieving this advantage are various, depending on the structure
of each industry and market, and they involve access to raw materials, access to
product or process technology, the pursuit of economies of scale, and
exploitation of learning and experience effects. A cost leadership strategy is
most effective in predictable and stable environments, since environments that
are unpredictable or subject to much change will create severe diseconomies for
organisations trying to pursue a cost leadership strategy (Miller, 1988). If
successful, a firm that can achieve and sustain overall cost leadership and charge
an average price will be an above-average performer in its industry. Two
important aspects of this strategy should be noted here. First, to be an above-
average performer, a cost leader must achieve parity or proximity in the bases of
differentiation relative to its competitors. It follows, therefore, that the different
generic strategies are not separate (a theme that will be discussed later as the
argument develops). Secondly, for a firm to sustain a superior performance the
sources of its cost advantage should be difficult for competitors to replicate or
imitate (Kay 1993). An implication here is that a strategy of what might be
called 'cost following' - a decision to adopt a position of second or third in a
market - may be rational, rather than just cost leadership (Dietrich and Al-
Awadh, 1993).
Reviewing the strategy literature focusing on the idea of cost leadership
indicates differences in the way in which it can be interpreted. From Porter's
work it is not clear whether cost leadership is associated with prices or not. If a
leader attains parity in terms of differentiation, it has left open the question of
price parity. Day (1984) ties the efficiency of generic strategies to different
environmental factors, and links customer price sensitivity to the viability of a
cost leadership strategy. Miller (1988) makes a strong connection between a
cost leadership strategy and low price to satisfy customer price sensitivity and
claims that users of the "cost leadership" strategy are likely to confront the least
environmental unpredictability and change, and they seek out customers who
care more about price than about image or novelty. Similarly Dess and Davis
(1984) assert that competitive pricing is highly associated with cost leadership.
Although exploiting price sensitivity increases the advantage a cost leader may
have over other competitors, Murray (1988) argues that price sensitivity is a
minor consideration that does not provide sufficient justification for adopting a
cost leadership strategy. He sees the variety of cost structures among





that a central factor here will be non-imitability. A related issue is stressed in
Bowman's (1992) study, in which he distinguishes between competing on price,
which is visible to customers, and cost control as an internal competence, which
may not be visible to customers.
There are, therefore, certain problems associated with interpreting what
is meant by cost leadership, most notably whether cost leaders compete on price
(i.e. from the demand side) or through cost control (i.e. from the supply side).
Related to this are environmental and organisational characteristics that can
impinge on a cost leadership strategy. Furthermore, if competitive parity in
terms of differentiation is accepted, this is likely to have different implications
for competitive pricing and cost control in different circumstances depending on
the specific nature of demand and supply side factors and the ways in which
these interact. On the demand side the issues involved can be analysed in terms
of two dimensions: the extent to which product/service characteristics are
assessable by consumers prior to purchase; and product durability. Dietrich and






Consumer price sensitivity will be of overwhelming strategic importance
in cell 1 - and with a cost leadership strategy. At the other extreme, in cell 4,
demand side reputation effects are likely to be central (Kay, 1993) which
subverts the basis of cost leadership. Products in cell 2 are likely to be
characterised by extensive promotion (Koutsoyiannis, 1982) with implications
for, what is called below, marketing differentiation. In cell 3 consumer
information (both search and provision) is likely to be central because of
infrequent purchase. One possible response here might involve an emphasis on
(assessable) product quality. Hence, in general, we might want to talk of cost
leadership strategies (in the plural) being effective in different circumstances. Of
particular relevance for cells 2 and 3 might be the development of total quality
control systems that emphasise pursuing quality objectives (i.e. a differentiation
strategy) as an important means of lower costs through reduction in overhead
quality control costs, scrap elimination, and reworking and the like. One
possible direction to take here could involve claiming that cost leadership is
restricted to cell 1 in the above matrix, involving product and process
standardisation, with a resulting relative elimination of differentiation
possibilities. But recent developments in technological and organisational
flexibility (i.e. differentiation based on internal competencies) and market
segmentation might marginalise such a view of cost leadership. These
comments are merely suggestive, the implications involved here will be
developed and explored later in this chapter.
3.2.2 Differentiation
Porter's (1985) second generic strategy is differentiation. This strategy is
based on the idea that a strategy is unique in ways valued by buyers. This
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idiosyncrasy is more or less general depending on the degree of focus involved.
Unlike a cost leadership strategy, there might be more than one successful
differentiation strategy in a market, depending on the number of relevant
attributes. The achievement of differentiation can take different means, such as
product characteristics and/or the way a product is marketed, locational
characteristics or the delivery system; the possibilities depend on the nature of
each market. The strategy of differentiation aims to create a product or service
that customers see as unique. Differentiation often involves new technologies,
unforeseen customer and competitor reactions, and the confluence of many
unstructured marketing problems (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Miles and Snow,
1978; Miller and Friesen, 1984; and Lamont et al., 1993). Clearly successful
differentiation is usually costly, with the implication that a differentiation
strategy must maintain cost proximity with competitors. Thus, when a firm
achieves and sustains differentiation with a price premium exceeding any added
costs of being unique, it will be performing above average in its industry.
Successful differentiators, therefore, achieve superior profits through premium
pricing. Obviously, to sustain a differentiation advAntage requires barriers to
imitation by competitors and a continued perceived value to buyers.
However, differentiation is subject to different interpretations. Three
problem areas can be identified. First, there might be two or more kinds of
differentiation strategies. Miller (1986) makes a distinction between innovative
differentiation and marketing differentiation. He refers to innovating
differentiators, much like Miles and Snow's (1978) prospectors, and Miller and
Friesen's (1984) adaptive firm, as those exploiting new products and
technologies on the basis of which they may charge fairly high prices; and refers
to marketing differentiators as those offering an attractive package, good
service, convenient location, and so on. The recognition of innovative
differentiators compromises the separation of differentiation and cost leadership
strategies. Innovation which is particularly oriented towards production
processes can help reduce costs and differentiate at the same time (Bowman
1990). This problem is an aspect of a more general issue involved with the
classification of generic strategies. It will be suggested in this chapter (as
mentioned above) that competitive advantage must be separated from
competitive strategy - being 'stuck in the middle' is a problem for the latter, not
the former. Bowman's (1992) study reinforces this conclusion when he
identifies two factors as being related to a differentiation strategy: one is visible
to customers, and involves a unique product/service, and the second is
product/service development which is viewed as an internal competence and
may not be visible to buyers.
Second, Porter's assertion that differentiators achieve superior profit
through premium pricing is not universally accepted. A number of studies (such
as Hill, 1988 and Bamberger, 1989) have related the achievement of superior
profit from differentiation to those differentiators who are able to achieve
market dominance at a given price. Porter himself suggests that the superior
performance of American Airlines, an example he takes of a differentiator, is
from their ability to increase market share not just from premium pricing (cited
in Bowman 1992). Underlying this ambiguity is a significant conceptual issue.
If the link between differentiation and performance operates through market
dominance (at a given price), this must involve efficiency gains - for instance
scale and/or experience advantages. This possibility implies that differentiation
and cost leadership are not necessarily mutually exclusive strategic orientations
- a recurrence of a common possibility.
Finally, there is a problem with the question of over which organisation
a firm charges a premium price. As Bowman (1992) argues, there is a potential
problem here. How does a firm achieve superior performance if more than one
firm in an industry can pursue differentiation and therefore command a
premium price? This problem can be resolved by recognising the importance of
defining the boundaries of an industry, or the segment that a firm may target.
For example, Murray (1988) cites Southland's 7-11 stores as exemplifying
product differentiation based on convenience, 'but this is only when they are
compared with food retailers targeting other market segments (e.g.,
supermarkets). When they are compared with other firms competing in their
own niche (i.e., other convenience stores), ft becomes clear that 7-11 stores
strive for cost leadership' (p.391). This problem is not unique to this example,
hence there is a potential confusion between a firm differentiating itself in its
industry or focusing, as a cost leader, in one segment of the market. This issue
will be discussed later in this chapter.
3.2.3 Stuck in the middle
Porter (1985) uses the term 'stuck in the middle' to indicate the
characteristics of a firm that engages in more than one generic strategy but fails
to achieve any one of them. According to Portei, a firm in this position
possesses no competitive advantage because of its unwillingness to make a
choice about how to compete. Its profitability will inevitably be low because
each competitive strategy requires inconsistent actions. Low cost competitors
will serve low price/high volume customers, leaving the "stuck in the middle"
organisation with low market share and/or low margins; high margin customers
will be attracted by either successful differentiators or by cost leaders who focus
on that type of segment.
The idea of "stuck in the middle" therefore suggests that different
generic strategies are mutually exclusive alternatives, a perspective that is by no
means universally accepted, as has been hinted at a number of time already in
this chapter. Murray (1988), linking Porter's generic strategies to a set of
environmental variables, argues that the exogenous preconditions for a viable
cost leadership strategy stem principally from the industry's structural
characteristics and the preconditions for product differentiation stem primarily
from customer tastes. Because these two sets of exogenous factors are
independent, the possibility of a firm pursuing cost leadership and product
differentiation simultaneously is not precluded. This perspective implies that
when a firm combines both competitive strategies successfully, taking into
consideration the independence precondition, it should be able to out-perform
competitors that pursue a single strategy. White (1986) also found that 19 of the
69 business units he examined had the highest ROT and achieved competitive
advantage based on combined cost and differentiation strategies. Dietrich and
Al-Awadh (1993) note that an example of this successful mixing of strategies
occurs in the UK food retailing industry. Sainsbury's, which is considered as the
market leader (Kay 1993), is an example in this activity. This company uses a
combination of quality maintenance to target relatively high income consumers,
and efficient supply management to maintain competitive cost levels. In this
light it is clear where the disagreement arises between Porter and David
Sainsbury over the strategy of the latter's company, where Porter argues that the
claim that Sainsbury's is oriented towards cost leadership and differentiation is
inappropriate (see Porter et al (1987)).
This argument can be generalised. In many circumstances the surplus
derivable from cost efficiency can be invested in differentiation possibilities.
Alternatively (and as suggested above) the causation can be reversed.
Differentiation may be a way of achieving cost leadership in that while it may
increase costs in the short run, long-run unit costs may be decreased because of
scale advantages and/or experience curve effects. It is, therefore, hardly
surprising that empirical investigation by Phillips et al. (1983) provides a link
between product differentiation and cost leadership. In short, the
implementation of one or both of the generic competitive strategies for gaining
competitive advantage depends on certain characteristics of the specific industry
and/or market in which a business operates. It follows, therefore, that if firms
are largely idiosyncratic, in terms of detailed organisational and product-market
characteristics, following Hill (1988) there is no unique low-cost position, and
that any firm may have to base its sustainable competitive advantage on the
simultaneous and continuous pursuit of both low cost and differentiation.
To clarify the issues being discussed here it may be useful to draw out
the similarities and differences between the arguments just presented and the
idea of "stuck in the middle". The criticisms suggest that potential positive, or
synergistic, links might exist between different broad strategies. These positive
effects are different from a formulation that suggests a trade-off between
strategies or, as Karnani (1984) argues, a firm cannot emphasise one dimension
at the cost of neglecting another. This latter perspective is consistent with
Porter's (1985) view that a cost leader must achieve parity or proximity in the
bases of differentiation relative to its competitors to be an above-average
performer, even though it relies on cost leadership for its competitive advantage,
and a differentiator cannot ignore its cost position, because its premium price
will be nullified by markedly inferior cost position. A differentiator in fact aims
at cost parity or proximity to its competitors by reducing cost in all areas that do
not affect differentiation. From this perspective, the only circumstances in
which a firm can achieve both differentiation and cost leadership simultaneously
are: if a competitor is "stuck in the middle"; if a firm dominates its market
because of size advantages; or if a firm has exclusive rights to a major
technological innovation (Porter 1985, 19-20). Hence Porter sees the mixing of
strategies as the exception rather than the rule.
The same basic principles used in Porter's work will be followed in the
development of the competitive strategies' framework presented in the next
section. This framework is different from that developed by Porter by
suggesting that the classification of competitive strategies is more complex than
he suggests. It also introduces another aspect into the idea of "stuck in the
middle" which might explain the existence of this problem in different ways.
Thus, the idea of "stuck in the middle" is still relevant to the framework that
will be developed and discussed in the next section. However, the idea will not
be discussed in this chapter; instead it will be discussed in the final chapter after
shedding some light on the nature of the competitive strategies (discussed next)
and on the nature of the barriers to achieving competitive advantage (discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6).
3.3 From competitive advantage to
competitive strategy
The previous analysis suggests a number of important issues for
conceptualising competitive advantage and generic strategies. Accepting the
general principle that a firm needs a well defined and achievable competitive
strategy to compete effectively against other organisations in its product/market
area, leaves a wide area of disagreement with regard to the nature of such
strategies.
Therefore, based on the previous discussion, this section will discuss the
competitive strategies' framework. This discussion is based on the development
of, rather than a break with Porter's (1980, 1985) work on the generic strategy
concept. There are two important themes which can be derived from earlier
discussion that can be used to build on Porter's basic insights. First, a firm
should distinguish between supply and demand sides of its competitive
advantage. Secondly, Porter's generic strategies are not necessarily independent.
3.3.1 Supply/demand and competitive advantage
To understand the competitive dynamics and position of a particular
industry-market, a firm must consider the distinctions and links between the
supply and demand sides of any potential competitive advantage. It is evident
from earlier discussion that Porter's generic strategies are oversimplified in this
respect. When supply and demand effects are separated a firm can exploit a cost
leadership competitive advantage in two different ways (see Figure 3.2). On the
supply side a firm may exploit a cost advantage (cell 1) in various ways
discussed in the previous section. The existence of this cost advantage depends
on a diversity of cost levels in an industry, either because of market structural
characteristics or non-replicable organisational practices. A central feature here
is relative supply-side stability which precludes innovative (supply side)
differentiation possibilities. This competitive advantage, however, is a potential
rather than actual competitive strategy because a demand side link is necessary.
To emphasise the potential nature of a cost advantage it will be referred to as a
foundation which is distinct from its use in particular strategies. On the demand
side, a competitive strategy that is similar to Porter's cost leadership strategy
implies competing on the foundation of price (cell 2). Market conditions
necessary here are either product homogeneity and/or a well defined market
segment in which buyers are price sensitive. Both of these possibilities imply
that the demand for the firm's products is highly related to prices. Linking these















on using capacity and scale economies with homogenous products or
idiosyncratic expertise/skills with focus on a particular segment.
Figure 3.2: 
Foundations of Competitive Advantage
Supply Side Demand Side
Turning to differentiation strategies, a firm can achieve an advantage
from the demand and/or supply sides, with different strategic implications. A
firm can achieve a differentiation advantage by using its resources, technologies
and organisational competencies (as will be discussed in the next chapter), to
offer existing products more efficiently or new products/services. The different
ways that a firm may use them to create competitive advantage will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The important point about
'newness' here is that it derives from a supply side advantage and hence might
involve improved performance in some sense, as well as fundamentally new
products. Following Miller (1986) this advantage is referred to as an innovative
differentiation capability (cell 3). In addition, however, a firm can achieve a
differentiation advantage on the demand side. Here a firm exploits particular
links with buyers, with the degree of focus determining the segmentation
involved. As such, this advantage is based on marketing mix and promotional
activity, and following Miller is called marketing differentiation (cell 4). This
advantage is likely to be most powerful when reputational effects are important,
as discussed in the previous section. With assessable product/service
characteristics differentiation will depend solely on supply-side factors.
In summary, there are four foundations to competitive advantage. Two
advantages operate on the supply side: cost advantage (CA) and innovative
differentiation (ID). Two are derived from demand side factors: price
competition (PC) and marketing differentiation (MD). This repositioning of
Porter's work has two important effects: it removes the ambiguities highlighted
in the previous section, and it expands the ways in which the firms might
achieve and sustain a competitive advantage. To reiterate a point made earlier,
these foundations define the limits to particular generic strategies that can be
developed by firms. This implies, among other things, that a 'stuck in the
middle' problem does not exist at this level because these foundations to
competitive advantage can be combined to produce, it is hoped, coherent
strategies - an aspect of the discussion that will be presented next.
3.3.2 Competitive strategies
Four foundations of competitive advantage have been derived which can
be used to develop particular strategies. The ways in which these strategies can
be grouped into generic forms will now be discussed. The same basic principles
used in Porter's work will be followed here. He considers each generic strategy
to be a fundamentally different approach to creating and sustaining a
competitive advantage. This development departs from Porter, however, by
suggesting that the classification of generic strategies is more complex than he
suggests. The following competitive strategies can be derived from the
framework that has just been set out.
3.3.2.1 Price leadership (PL)
This strategy combines a cost advantage with price competition - cells 1
and 2 in Figure 3.2. Marketing, based on reputation and extended consumer use,
is unimportant here, hence the characteristics of products/services must be
assessable prior to purchase. In turn, this suggests that consumers are price
sensitive. Price leadership strategy, therefore, is most effective in stable and
predictable environments (Hambrick 1983b; Miller 1988; Kim and Lim 1988),
since environments that are unpredictable or subject to much change will create
severe diseconomies (Miller, 1988) for organisations trying to pursue such a
,
strategy. Since the supply side of any activity is stable, this will preclude
innovative competition based on differential competencies, etc. In other words,
price leaders do very little innovation because it disrupts efficiency. Therefore,
different characteristics of the firm's competencies, discussed in Chapter Ecur
(i.e. complexity, tacitness and specificity), are less important regarding this
competitive strategy compared to the other competitive strategies, as will be
discussed further in the next competitive strategies, later. However, specific
internal and external factors are required to be considered by a firm (using PL
competitive strategy) for the successful implementation of such a competitive
strategy. For example, firms using price leadership strategy might need an
organisational structure that places a great deal of emphasis on sophisticated
cost control systems; standard, repetitive procedures; cost information systems,
etc. These factors and others will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and
6. Furthermore, following Murray (1988), a differentiated cost structure is a
precondition of gaining an above-average performance. If costs are similar the
idea of strategy, as a forward-looking activity rather than simply rivalry, is
difficult to incorporate. Dietrich and Al-Awadh (1993) discussed, in this
situation, the basic economics of oligopoly which may lead to one of two
conclusions: with the main strategic variable being output adjustment, firms will
earn, in equilibrium, similar above-normal profits; with price being the strategic
variable, competition will tend to reduce profits to normal levels. With a
differentiated cost structure, however, economic theory tells us that one firm (or
a cohesive group of firms) can dominate price determination, and hence become
a price leader of either a dominant or barometric type. In the circumstances
involved here, dominance of this sort is the only way to generate superior
performance. It follows from earlier discussion that differentiated costs may
arise because of either size/market-share differentials or structural
characteristics that generate absolute cost (dis)advantages.
3.3.2.2. Low cost differentiation (LCD)
This generic strategy combines cells 1 and 4 in Figure 3.2 These
conditions imply a stable supply side to an activity but with cost differentiation
(which is similar to the supply side characteristic of the PL strategy), and the
centrality of marketing activities on the demand side. A low-cost advantage
which is needed in this case to generate supporting funds for the marketing
differentiation characteristics can be achieved through different ways, such as:
learning effects, economies of scale, economies of scope, and capital/labour
substitution (BCG, 1976; Hill, 1988; Porter, 1980, 1985; Lado et al, 1992).
Learning effects are usually viewed as the operational economies resulting from
repetition of activities that lead to greater learning and efficiency in production
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). Hill (1988) notes that learning effects will be
most significant in the case of new and complex processes; however, learning
effects will also be significant in the case of new processes, even if they are
routine and involve low variability (p. 406-407). Scale economies are expected
decreases in long-run average costs due to capacity expansion and factor
intensity (Lado et al, 1992). Economies of scope result from sharing of
resources among organisational units, which reduces the economic cost of
producing a range of goods (Teece, 1980). Capital/Labour substitution involves
substituting capital for labour or vice versa in order to enhance efficiencies
(Lado et al, 1992). The marketing differentiation, on the demand side, involves
those activities in which it is difficult or costly to assess the characteristics of
products/services prior to purchase; the resulting marketing activity implies
non-homogenous outputs and reduced consumer price sensitivity, with
reputation becoming important. Even though customers may want state-of-the-
art, sophisticated products, some of them might be willing to trade-off novelty
for reliability and reputation (Miller, 1986). As discussed earlier, a basic
condition for this strategy to be viable is the independence of supply and
demand characteristics, i.e. there is no trade-off between differentiation and
cost. Moreover, firms may use some technology and innovative organisational
systems (such as total quality and just-in-time management) that facilitate not
only the reduction of production costs but also enhance product line flexibility,
as will be discussed in the next chapter. In these circumstances, a cost advantage
can provide funds to generate differentiation characteristics. A useful example,
as suggested in the previous section, is the UK food retailer Sainsbury's, for
which above-average performance is based upon cost and price.
3.3.2.3 Differentiation (DIF)
A strategy of this type combines cells 3 and 4 in Figure 3.2. Demand
side characteristics are the same as for low-cost differentiation; the supply side,
however, is markedly different. Here investment is undertaken to develop
innovative product and process attributes, this investment implies that above-
average performance is based on high prices. Differentiation strategy is most
effective in dynamic environments in which products, services, and practices
change quickly (Duncan, 1972), it is difficult to forecast the behaviour of
competitors and customers (Khandwalla, 1977), or where it can be used to avoid
more costly forms of competition like simple price cutting (Hambrick, 1983b;
Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980; Miller, 1988; Lamont et al, 1993). The
idiosyncratic firm competencies elicited, for example, from interpersonal
relations among managers in a firm (Hambrick, 1987), entrepreneurship
(Nelson, 1991; Rumelt, 1987; Schumpeter, 1934), organisational culture
(Barney, 1986b; Fiol, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) and others have been
recognised as potential sources of sustainable competitiye advantage, especially
when they are complex, tacit and firm-specific, as will be discussed in the next
chapter. Their role in achieving a superior level of performance has also long
been recognised (Smircich, 1983; Tichy, 1983; Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). This
implies long-run investment that needs to be directed, by differentiators, to the
firm's resources and distinctive competencies (i.e. high costs). Furthermore, on
the supply side, such organisations (i.e. competing on differentiation) are
inventive in such a way that they create new products as well as the processes
by which they are produced. Both product and process change is very dynamic.
Examples here might be BMW and Rolls Royce from the automobile industry,
and Marks and Spencer and Burton in clothing retailing. The high costs
involved with differentiation implies the existence of strong barriers to
imitability.
Rather schematically, Dietrich and Al-Awadh (1993) argue that two
separate cases of this generic strategy can be identified: idiosyncratic
differentiation and life-cycle differentiation. The first of these, as the name
implies, involves strict non-imitability. This might involve organisational or
supply/distribution networks and practices (as with the just mentioned clothing
retailers) and/or technological and product characteristics (as with BMW and
Rolls Royce). Life cycle differentiation cannot rely on strict non-imitability but
rather lags in imitation are exploited, along with continuous innovative
capability. Competitive advantages of this type might be based on patents, as
with Glaxo in the pharmaceutical industry. In this regard, high prices reflect a
skimming strategy.
3.3.2.4 Imitation (IMT)
This generic strategy combines cells 2 and 3 in Figure 3.2. The demand
side characteristics are the same as for price leaders; however, the supply side is
based on innovative differentiation. This link will be appropriate when supply
side development activity is used primarily to reduce costs. In terms of demand
side links, therefore, a generic imitation will emphasise price competition. Such
firms do not simply imitate but learn from differentiators (strategic leaders) and
therefore may incrementally improve the technologies and products first
introduced by differentiators. Therefore, the innovation of competitors will be
imitated only after a considerable risk-reducing lag. Such companies might be
also called life-cycle followers that do not incur the overhead costs involved
with strategic leadership, but are able to exploit supply and demand side
advantages. Since the cost of innovation in this type of strategy is less than that
in the differentiation strategy, prices will be less than that charged by a
differentiator. Especially, competitors may gain detailed information of about
70% of a firm's new product within a year of its development, for a third less
than its cost (Ghemawat, 1986).
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that generic strategies, as usually formulated,
fail to accommodate a number of important issues. These failures place limits
on the extent to which the literature in the area can offer insights into strategic
management. The problems involved have been discussed under two general
headings. First, the importance of differentiating the supply and demand sides
was discussed. Based on this differentiation four foundations of competitive
advantage were identified: two of them operate on the supply side: cost
advantage (CA) and innovative differentiation (ID); the other two are derived
from demand side factors: price competition (PC) and marketing differentiation
(MD). Second, a framework of competitive strategies was derived from the four
foundations of competitive advantage which accommodates the complexities
involved under these two headings. Four different competitive strategies were
developed in this framework based on appropriate links of particular
foundations of competitive advantage. These competitive strategies are: price
leadership, low cost differentiation, imitation and differentiation. It should be
noticed that while this framework is a significant step away from the Porter
tradition, the move should be seen in terms of development rather than break.
Finally, each strategy, as has been discussed, consists of two particular
foundations of competitive advantage.
In later chapters these competitive strategies will be measured in terms
of a number of factors which are based on the four foundations of the
competitive advantage. The distinction between the demand and supply side
advantages will also allow us to measure the internal consistency of these
competitive strategies. This internal consistency, which is the primary analytical
element of the strategic coherence, will be referred to as "competitive
coherence". This aspect of coherence is one of the three aspects of "strategic
coherence"; the other two aspects being "organisational coherence" and
"cognitive coherence". Because of the increasing complexity of markets and
competition, firms need a multi-variable approach to "strategic coherence" in
order to achieve and sustain their competitive advantage. In other words, failing
to achieve one or more of these aspects of the strategic coherence implies a
barrier to achieving and sustaining a competitive advantage. Thus, two
important principles implicitly inform any discussion in this area: strategic
coherence is necessary to generate above-average performance, and competitive
strategies are a useful way of defining strategic coherence. Further discussion of
these principles will be presented in chapters 5 and 6.
Finally, in the development of the four competitive strategies, the firm's
resources and competencies have been considered as an important potential
source of the firm's competitive advantage. Further discussion of resource-based





To manage competition successfully and gain a superior performance, a
firm needs an appropriate competitive strategy that provides it with the ability to
achieve and sustain its competitive advantage. Such a strategy should be
supported by competencies that are unique and superior, as discussed in the
previous chapter. Aaker (1992) notes that a strategy (defined as how you choose
to compete through the combination of a large number of functional area
decisions) produces a sustainable competitive advantage when it is valued by
segments in an organisation's served market, is supported by skills and
resources, and cannot be easily matched or duplicated by competitors. In
addition, Ansoff (1965, 1976) discusses the firm's competencies as an integral
component of corporate strategy and argues that an organisation's distinctit
competencies are essential to identifying and responding to environmental
signals. Different competitive strategies require different organisational
resources and competencies, as well as different environments, to contribute to
the creation and protection of the firm's profitability (Porter, 1980; Snow and
Hrebiniak, 1980; Miller, 1986; Williams, 1992). For example, innovation
(which provides an organisation with the capability to generate new
products/processes faster than competitors) requires different capabilities such
as intensive research and development, engineering skills, complex
collaboration between different specialists (in different functions), and so on.
Therefore, firms focusing on innovation in their competitive strategies need
competencies that can manage such complexities more than those firms
focusing on a cost/price competitive strategy. In contrast, the latter firms need
skills such as to control costs and manage production efficiency, more than
those firms that emphasis innovation. Collis (1991) notes that the firm's
capabilities are necessary to support any generic strategy. The choice of such a
strategy must also consider the characteristics of the industry as well as the
firm's position within the industry.
The overall relationships between the different concepts (such as
resources, skills and competencies) that will be discussed and defined later in
this chapter are illustrated in Figure 4.1. Following Grant (1991a), the
individual resources of a firm (which include items of capital equipment,
patents, finance, efforts of individual employees, and so on) are the inputs into
the production process; however, few of these resources are productive on their
own. Therefore more than one input of these resources is required for a
productive activity. Each individual resource does indeed require special skill(s)
for its operation. Thus, when these skills are linked together (through interaction
and integration) they will form the bases of creating the firm's competitive
advantage (as illustrated in Figure 4.1). When these individual skills co-operate
and interact (or are linked) with each other, we call them collectively the firm's
competencies or distinctive competencies. Therefore, the firm's competitive
advantage is based on these distinctive competencies rather than on the
individual resources or skills. These terms will be explored in more detail in the
next section.
Figure 4.1 









Amit and Schoemaker (1990:4-5) have drawn a helpful distinction
between resources and capabilities (or competencies):
'The firm's resources will be defined as transferable input factors
controlled by the firm, that are converted into outputs using a wide
range of firm assets and bonding mechanisms such as management
information systems, incentive systems, or trust between
management and labour. These resources consist of proprietary
knowledge (e.g. patents and trade secrets), financial or physical
assets (e.g. property, plant and equipment), human capital,
government licenses, etc. Capabilities, in contrast, are tangible or
intangible (invisible) assets that are firm-specific and are created
over time through complex interactions among the firm's
resources. They can be thought of as 'intermediate goods'
generated by the firm to provide enhanced productivity of its
resources as well as flexibility and protection for its final product
or service. Capabilities are based on developing, carrying, and
exchanging information through the firm's human capital.'
The importance of the firm's resources and competencies as a source of
competitive advantage has been recognised by a great deal of theoretical and
empirical efforts (e.g. Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schendel, 1978;
Snow and Hrebiniak 1980; Wernerfelt 1984; Hitt and Ireland, 1985;
Williamson, 1985; Winter, 1987; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Reed and
DeFillippi, 1990; Conner, 1991; Grant, 1991a, and others). This chapter,
therefore, will discuss and review the resource-based approach literature. It will
also discuss the identification of different characteristics of competency. Then it
discusses how a firm may sustain its competitive advantage.
4.2 Resources and competencies
This section first defines the resources and competencies of a firm and
then discusses the ways in which they are the source of the firm's competitive
advantage. A firm's resources can be defined, in general, as all assets - either
tangible or intangible, human or non-human - that are owned or controlled by
the firm, and needed for its performance. In more general terms, they might also
be seen as anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a
given firm (Wernerfelt 1984). However, since this study makes the distinction
between resources and competencies, the strength and weakness of a given firm
will be defined in terms of the firms competencies, as will be discussed later. A
firm's resources can include items of capital, brand names, employment of
skilled personnel, patents, machinery and, so on. Winter (1987) considers
knowledge a strategic asset that firms possess, and points out the critical role of
managerial knowledge and competence underling the firm's technological
capabilities. A major problem with identifying a firm's resource is that the
management information system, for example, typically provides only a
fragmented and incomplete picture of a firm's resources base. Financial
statements are unable to define the most strategically important resources of the
firm, which are intangible resources and people-based expertise (Grant, 1991a).
Therefore, the classification of organisational resources is a useful method of
identification. In this respect, Hofer and Schendel (1978) suggested six major
categories of resources: financial resources, physical resources, human
resources, reputation, organisational resources and technological resources.
As discussed earlier, and illustrated in Figure 4.1, individual resources
require special skill(s) to operate, as well as to link these resources together.
Following Nelson and Winter (1982) skills can be defined as activities that,
through continued practice or use, can be performed without conscious and
explicit thought. Therefore, it can be argued here that the accumulation of these
skills will generate the firm's competencies (as illustrated in Figure 4.1) Nihich
in turn become the source of the firm's competitive advantage.
The competency of a firm can be defined as the accumulated
differentiated skills that are required to perform an action better than its
competitors. Various authors have called the firm's competencies core or
organisational competencies (e.g. Hayes et al, 1988; Dosi et al, 1990; Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990), firm's specific competencies (e.g. Pavitt, 1991), invisible
assets (e.g. Itami, 1987), distinctive competence (Fiol, 1991; Reed and
DeFillippi, 1990; Selznick, 1957), and core capabilities (e.g. Leonard-Barton,
1992). Teece et al (1990) define competencies as 'a set of differentiated skills,
complementary assets, and routines that provide the basis for a firm's
competitive capacities and sustainable advantage'. Dosi et al (1990) define core
competence as 'a set of differentiated technological skills, complementary
assets, and organisational routines and capacities'. Furthermore, Grant (1991a)
defines the firm's competencies (called capabilities) as what the firm can do as a
result of teams of resources working together. Organisational capabilities
characterise the dynamic, nonfinite mechanisms that enable the firm to acquire,
develop, and deploy its resources to achieve superior performance relative to
other firms (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Lado and Wilson, 1994).
It is important to recognise that any competency which is developed by a
firm will be valuable if it is distinctive (Collis, 1991). That is to say that the
competence which the firm possesses will be evaluated against those held by
competitors. Thus, distinctive competency that is competitively unique and
superior is concerned with providing the firm with an advantage compared to its
competitors by identifying those particular strengths which the firm should
maintain and/or those particular weaknesses which should be improved on or
avoided. Barney (1991) also argued that in order for competencies to generate
competitive advantage, they must satisfy at least two conditions: (1) the
competencies must be valuable, enabling the firm to exploit opportunities and/or
neutralise threats in the competitive environment, and (2) only a small number
of firms in a particular competitive environment possess these competencies. In
addition, Lado and Wilson (1994) add that organisational competencies must be
relatively immobile in order to confer durable economic benefits to the firm.
Another important point to be made when attempting to identify competencies
is that they may be formed at the business or corporate level. Miles and Snow's
(1978) research shows a significant relationship between business level strategy,
distinctive competencies and performance. At the corporate level, Hitt and
Ireland's (1985) study also reported a significant relationship between corporate
strategy, certain distinctive competencies and performance. Moreover, a firm's
competencies may arise from an integration of individual function capabilities
either at the business level or at the corporate level. When these competencies
are formed within functional areas (e.g. marketing, production, finance, etc.)
they should be defined in functional terms (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and
Schendel, 1978). Snow and Hrebinialc (1980), extending their earlier work,
related areas of competencies to functional areas of the firm (e.g. general
management, production, marketing/selling).
The term competency or the firm's distinctive competencies emerged in
the 1960's as a desired end-result of business policies (Ansoff 1965; Learned et
al, 1969). Learned et al (1969) incorporated this concept into a business policy
framework, which placed emphasis on assessing internal organisational
capabilities (strengths and weakness) and matching these with environmental
opportunities and threats. Andrews (1971) emphasised the concept of the firm's
distinctive competence by pointing out that it was more than what the firm
could do; it was the set of the things that the firm did particularly well. Hofer
and Schendel (1978) have viewed competencies as an integral part of
organisational strategy. Then it became the subject of more theoretical and
empirical studies (e.g. Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980 and Hitt and Ireland, 1985,
1986; Collis 1991; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Farjoun, 1994; Helfat, 1994;
Henerson and Cockburn, 1994, and others). Snow and Hrebiniak (1980)
examine the relationships between strategy, distinctive competence and
organisational performance, and find that effective organisational design
enables the organisation to make full use of its strengths in pursuing
environmental opportunities, while simultaneously minimising the risk to which
the organisation is exposed by its current weaknesses. Prahalad and Hamel
(1990) describe the distinctive competencies, or as they call them "core
competencies", as the collective learning in the organisation, especially the
capacity to co-ordinate diverse production skills and integrate streams of
technologies. Learning is an important factor in sustaining competitive
advantage, as will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Moreover,
Prahalad and Hamel argue that in identifying core competencies in a company
the following factors should be considered:
First, a core competency provides potential access to a wide variety of markets.
Second, a core competency should make a significant contribution to the
perceived customer benefits of the end product.
Finally, a core competency should be difficult for the competitors to imitate.
Thus, defining competency as the firm's ability to perform a task or
activity by using its resources and skills better than its competitors implies that
it involves a complex interaction within and between people and other
resources. This interaction leads to the importance of the managers' perception
of their firms' competitive advantages. Amit and Schoemaker (1993) draw upon
resource-based theory in developing a behavioural view of strategic assets and
offer some prescriptive advice on how to target, develop and deploy them.
Wernerfelt (1989) proposes some guidelines to help managers identify their
critical resources and decide how to apply them. The social complex (Diericicx
and Cool, 1989) in the firm, such as the interpersonal relations among managers
(Hambrick, 1987), or the firm's culture (Barney, 1986b; Fiol, 1991; Amit and
Schoemaker, 1993) can be a source of competitive advantage as well as
affecting the firm's strategic choice. This issue will be taken up again later in the
discussion of tacit knowledge. Although the managers' perception will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, it is important to mention here that
managers may perceive these competencies differently. Stevenson (1976)
concluded, when he examined organisational strengths and weaknesses in his
study of the strategic planning process, that there was a wide variation in senior
managers' perceptions of their organisations' distinctive competencies. Snow
and Hrebiniak (1980) try to explain this variation in the managers' perceptions
by organisational strategy.
The distinctive competencies of the firm are the bases upon which a firm
develops and maintains its competitive advantage and the primary sources of its
sustainable profitability; hence, in the long run, a firm needs to invest in its
resources and competencies in order to have more advantage over its
competitors, to sustain its position and to secure its future. Thinking of
competitive strategy, a firm should always pursue strategies which are within its
capability, by analysing its strengths to be used in the future and/or weaknesses
to be improved or avoided. In other words, a firm which aims to win future
competitiveness should pursue strategies that achieve a comparative strength
while avoiding expanding its activities beyond the scope of its competencies.
Therefore, firms that are considering this approach will not only think of the
present competitiveness with existing products but they will also build
competencies that enable businesses to adapt to new opportunities and win
future competitiveness. Thus, in this approach, firms should not just be seen as
portfolios of business or portfolios of products but also as portfolios of
resources (Wernerfelt 1984) and as portfolios of core competencies ( Prahalad
and Hamel 1990).
4.3 Characteristics of competencies
There are characteristics of a firm's competencies that make them
imperfectly imitable. The relationship between the causal ambiguity of a firm's
resources and competencies and imperfect imitability has received systematic
attention in the literature (see, among others, Alchian, 1950; Mancke, 1974;
Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984; Barney, 1986b; Reed and
DeFillippi, 1990; Barney, 1991). Causal ambiguity exists when the link between
the resources and competencies controlled by a firm and a firm's sustained
competitive advantage is not perfectly understood. Ambiguity is also defined as
the "basic ambiguity concerning the nature of the connections between actions
and results" (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982: 420). Lippman and Rumelt (1982)
and Reed and DeFillippi, (1990) argue that in order for resource-based
competencies to generate quasi-rents and be a source of sustainable competitive
advantage, they must be ambiguous. Although they exhibit complex
relationships with other firm-specific resources and capabilities, this does not
mean that these resources and competencies cannot be identified. Rather their
reproduction may be highly uncertain, especially if they are strongly time-path
dependent (Peteraf, 1993) and/or socially complex (Diericicx and Cool, 1989).
Reed and DeFillippi (1990) argue in the resources-based approach to strategy
that achieving and sustaining competitive advantage requires reinvestment in
ambiguous organisational competencies that have three characteristics. These
include (1) tacitness (Polanyi, 1967), which refers to the implicit and non-
codifiable accumulation of skills that results from learning by doing, (2)
complexity (Barney, 1985; Nelson and Winter, 1982), which results from
having a large number of interdependent skills and ass'ets, and (3) specificity
(Williamson, 1985), which refers to the transaction-specific skills and assets
that are used in production processes and provision of services for particular
customers. Reed and DeFillippi (1990) also argue that any or all of these
competency characteristics can produce an ambiguity between actions and
outcomes that creates the firm's advantage. This, in turn, creates barriers to
imitation and enables firms to sustain their competitive advantages. Similar to
these characteristics mentioned by Reed and DeFillippi, Grant (1991a) points
out four characteristics of resources and competencies which are likely to be
particularly important determinants of the sustainability of competitive
advantage: (a) 'durability', where they are to be maintained and renewed; (b)
'transparency', where they are difficult to identify and understand (a
characteristic which is similar to the tacitness mentioned above); (c)
'transferability', where they are imperfectly transferable (i.e. a specific resources
and competencies); and (d) 'replicability', where they are not easily replicated
(i.e. complex).
Based on the above discussion, there are three characteristics of
competencies which provide the sustainability of the firm's competitive
advantage. These are complexity, tacitness and specificity. The following
discussion explores how these three characteristics of competency can promote
the achievement and the sustainability of the firm's competitive advantage.
4.3.1 Complexity
Competencies that are complex will be more difficult for other firms to
imitate. This complexity can be defined as the results of the interaction of
numerous skills and assets when performing an action. Complexity, therefore,
describes the range of interrelationships among skills s and other knowledge-
based competencies (Winter, 1987). Despite the fact that a firm's competencies
differ in their complexity, i.e. some may be derived from the contribution of a
single resource while others may require a complex interaction of a large
number of diverse resources, complexity is one of the competency
characteristics that is relevant to the sustainability of the firm's competitive
advantage. The complexity of the competency determines the difficulties of
imitation, as Prahalad and Hamel (1991) stated: "core competence should be
difficult for a competitor to imitate, and it will be difficult if it is complex"
(p.84). Barney (1991) distinguishes between physical technology and social
complexities. Barney argues that a wide variety of the firm's resources and
competencies are socially complex. Examples include a firm's relationships with
suppliers (Porter, 1980) and customers (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1987;
Klein and Leffler, 1981). When competitive advantage is based on such
complex social phenomena, the ability of other firms to imitate these resources
and competencies is significantly constrained. Furthermore, in considering the
sustainability of the competitive advantage, there are some competencies which
appear to be simple but prove exceptionally difficult to imitate, as for example
two of the simplest and best known Japanese manufacturing practices: Just-In-
Time scheduling and quality circles. Considering their simplicity, few American
and European firms have introduced either with the same degree of success as
Japanese companies (Grant, 1991a). Therefore it will be easier to see how firms
that develop highly complex competencies can maintain their competitive
advantages over very long periods of time. Thus, the more complexity there is
within and between the firm's competencies, the more difficulties it can create
for the competitors to imitate them.
This complexity may limit, in most situations, the ability of an
individual to comprehend all alternatives and the consequences attached to them
when making a decision or performing an action. When this situation is
generalised more to embody the identification and the solution of the problems
faced by an organisation, it will be more difficult to completely satisfy either.
Lindblom (1959) and Quinn (1980), among others, have highlighted different
ways in which managers usually deal with complexity. The nature of the
organisational decision making has been emphasised by the writers on strategy
formation (e.g. Mintzberg, 1987; Isenberg, 1987; MacCrimmon and Wehrung,
1986). An example is Cohen, March and Olsen's (1972) garbage can model, in
which problems, solutions, hidden agendas, coalitions and so on mesh in a
complex way to yield decisions. The difficulties faced by managers, therefore,
are caused by the complexity of the decisions and their own bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality can be defined as that state where people are not
consciously and deliberately irrational, but neither their knowledge nor their
powers of calculation allow them to reach optimised decisions that are based on
global optimisation (Simon, 1957). Thus, these complexities in decision making
which increase the barriers to imitation, through the interactions between
numerous skills and assets when performing an action and through the
interpersonal relationships among managers in a firm (Hambrick, 1987), are
imperfectly imitated, and consequently they will be a source of the firm's
competitive advantage.
The dimension of complexity is also related to the amount of
information required to characterise the item of knowledge in question (Winter,
1987). The greater the complexity within and between the firm's competencies,
the less the breadth and depth of knowledge that most, if not all, individuals
grasp of the overall performance package (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This
complexity, therefore, will prevent such information from expropriation when
employees are recruited by competitors. The complexity of cause-effect
relationships in the firm's resources and competencies will make imitation more
difficult, especially when the new product complexity requires extensive
reorganisation of interdependent procedures and/or the co-ordination of many
skills and numerous departments (Macmillan, Mccaffery, and Van Wijk, 1985).
Therefore, the more complex the product, the greater the logistic problems of
revising existing procedures, policies and programmes to incorporate the
required activities which enable the firm to sustain its advantage for a long
period of time. However, it should be understood that complexity itself is not a
direct source of advantage, but it is the way in which the firm combines its skills
and resources. Thus, as complexity has been defined as the result of the
interaction and integration of a large number of skills and assets when
performing a task or activity, it can be concluded that the greater the complexity
required to perform an action, the more difficult it will be for competitors to
imitate the firm's competitive advantage.
4.3.2 Tacitness
Tacitness is embodied in almost all of the skills required to create the
firm's competencies. Tacitness can be defined as the implicit accumulation of
skills that result from learning by doing. The word "learning" is an important
concept here since it is the way of generating and maintaining this tacitness.
Knowledge which is possessed by the firm as a strategic asset can be tacit.
Wagner and Sternberg (1985:439) stated that tacit knowledge is 'probably
disorganised, informal and relatively inaccessible, making it potentially ill-
suited for direct instruction'. This tacitness in the organisation's knowledge may
arise at three points. First, the association of an individual with the organisation,
for whom the knowledge in question is tacit. Second, the myriad of
relationships that enable the organisation to function is not well known to most
participants in the organisation. Third, the organisation's top management is
uninformed regarding the details of what happens when their decisions are
implemented (Winter 1987), as has been discussed earlier. Therefore, tacit
knowledge describes the information and the competencies that are non-
codifiable and non-explicitly replaceable (Polanyi, 1967).
Skills which dominate most of the firm's activities and have been
considered as the source of competitive advantage are embedded with tacit
knowledge. Hitt and Ireland (1985) listed a wide range of skills under the major
activities of the firm (e.g. general administration, production, engineering and
R&D, marketing, finance, personal). Thus, this knowledge is very difficult to
impart or imitate, especially when it is established within the procedural
relations of the firm.
Tacit competency differs from complexity in that a tacit competency, by
definition, is not easily transferable. For example, in a complex chemical
formula or a complex computer, a chemist or a computer engineer each know
and understand the task related to their subject and thus they can transfer, say by
teaching, their knowledge to others; however, other activities such as swimming
cannot be transferred to others, no matter how much effort has been made to
teach them this skill, they still have to practise it and learn it through doing.
This can also be applied to the relationships that exist between the different
skilled (professional) people when they are working as a team in the
organisation. Examples include the relations between managers in a firm
(Hambrick, 1987), a firm's reputation among suppliers (Porter, 1980) and
customers (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1987; Klein and Leffler, 1981).
Tacitness, therefore, may raise the barriers to imitation by making the
firm's competency more difficult to be described or understood. There are two
problems for competitors to overcome in order to imitate the firm's competitive
advantage that is based on tacit competencies. First, there is an information
problem with identifying and achieving successful competitive advantage.
Second, there is a strategy duplication problem regarding the way that
competitors amass the resources and the competency which is required for the
achievement of the competitive advantage (Grant, 1991a). In terms of the firm's
competitive advantage sustainability, tacitness may vary from one extreme to
the other. Thus, the ability of a competitor to imitate successfully varies from
one situation to another. At one extreme, imitation will be very clear by "reverse
engineering", which means that there is a little tacitness in the production
process, because it contains a simple combination of some standardised
technological elements. At the other extreme, the target routine may involve so
much idiosyncratic and 'impacted' tacit knowledge that even successful
replication is problematic, let alone imitation from a distance (Nelson and
Winter, (1982: 123-24). However, it could be argued that in between these
extremes, tacitness of competencies can prevent the imitation of the firm's
competitive advantage. Thus, tacitness as one of the competency characteristics
will also create barriers for competitors to understand the cause-effect
relationship among the firm's actions. The more that the firm practises its
actions of performance, the more ability it has of creating a tacitness around
them. Therefore, the greater tacitness within the competency over how the firm
can perform a task or activity, the higher the barriers to imitation will be; as a
consequence, the longer that firm can maintain the level of profitability.
4.3.3 Specificity
Although competitors may overcome the problems associated with the
complexity and tacitness, there is a problem of specificity . of the firm's resources
and competency. Specificity describes the extent to which resources and skills
are idiosyncratic to the firm and not easily transferable to alternative use without
substantial cost (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990; Williamson, 1985). A simple
example of this specificity can be seen in the machine process of pressing or
moulding a car's body which may be neither complex nor tacit, but it is very
specific to the firm. Another example is the firm's reputation, image and
relationships with suppliers and customers - besides their complexity and
tacitness, and besides the difficulties (in terms of effort and time) that a firm
may face to develop and maintain them - such competencies are specific to the
firm. Therefore, the firm's specific competencies can be considered as a basis
for creating and protecting the firm's competitive advantage. Furthermore,
Hayes et al (1988) argue that the ultimate purpose of strategic management is to
focus on the development of specific organisational competencies and
relationships which are difficult for competitors to match over a long period
time.
Four types of asset specificity have been identified by Williamson
(1985). The first is 'site' specificity, where the set-up and/or relocation costs are
great and thus parties to a transaction are locked into a relationship. The second
is 'human' asset specificity arising, for example, from learning by doing. The
third is 'physical' specificity involving, for example, specialised equipment. The
final is 'dedicated' specificity, as a generalised investment that produces output
for specific customers. Each type of specificity, therefore, refers to durable
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions which
involve relationships between the firm and its customers, thus the continuity of
these relationships is valued. In the same way, Reed and DeFillippi (1990) see
specificity as the transaction-specific skills and assets that are utilised in
production processes and provision of services for particular customers.
However, competency should be more specific to the firm rather than to a
particular transaction or to a particular customer.
The specificity of the firm's competencies will make imitation more
difficult for competitors when these assets competencies have been created and
associated within the firm. In addition to the transaction costs that will be
associated with the immobility and imperfect information of imitating these
asset and competencies, the value of some resources or competencies may fall
in transfer because of a decline in their productivity. For example, employees'
productivity may suffer a decline in the process of the inter-firm transfer
because it may be influenced by situational and motivational factors, and so on.
Furthermore, some resources which are almost entirely firm-specific, such as
corporate reputation, may not be transferred, except by the acquisition of the
whole firm. However, this reputation of the acquired firm may still be
depreciated during the change in ownership (Grant, 1991a).
Therefore, to make the firm's competency more sustainable over a long
period of time, competency, beside its complexity and tacitness, should be firm-
specific in such a way that just a few, if any firms, have a similar or the same
competency. Thus, the longer that the firm possesses a specific competency, the
more it can make such a competency difficult to imitate, and then the longer it
sustains its competitive advantage.
4.4 Sustaining competitive advantage.
Firms should not only secure the development of competencies required
to achieve their competitive advantage, but they should also develop the
competencies needed to meet the challenges of the future. In this respect, a firm
needs to provide a secure foundation for sustaining its competitive advantage by
developing barriers to imitation for a long period of time. Building and
developing its own distinctive competencies and maintaining them for a long
period of time, a firm will be able to create its environment rather than simply
respond to it.
Since successful competitive advantage might be quickly imitated by
other firms, a firm should build and develop barriers to protect and maintain the
skills and competencies on which its advantage is based. A firm will be able to
sustain its competitive advantage by possessing immobile competencies to the
extent that they cannot be transferred easily from one firm to another. Examples
include organisational culture (Barney, 1986b), organisational routines (Nelson
& Winter, 1982), and a firm's reputation and image (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988)
which may not be perfectly transferred across organisational settings. A firm,
therefore, should have distinctive competencies that are characterised by some
features that are difficult to comprehend or imitate. The need for such actions is
specially significant when competitors may gain detailed information of about
70% of the firm's new product within a year of its development, for only two-
thirds of its cost (Ghemawat, 1986). Thus, creating complexity, tacitness and
specificity around a firm's competencies will explain how some firms can
sustain their competitive advantage and as a consequence become more
profitable, in the long run, than their competitors.
Since the environment and basic organisational characteristics are given
in the short term, firms may analyse these factors and compete with current
products in the existing environment. However, in the long run, when the
environment and basic organisational characteristics may change, firms should
build on competencies, and/or develop new areas of expertise, that create
unanticipated products, which enable the firm to compete in the future. Building
these new organisational characteristics, a firm will not only respond to the
external environment but it will create a new one. This creation or formulation
of the new environment which is achieved by possessing a successful
competitive advantage creates an incentive for other firms to modify their
business in order to adapt and/or duplicate that success which has been created
in their environment. However, decisions about the firm's resource
competencies that bestow sustainable competitive advantage are among the
most complex that managers encounter; therefore, it should be emphasised that
the firm's competencies, by definition, cannot be purchased off-the-shelf but
required strategic vision and development time (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).
The firm should therefore consider the resource-based approach to develop its
competitive advantage in the long run and make it difficult for competitors who
failed to invest in competencies to enter an emerging market (Prahalad and
Hamel 1990). In short, to sustain its competitive advantage, a firm should also
take into consideration the following factors:
First, the process of building competencies may span a decade or longer.
Second, the firm must reinvest in the factors that create barriers to imitation.
Third, there are important characteristics of competencies that determine the
sustainability which are complexity, tacitness and specificity.
Firms should therefore evolve a strategic direction in terms of the
competencies that will form the bases of their future competitive advantage.
Barney (1991) argues that in order for a firm's resources and competencies to be
a source of sustainable competitive advantage there must be no strategically
equivalent valuable resources that are themselves either not rare or imitable.
Two valuable firm resources are strategically equivalent when they can be
exploited separately to implement the same strategies. Barney sees that strategic
substitutability of firm resources is always a matter of degree. Therefore, if
enough firms have these valuable substitute resources (i.e. they are not rare), or
if enough firms can acquire them (i.e. they are imitable), then none of these
firms (including firms whose resources are being substituted for) can expect to
obtain a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991:111-112). The firm's
functional areas and major activities could be its distinctive competencies on
which its competitive advantage is based. Therefore, what a firm needs in order
to sustain its competitive advantage is to create a situation where its own
resource position directly or indirectly makes it more difficult for others to catch
up (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Resource position barriers, just like entry barriers, do indicate a potential
for high returns because one competitor will have an advantage. However, both
barriers are needed to secure the position of the firm. An entry barrier without a
resource position barrier leaves the firm vulnerable to diversifying entrants,
whereas a resource position barrier without an entry barrier leaves the firm
unable to exploit the barrier (Wernerfelt 1984:173). This duality between these
two concepts of barriers corresponds to the duality between the two approaches
(product/market position and resource-based approaches) discussed earlier.
Thus, the sustainability of advantage depends on factors such as the
ability of the firm to create and maintain barriers to imitation, the amount the
firm is investing in its source of competitive advantage (resources and
competencies), and the determination and the speed of the competitor in
imitating the firm's strategy.
4.5 Conclusion
Two different approaches should be considered by a firm for achieving
and sustaining its competitive advantage. One is the resource-based approach
(which might be thought of as inside the firm), while the other is the market-
product approach (which might be thought of as outside the firm, i.e. the
business environment). It is argued that the firm's distinctive competencies are
the source of its competitive advantage. Therefore, they must be continually
upgraded and deployed in order for the firm to achieve and sustain a
competitive advantage. Three characteristics of competencies have been
identified which prevent imitation of the firm's competitive advantage. Thus,
creating barriers to imitation enables the firm to sustain its competitive
advantage over time. It is also argued that even though the resource-based
approach correctly suggests that focusing on the firm effects is important in
developing and combining resources and competencies to achieve and sustain
competitive advantage, this does not imply that market product analysis merely
yields normal returns. On the contrary, analysis of the environment is also
critical, since environmental change 'may change the significance of resources
to the firm' (Penrose, 1959:79). Moreover, although the firm's competencies can
be a source of sustainable competitive advantage on their own, it also necessary
to build such competencies to support any generic strategy.
The firm internal resources and competencies as well as its external
environment have been considered in the development of the competitive
strategies framework. In the next two chapters competitive strategies will be
linked to the internal and external environments of an organisation. These links
will form the organisational coherence which is one aspect of the three aspects
of the strategic coherence.
Chapter 5
Barriers to achieving competitive
advantage I: Internal factors
5.1 Introduction
It might be easier to answer the question of how companies achieve and
sustain their competitive advantage than to answer the question why they do
not. Rather than answering the latter question directly, it will be suggested that
different barriers may prevent firms from achieving and sustaining their
competitive advantage. These barriers can be analysed in a rigorous manner.
In the previous chapters two different approaches (the resource-based
and the product market approaches) have been discussed and considered as the
source of achieving and sustaining the firm's competitive advantage. It was also
concluded there that a firm needs certain competitive strategies to achieve its
advantage and as a consequence achieves higher performance. It was shown
there that the identification of these competitive strategies is based on particular
links between supply and demand characteristics.
Although the immediate determinant of competitive advantage is an
effective competitive strategy, the potential of such a strategy is conditioned by
organisational functioning. This in turn will create more or less appropriate
internal and external environmental links as predicted by the resource-based
approaches. The potential of such a strategy is also conditioned by individual


















Dietrich and Al-Awadh (1995)). Once the competitive strategies are defined (as
discussed in the previous chapter), they will be linked to organisational
functioning to form "organisational coherence", as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 
A model of competitive advantage and strategic coherence
Organisational coherence, therefore, can be achieved by avoiding
potential barriers that may arise with a lack of fit between the firm's competitive
strategy and other organisational and environmental factors. These barriers can
be classified into two broad categories: internal and external, as illustrated in












the next chapter, while the potential internal barriers (organisational factors)
will be the subject of this chapter.
Figure 5.2
Barriers to achieving competitive advantage
Discussion of the internal potential barriers will be organised as follows.
The emphasis will be on control processes which affect day-to-day actions as
well as the formulation and implementation of the firm's competitive strategy.
These control processes can be classified into two general types: formal and
informal, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Before going into detailed discussion and
definitions of these two types of control, a general overview of the relationships
between the different internal potential barriers and the competitive strategies
will be introduced. Different elements of the formal control processes will then
be defined and discussed and linked to the four competitive strategies that have
been developed in the previous chapter. Finally, the definitions and discussions
of the different elements of the informal control processes will then be presented
and linked to the four competitive strategies. These different links between the
internal factors and the competitive strategies will form the internal part of
"organisational coherence".
5.2 General overview of internal factors
Since the focus of this research is on the barriers that may prevent firms
from achieving their competitive advantages, different competitive strategies
have been developed in this thesis as the means of achieving these advantages.
Therefore, the discussion in this chapter will pivot on these competitive
strategies as the benchmark. However, other strategies that are used by firms to
set and implement their different control processes should also be considered.
These strategies will be called "organising strategies", as illustrated in Figure
5.3. Appropriate links between these strategies and competitive strategies are
required for the achievement and sustainability of competitive advantage. In
other words, the lack of fit or the mismatch between the firm's competitive
strategies and the formal and/or informal control processes (organising
strategies) may act as a potential barrier that prevents firms from achieving their
competitive advantages, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Other potential barriers to
the organising strategy, such as those related to individual careers, perceptions,
cognition and so on, can be also identified and considered where appropriate.
These different strategies are referred to as "individual (or behavioural)
Competitive
Advantage
strategies", as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Furthermore, external education and
social strategies may also have a prior influence on these series of strategies.
Although all these aspects of strategy will have an effect on the achievement
and sustainability of the firm's competitive advantage, following the scope of
this research a line will be drawn (as illustrated in Figure 5.3) between the
organising strategy and the behavioural (or individual) strategies. Since the
foundations on which the firms base their competitive advantages and the means
(i.e. competitive strategies) of achieving them have already been discussed,
other strategies (or set of strategies), either internal or external, will be
considered as exogenous parameters that act as potential barriers to achieving
competitive advantage.
Figure 5.3: 



















5.3 Formal control processes
The purpose of this section is to define some of the internal elements (or
factors) of the formal control processes and illustrate how they are linked to the
different competitive strategies in order to achieve and sustain competitive
advantage. In Mintzberg's (1983) terms, such links address which contextual
factors must be managed to stimulate the effectiveness of different strategies.
Porter (1980) states that implementing competitive strategies successfully
requires different organisational arrangements, control procedures and
innovative systems. Thus, it is argued that an organisation should have suitable
formal control processes, given its competitive strategies, in order to achieve
and sustain its competitive advantage.
Organisational structure is one of the important internal factors that will
be considered and linked to competitive strategies. There is a substantial body
of work on the relationship between strategy and structure (e.g. Chandler, 1962;
Channon, 1973; Rumelt, 1974; White, 1986; Donaldson, 1987; Miller, 1988;
Hamilton and Shergill, 1992); and much empirical research on the components
of structure (Miller and Droge, 1986). The Aston researchers (Pugh et al, 1969)
isolated central dimensions of structure in a diverse sample of British firms,
using factor analysis. They found four dimensions: (1) structuring of activities -
including specialisation and formalisation; (2) concentration of authority - really
a measure of centralisation of decision-making power; (3) line control of
workflow - use of many line supervisors rather than impersonal formal controls
of task performance; (4) size of the supportive (non-line) component. On the
other hand, Reimann (1973) found three related dimensions: centralisation of
authority, specialisation and formalisation, as well as a fourth dimension that he
considered less important, which is size of staff or supportive component.
However, three of the most common dimensions of the general organisational
structures that a firm uses for managing its business and controlling its
performance are formalisation, authority delegation (Child, 1974; Fredrickson,
1984; Jackson and Morgan, 1982; Blackburn, 1982; Sathe, 1978), and
integration, through the use of liaison devices (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979; Miller and Friesen, 1984).
Furthermore, Goold and Campbell (1987) have investigated companies
that are widely regarded as successful leading companies in the UK. They
conclude that the three most common management styles among these firms
are: strategic planning, strategic control and financial control. Within each
management style there is a control process style (flexible strategic control,
tight strategic control, and tight financial control). These control process styles
include how to develop a winning strategy, how to motivate a management team
and how to succeed competitively. These different styles will also be discussed
and matched to the competitive strategies later in this section.
Before discussing the different dimensions of • structure and these
management styles, it is important to shed some light on the different types of
organisational structure.
5.3.1 Organisational structure
The way that a firm is organised is crucial to the effectiveness of
strategy. Although there is an almost infinite number of detailed structural
forms, there are general structures that are well defined, and that predominate in
modern complex organisations. They are also well defined in the literature (e.g.
Rumelt, 1974; Mintzberg, 1979; Child, 1975; Osborn et al, 1980; Johnson and
Scholes, 1993; Whellen and Hunger, 1986). These include: simple structure,
functional structure, divisional structure and matrix structure. These are
discussed in turn below.
5.3.1.1 Simple structure
A firm with a simple structure is likely to be small in size and
undifferentiated in terms of its market and/or product. This firm is likely to be
managed by an owner-manager who either undertakes most of the responsibility
of management or oversees a group of unspecialised people who do whatever
needs to be done to provide a single product or service, with little clear
definition of who is responsible for what.
Figure 5.4 represents a simple structure. The main problem here is that
this type of structure can be effective only up to a certain size of operation. The
determination of size depends on the nature of the business in which the firm is
operating, which is affected by the complexity and dynamism of the
environment in which it is operating. These environmental issues will be
elaborated in more detail in the discussion of the external factors in the next
chapter. In brief, environmental complexity depends on the number of elements
in the environments that the firm is dealing with, and on the cause-effect
relationship between those elements. The dynamism of the environment, on the
other hand, refers to the rate of change that is evident. So, for example, a simple
structure might be appropriate for a building company which operates in a stable
and uncomplex environment, where the owner-manager can effectively manage
the operations based on established rules of thumb. On the other hand, a similar
sized business dealing with computer software, for example, might need
specialists to handle different operations. Therefore, a simple structure might







In a functional structure, work is divided on the basis of necessary tasks
such as manufacturing, sales, finance, marketing and personnel, as illustrated in
Figure 5.5. It enables a firm to take advantage of specialists in management
positions and to deal more effectively with complex production or service
delivery problems. Top management will also be able to co-ordinate activities
and keep in direct touch with operations, and to reduce the problem of control as
long as the vertical lines of communication are short. The dynamism and
complexity of the environment also determine the size of the firm. For example,
in a firm which is dealing with a narrow range of products and/or a single
market, the functional managers are able to handle their functional operations.
However, if the firm is diversified in terms of its products or markets, even with
a similar size of operations to that in the previous example, it will be more
difficult for the functional managers to handle different operations of
production, or to deal with different environmental situations. Therefore, when
operations are large in the firm, the functional structure might become slow in
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Department	 Department	 Department	 Department
responding to environmental changes. This problem may worsen when there is
more co-operation required across functions. As a result, senior managers in
such situations will be over-concerned with routine matters at the expense of the
strategic concerns that face their organisation. Furthermore, due to the limited
span of control and the expansion in the firm's business, another problem may





As Figure 5.6 shows, an extra management layer of division chiefs
between top management and functional managers is the main characteristic of
the divisional structure. These divisions may be formed on the basis of products,
geographical areas or process of the operation. A firm can base its structure on
more than one divisional characteristic, i.e. a firm may have geographical
divisions with process or product divisions.
The main advantage of the divisional structure is that it overcomes
problems arising in the functional structure. Since each division is operating
Division A Division B
II
fairly independently, it will be able to concentrate on problems and
opportunities of its particular business area. This type of structure is appropriate
for a firm with many products and serving many markets. It provides the firm
with the flexibility to operate in many industries and the ability to assess more
easily its performance in different areas of activities.
However, a divisional structure has disadvantages. For example, a
division may operate at over-capacity while another is under-employing much
of its facilities and staff. As a result, some problems may follow from this
disadvantage, such as the allocating of financial resources, and so on.
Furthermore, problems in the functional structure may arise again if one of the
divisions becomes too large. Finally, fragmentation of functional management
needs inter-divisional co-ordination. This co-ordination may either be controlled
centrally (which introduces the problems of functional organisation) or it may




















A matrix structure might be a combination of functional and divisional
structures at the same level of a corporation. In this type of structure employees
mainly have two superiors, a project manager and functional manager. Figure
5.7 gives an example of such a structure. It may also be a combination of more
than one division, such as product and geographical divisions, where an
employee has mainly two superiors, a regional manager and product manager.
In a matrix structure all levels of management are involved in strategic
activities, therefore it supposes an increase in both managerial motivation and
managerial development. In reality, however, one dimension may be dominant
for line management. Since this type of structure encourages debate amongst
potential competing groups, the quality of decision making may be improved,
especially if there is a risk of one vital interest of the firm dominating the
consideration of a problem at the expense of other interests. However, this
encouragement of debate may require a very long time before a decision can be
made. Moreover, lack of clarity of role definition and responsibility which may
occur is another problem in such a structure.
Chief executive
















Each structure, as described above, has both advantages and
disadvantages, and therefore the choice between them is not straightforward.
Choosing a structure compatible with a firm's strategy is a corporate strength.
In addition, firms may mix structures in order to respond to different challenges
they face, to innovate or develop a product/service, to start new business, and so
on.
As noted earlier, the relationship between strategy and structure has
received much attention in the literature. Chandler (1962) shows that a change
in strategy requires subsequent alteration in structure. Rumelt (1974) shows how
the match between strategy and structure influences performance. A recent
study by Hamilton and Shergill (1992) concludes that the congruence of
strategy and structure is influential in terms of company financial performance,
which is to some extent an extension of Donaldson's (1987) study. Therefore,
the following section takes into consideration the importance of organisational
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structure as the main factor in the formal control processes, by linking the latter
to the competitive strategies.
5.3.2 Formalisation, authority delegation and liaison
devices
Three internal elements will be discussed briefly in this subsection
which are formalisation, authority delegation and liaison devices. The purpose
of this discussion is to relate them later in this chapter to the different
competitive strategies. These links will then be empirically tested in later
chapters.
5.3.2.1 Formalisation
Formalisation can be defined as the extent to which rules, procedures,
communications and instructions are written. This definition is consistent with
that of Oldham and Hackman (1981), Pugh et al (1969) and Price and Mueller
(1986). Reimann (1974) stated that formalisation is "the extent to which an
employee's role is defined by formal documentation" (p. 697). Mintzberg (1979)
defines formalisation as the design parameter by which the work processes of
the organisation are standardised. As Bjork (1975) suggests, organisations
formalise behaviour to reduce variability, ultimately to predict and control it.
Furthermore, Lado and Wilson (1994) note that the use of rules and
standard operating procedures and of hierarchical authority to achieve co-
ordination and control of operations may contribute to the attainment of the
goals of a bureaucratic organisation (e.g., stability, predictability, and
efficiency). Organisations apply formalisation to predict performance and
control employees' behaviour at work; therefore, the more stable and repetitive
the work, the more programmed it is and the more bureaucratic that part of the
organisation (Mintzberg, 1979). Formalisation pertains to the use of rules and
official procedures in prescribing organisational behaviour (Hall, 1972). Such
formalised procedures seek to provide the firm with the ability to achieve
greater efficiency at the lowest cost. Therefore, high formalisation means an
explicit (generally written) definition of rules and procedures that are required
to perform an action and leads to a standardisation of procedures and behaviour.
Burns and Stalker (1961) note that some organisations issue a printed book of
their policies, regulations and procedures. Mintzberg (1979) suggests three ways
to formalise employees' behaviour in an organisation:
1. Formalisation by job: in this case, the organisation will use formal job
descriptions;
2. Formalisation by work flow: instead of attaching specifications to the
jobs, the organisation can instead link them to the work itself, i.e.
specify work steps and procedures;
3. Formalisation by rules: the organisation may establish rules for all
situations - all jobs, all work flows, all workers.
Furthermore, one might argue that since organisations formalise
behaviour to control it, a negative correlation is likely between formalisation
and organisational level; low organisational levels will be more formalised than
high levels. Aiken and Hage (1966) note that the basic tenet of formalisation is
that organisations establish hierarchies in which supervisors have greater
authority to direct the behaviour of their subordinates, rather than the other way
round. Hall (1962), in support of this view, also finds that departments or
organisations that perform uniform, easily routinised tasks are more
bureaucratic and formalised than those that do not.
5.3.2.2 Authority delegation
Authority is defined as the right given to an executive in association
with his position to perform roles; such rights are legitimated by consensual
decisions codified in constitutions, contracts, charters, rulings, and other
accepted institutional sanctions (Cartwright, 1965; Gilman, 1962; Katz & Kahn,
1978; Kahn and Kram, 1994). Dessler (1986) views authority as the right each
position holder has to influence or command thought, opinion or behaviour.
This gives managers the right to carry out their tasks by orders given to their
subordinates, and to expect compliance. Delegation of authority can be seen in
terms of the ratio of the number of specific management decisions the chief
executive delegates to the number he has the authority to make, that is, those
decisions he does not have to refer to a higher authority (Reimann, 1973).
The complexity of a task and environmental uncertainty in which a firm
operates are related to the degree of authority in the organisation. As Thompson
(1967), Hickson et al (1971) and Perrow (1972) state, functional groups that are
effectively handling uncertainty tend to have more authority than non-functional
groups. Miller (1988) argues that in the case of complexity and change in
product design, top executives may be too remote from the situation or too
untrained to make the necessary judgement. Burns and Stalker (1961), Miller
and Friesen (1984), Mintzberg (1979) and Thompson (1967) also argue that
such a situation creates the need for the delegation of authority to the expert
most capable of making critical decisions. Burns and Stalker (1961) also state
that the degree of legitimate authority in a bureaucratic and mechanistic
organisation is clearly specified, strictly followed and widely known, while in
an organic organisation the degree of legitimate authority is often blurred.
5.3.2.3 Liaison devices
Liaison devices can be defined as the extent to which organisations use
integrative mechanisms to ensure collaboration and compatibility between the
decisions in the different departments (e.g. marketing, production, legal, and so
on). Mintzberg (1979:162-175) gives four basic types of liaison devices. These
are:
1. Liaison positions: when a considerable amount of contact is
necessary to co-ordinate the work of two units, a "liaison" position
may be formally established to route the communication directly,
by-passing the vertical channels;
2. Task forces and standing committees: a task force is a committee
formed to accomplish a particular task and then disbanded; a
standing committee is a more permanent interdepartmental
grouping that meets regularly to discuss issues of common interest;
3. Integrating managers: when more co-ordination by mutual
adjustment is required than liaison positions, task forces, and
standing committees can provide, the organisation may designate
an integrating manager, in effect a liaison position with formal
authority; and
4. Matrix structures: by using a matrix structure, the organisation
avoids choosing one basis of grouping over another: instead it
chooses both; a matrix structure seems to be the most effective
device for developing new activities and for co-ordinating complex
multiple interdependencies, but it is no place for those in need of
security and stability.
Liaison devices are generally used where work is horizontally
specialised, complex and highly interdependent (Mintzberg, 1979). As for
example when the strategy of innovation requires collaboration between
specialists such as scientists and engineers from different departments to design
innovation. This may also require collaboration with other department staff such
as pricing, packing, and so on. Thus, such complexity will create
interdependencies that require close contact among managers (Galbraith, 1973;
Thompson, 1967). Therefore, Miller and Droge (1986) argue that the more
complex and diverse the array of departments and roles (Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967), the more intensive the face-to-face liaison devices to promote
collaboration and resolve differences (Galbraith, 1973). The different types of
liaison devices such as task forces and committees and others (as mentioned
above) may facilitate such collaboration. However, complex work can, of
course, be co-ordinated by standardising the skills used to do it, but only as long
as the interdependencies are not great (Mintzberg, 1979).
5.3.3 Management styles
Researchers have studied strategy, especially Porter's competitive
strategies and described them in detail (e.g. Dess and Davis, 1984; Hambrick,
1983b; Miller and Friesen, 1986). Yet these researchers have chosen to ignore
organisational factors such as control processes, investigating the possibility
that a firm will have a good performance if its strategy suits its environment.
The work of Goold and Campbell (1987), as has been mentioned earlier,
will be used as an organising form in this section. Each of the three management
styles (Strategic Planning, Strategic Control, and Financial Control) that they
describe is more or less appropriate in different business circumstances; thus no
one style is conclusively superior to others. The different control process styles
(flexible strategic control, tight strategic control, and tight financial control) will
be discussed under the three management styles consecutively. Competitive
strategies, which have been developed in Chapter 3, will be linked with these
three types of management style. However, before doing so, a brief description
will be given to each of these styles as Goold and Campbell present them.
5.3.3.1 Strategic Planning style
The structure of the strategic planning organisation encourages different
levels in the organisation, and other businesses or division with a related or
overlapping interest, to put forward relevant ideas. Strategic planning
companies are helping businesses to embark on strategies to build long-term
competitive advantage; they also place a heavy burden on the capability and
knowledge of the corporate management group. In general, strategic planning
companies place rather less emphasis on corporate control. Performance targets
are set flexibly, and reviewed within the context of long-term strategic progress.
The organisation of strategic planning companies is typically less clear-cut than
in strategic control or financial control companies. The objective in such
companies is to build strong core businesses, and to expand in areas related to
existing businesses and new ones.
Corporate management in strategic planning companies believe that the
centre should participate in and influence the development of business unit
strategies. Their influence takes two forms: establishing a demanding planning
process and making contributions of substance to strategic thinking. Therefore,
in order for the strategic planning style to work well, it requires central
management to have close knowledge of the business units. However, this
criterion is most likely to be met in less diverse companies, and in companies
where corporate management has personal experience of the businesses. As far
as the structure is concerned, individual businesses within strategic planning
companies are encouraged to push for optimum utilisation of their resources for
the achievement of competitive advantage. Therefore, the chief executive officer
has strong central functional support, and the business operates mainly in some
form of (formal or informal) product-geographic matrix to ensure global co-
ordination of strategy. In these organisations profit centres propose strategies.
However, the centres not only react to business proposals, but also take the
initiative in putting forward ideas and co-ordinating strategies between
businesses.
5.3.3.2 Strategic Control style
According to Goold and Campbell (1987), the predominant
organisational theme of the strategic control companies is the creation or
reinforcement of independence, where divisions can devise their own strategies
with little need for co-ordination between divisions, which means that each
division will be separately accountable for its results. In this type, the centre is
less closely involved with each business, hence it is more able to handle a wide
portfolio of interests than with strategic planning; and it is better placed than
financial control to take account of the long time horizons that some businesses
require. Furthermore, in terms of strategic control-type activities, organisations
aim to balance the desire to reinforce competitive advantage with the need to
satisfy financial objectives, and there is acceptance of the need for long-term
investment.
The control processes in these companies are closely linked to the
planning process. A detailed reporting of performance for each profit centre to
the corporate management is a common practice. The strategic control
companies, however, are more prepared to accept a divisional role than the
financial control companies in co-ordinating between businesses, and a
corporate role in checking that opportunities have not been missed. Strategic
control companies are also concerned with business unit planning; but they
believe in organising around independent profit-responsible business units and
leaving as much as possible to the initiative of the management of the business
unit. The centre focuses more on establishing demanding planning processes
and on reviewing and criticising business unit proposals, than in advocating
particular ways forward. Strategic control companies try to exercise tight
control against results achieved, taking into account both financial and strategic
objectives. Therefore, responsibility for strategy is delegated to the group level
managers, where each group can then adopt its own, perhaps different, style for
dealing with its portfolio. The style of the central management in strategic
control companies is flexible enough to accommodate different divisions, each
with its own style.
5.3.3.3 Financial Control style
The structure of financial control companies is similar to that of strategic
control companies, but they go a step further in decentralising responsibility and
setting up separate business units. Individual businesses, in this type, seek high
margins, often in more protected speciality niches of a market, or through cost
reduction programmes. Therefore they avoid risky, long payback investments in
•
defence of competitive advantage.
In financial control organisations there is little or no co-ordination
between businesses, thus they discourage overlaps between those businesses. A
focus on the budget process is the central aspect of planning processes in this
management style. They also give more prominence to short-term financial
performance in assessing strategies. The structure of financial control
companies is characterised by a high degree of decentralisation of strategy and
responsibility that allows extensive diversity to be manageable. Therefore, the
prime profit responsibility is pushed down to the lowest level in the
organisational structure, where there are layers of general management on the
top of that. Thus, the headquarters is slim, supported only by a strong finance
function.
However, to make sure that decentralisation works, the financial control
organisation limits corporate interventions and co-ordination between
businesses. The control process creates a great pressure for success and an
atmosphere that financially rewards those who do succeed. But it can inhibit
innovation, risk-taking, and long-term business building. Financial control
companies are primarily control organisations. In other words, they have no
formal long-term planning systems but instead they are primarily concerned
with financial results and control against annual targets.
5.3.4 Formal control processes and competitive
strategies
As mentioned earlier, firms need to maintain "strategic coherence" in
order to achieve and sustain the potential offered by their competitive
advantage. One aspect of this general strategic coherence is "organisational
coherence". The organisational coherence will be discussed and thus achieved
through appropriate links between firms' competitive strategies and the internal
and external factors. Based on the previous discussion, this section will start
dealing with "organisational coherence" by linking the four competitive
strategies to the different formal control processes. These links will be then
directly hypothesised and tested in later chapters.
Firms that pursue a strategy of price leadership (PL) need to achieve the
lowest-cost position in an industry. They must devote much effort to control the
cost of different activities so that above-average returns can be obtained. Such
activities include operating efficiency, product and quality control, and
procurement of raw materials. Product lines in such firms remain, in general,
rather stable. Since products are more standardised and less innovative, there is
little need for specialists such as engineers and scientists who are more useful
for handling complex, unstructured problems; therefore, co-ordination can be
effected mainly through formal control and hierarchies (Miller, 1988).
As noted earlier, formalised procedures also seek to provide the firm
with the ability to achieve the lowest-cost position. Mintzberg (1979) argues
that when the work is not both horizontally specialised and interdependent,
close co-ordination is not necessary and the liaison devices will not be used in
such organisations. He further argues that when work is not complex, the
necessary co-ordination could be achieved largely by direct supervision or the
standardisation of work process or outputs. These formal controls and
standardised procedures can also minimise the need for the delegation of
authority (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). Price leadership organisations may use
the simplest type of the three interdependencies type suggested by Thompson
(1967), which is pooled interdependence. This type, which is the least costly
one, simply means that units share the same pool of resources such as money,
managerial talent or space (Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978).
Furthermore, a price leadership competitive strategy needs to find a
means of ensuring cost efficient operations and clear definitions of
responsibility for budget and control; therefore, to be more effective, it requires
a managerial style, the main task of which is to sanction expenditure and
monitor performance against targets. Thus, in order to keep costs, and thus
prices, at a minimum level, there will be a strong emphasis (by firms using such
a competitive strategy) on formal profit and budget controls (Henderson, 1979;
Porter, 1980; Miller, 1988).
A firm that uses a differentiation (DIF) competitive strategy can achieve
its competitive advantage by using its resources, technology and organisational
competencies to offer existing products more efficiently or to introduce new
products/services. Van de Yen (1986) describes innovation as a complex,
ambiguous process that requires the management of an extensive network of
personal and group interactions as a new idea moves from conception to
implementation. Such a firm needs an organisational structure which encourages
and motivates development and innovation, hence co-ordination between
business units, which helps to provide the collaboration of specialists from
different areas of the firm. For example, differentiation and new product/service
development require that research and development staff members, for instance,
have to resolve rapidly emerging manufacturing problems with production
engineering. They also have to consider marketing issues, such as pricing and
packaging, with marketing managers. Therefore, these complexities create
reciprocal interdependencies (Thompson, 1967) that require close contact,
through integrative liaison devices, among managers (Galbraith, 1973; Miller,
1988). Miller et al (1988) note that innovation will also impose administrative
complexity that requires the delegation of authority to experts in the firm. Burns
and Stalker (1961); Pierce and Delbecq (1977); Thompson (1967); Tornatzky et
al (1983), and others, generally indicate a link between higher levels of
innovation and more organic structures characterised by decentralisation, lack of
formalisation, and high levels of complexity.
Since the development of innovative product and process attributes
implies a long-run investment, that needs to be directed by differentiators, such
organisation requires a system that places less emphasis on financial control and
has a flexible set of performance targets, especially in the short term. Innovative
differentiation also requires an organisational structure that has flexible control
in terms of actual performance versus planned objectives. In other words, it
requires strategic planning that facilitates the complex and continual innovation,
and allow collaboration among specialists to create new products and to deal
more effectively and rapidly with the firm's complex and dynamic environment.
These themes are also stressed by Burns and Stalker (1961); Lawrence and
Lorsch, (1967); and Mintzberg (1979).
The previous discussion of the links between formal control processes
and the two competitive strategies represents two extremes, where a PL strategy
stands at one end and a DIF strategy at the other end. So, for example, a
differentiation competitive strategy is more effective when it is linked with high
degrees of authority delegation, liaison devices and lesser degrees of
formalisation, while the opposite is true for a PL strategy. The other two
strategies (i.e. LCD and IMT competitive strategies) have the same supply side
as PL and DIF competitive strategies respectively, but with different demand
sides. Therefore, in terms of these formal control factors, low cost
differentiation (LCD) is expected to be closer to PL competitive strategy while
imitation (IMT) is expected to be closer to DIF competitive strategies.
The demand side activities of LCD (which is marketing differentiation)
require different functional links compared to those of the price competition in
the PL. Compared with price competition, marketing differentiation requires
more communication and co-ordination between different departments;
authority is also likely to be then delegated to this department. In terms of the
interdependence required in firms using both LCD and IMT, competitive
strategies can be described as sequential interdependence (Thompson, 1967),
which is between the pooled and reciprocal interdependencies discussed earlier.
However, since marketing activities are the main characteristic of the demand
side of the LCD, the sequential interdependence will be forced and dominated
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more by the marketing department than by other departments such as R&D,
manufacturing and finance. But in the IMT firms where price competition is the
main characteristic of the demand side, and hence marketing activities are less
important, the sequential interdependence will therefore be forced more by the
R&D and manufacturing departments than by other departments such as
marketing and finance. Thus, it will be expected that LCD will require a higher
degree of authority delegation, liaison devices, and a lesser degree of
formalisation than PL.
However, since a low cost differentiation competitive strategy has the
same supply side characteristic as the PL strategy, it will be closer to the PL
strategy than to the differentiation strategy in terms of these functions. Turning
to the demand side of the imitation and differentiation competitive strategies, it
can be seen that the former requires more emphasis on cost control systems than
the latter.
Furthermore, innovative differentiation activities on the supply side
(which are used by firms following IMT) may incrementally improve the
technologies and products first introduced by differentiators to reduce costs.
Thus, as discussed earlier, it will be expected that IMT will require a lesser
degree of authority delegation, liaison devices and higher degree of
formalisation than DIF. However, since an imitation competitive strategy has
similar supply side characteristics to a differentiation strategy, it will be closer
to a differentiation strategy than to the PL strategy in terms of these formal
control processes.
Finally, in terms of the three management styles, price leadership and
differentiation competitive strategies have been linked to the financial control
and strategic planning, respectively. As noted earlier, the characteristics of the
strategic control organisational management style is to exercise tight control
against results achieved, while taking into account both financial and strategic
objectives. Therefore, both low cost differentiation and imitation strategies are
expected to be more effective when they are linked with the strategic control
management style.
5.4 Informal control
In previous sections we discussed ways that organisational factors may
facilitate or prevent a firm achieving its competitive advantage. But the way in
which people in an organisation perceive their organisational strategies, and
implement them, is another important internal factor that affects the
achievement and sustainability of competitive advantage.
Schwartz and Davis (1981) state that executives are generally more
aware that a firm's management systems and the skills and experience of its
people are as much a part of its organisation as its structure. In any organisation,
however, there are invisible forces behind all actions and decisions. These
invisible forces, such as assumptions, values and beliefs represent the culture
which influences the more visible things, such as structure. Changing these
visible factors is much easier than changing the invisible ones. Thus, this
change will affect the culture of the organisation or the invisible assumptions,
values and beliefs. Behavioural norms may fall between these two extremes, as
illustrated in Figure 5.8.
Assumptions, beliefs and values are more difficult to examine and to
change than behavioural norms (Kilmann et al, 1985). Sathe (1985) argues that
one way of changing people's beliefs and values is first to change their
corresponding behaviour. Thus, even though assumptions, values and beliefs
have an influence on the behavioural norms, change in the latter can affect the
former, and vice versa. Other interaction will also take place between the
behavioural norms and the more formal control processes in the organisation
such as structure. Figure 5.8 illustrates the levels of visibility of these factors, as
well as the interactions between them. Both the behavioural norms and the
assumptions, values and beliefs will combine in this study to represent informal
control processes in the organisation. This is illustrated in Figure 5.8, and it will
be discussed in more detail later.
The purpose of this section, therefore, is to discuss informal control
processes to complement the discussion of the internal 'or organisational' factors
(as illustrated in Figure 5.3) which may act as potential barriers to a firm's
competitive strategy and then prevent it from achieving and sustaining its
competitive advantage. This will be organised as follows: different elements of
informal control processes will be discussed by reviewing the literature on

















Miles and Snow's (1978) typologies (prospectors, analysers, defenders,
and reactors) are used to describe how an organisation behaves strategically, and
represent a dominant culture in the organisation (Johnson and Scholes, 1993).
Three of these typologies (prospectors, analysers and defenders; the exclusion
of the reactors will be explained in the next section) will be used as proxy
indicators of informal control processes (i.e. assumptions, values and beliefs).
Even though these typologies were not originally developed simply to measure
the informal control process they will nevertheless, for reasons detailed below,
be used in this study as proxy indicators providing subjective perception of the
informal control processes of the study respondents. These reasons can be
categorised into two main ones: firstly, the difficulties of measuring informal
control process by using a questionnaire as a measuring instrument (reasons for
using such a measuring instrument will be discussed later); and secondly, the
fact that this study, as previously mentioned, regards other "organising
strategies" as exogenous parameters that may act as potential barriers to
competitive strategies in achieving competitive advantage.
The behavioural norms (summarised by risk-taking propensity) will then
be discussed as another element of informal control processes that link the
organisational culture with the formal control process. Finally, the elements of
the informal control process will be linked with the four competitive strategies.
5.4.1 Elements of the informal control processes
Reviewing the organisational culture literature, there are several
definitions available, some are general and short, and others are long and more
elaborated. Smircich (1983), for example, has cited five classes or themes.
First, culture, in the comparative management theme, is one instrument
serving human biological and psychological needs. Culture, therefore, is
considered to be a background factor, a broad framework, or an explanatory
variable influencing the development and reinforcement of beliefs.
Second, culture, in the corporate theme, functions as an adaptive
regulatory mechanism. It unites individuals into social structures; organisations
are seen as social instruments that produce goods and services, and as a by-
product, they also produce distinctive cultural artefacts such as rituals, legends
and ceremonies.
Third, culture, in the organisational cognition theme, is a system of
shared cognitions or a system of knowledge and beliefs. The human mind
generates culture by means of a finite number of rules. Therefore, culture is seen
as "a unique system for perceiving and organising material phenomena, things,
events, behaviour and emotions" (Goodenough, 1971).
Fourth, anthropologists such as Geertz (1973) treat societies, or cultures,
as systems of shared symbols and meaning. Therefore culture, in this theme i.e.
organisational symbolism, is a system of shared symbols and meanings.
Symbolic action needs to be interpreted, read or deciphered in order to be
understood.
Finally, culture may also be regarded as the expression of an
unconscious psychological process. Thus organisational forms and practices,
from this point of view, are understood as projections of unconscious processes
and are analysed with reference to the dynamic interplay between out-of-
awareness process and their conscious manifestation.
Furthermore, there is no consensus about definition of organisational
culture, but authors will probably agree on the following characteristics of an
organisational culture construct as being:
(1) holistic,
(2) a pattern of basic assumptions and anthropological concepts,
(3) historically determined and socially constructed,
(4) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group,
(5) difficult to change.
(6) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and
therefore,
(7) is to be taught to new members as a correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to those problems. (Schein, 1990:111;
Hofstede et al, 1990:286).
Moreover, there are basic concepts in the literature, such as symbols,
beliefs and values, norms, and myths, which have direct relevance to the
concerns of organisational culture. These concepts are also important for
describing how organisations create a strong organisational culture (Bolman and
Deal, 1984; Hofstede et al, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979; Sathe, 1985; Schein, 1985).
Symbols which serve as vehicles for group and organisational conception can
attach names and meaning to the organisation's values, structure, beliefs and
vocabulary. Hofstede et al. (1990:291) defined symbols as "words, gestures,
pictures, or objects that carry a particular meaning within a culture". Shared
beliefs and values in the organisation are very important to the organisational
culture. Schein (1985) describes them as the way people dommunicate, explain,
rationalise and justify what they say and do as a community. Norms in the
organisation are prescriptions for behaviour that emerge in a particular social
context, they are standards of expected behaviour, speech, and presentation of
self (Sathe, 1983:13). Myths are shared organisational stories that explain,
express, maintain solidarity and cohesion, legitimise, communicate unconscious
wishes and conflicts, mediate contradictions, and provide narrative to anchor the
present in the past. Because myths are often about an event that happened in the
past, they link the past, present, and future, they have some truth and quality
that can reinforce the solidarity and stability of the organisation (Cohen, 1969).
However, based on the previous discussion, the concept of culture that
will be used here is organisational culture defined as a complex set of
assumptions, beliefs and values that people in an organisation share about the
way in which it conducts business and manages itself. This definition is
consistent with most research in the area (Lorsch, 1985; Wilkins and Patterson,
1985; Barney, 1986b; Peters and Waterman, 1982, and others).
Lorsch (1985) argues that beliefs in the organisation can inhibit strategic
change in two ways. First, if these beliefs produce a strategic myopia. Second,
that when managers can overcome such myopia, they respond to changing
events in terms of their culture, even though their deeply held beliefs represent
an invisible barrier that must be penetrated if strategic change is to take place
(Lorsch, 1985: 90-91). Peters and Waterman (1982:75) regard culture as
representing the shared values of an organisation's members. Schwartz and
Davis (1981: 33) regard culture as "a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared
by the organisation's members" that produce "norms that powerfully shape the
behaviour of individuals and groups in the organisation". Organisational culture
may be considered, however, as another key by which strategic managers can
influence and direct the course of their organisation (Schwartz and Davis 1981).
A firm's culture which can be a source of competitive advantage
(Barney, 1986b; Fiol, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) will also affect the
strategic choice of any organisation. Culture, in any organisation, is considered
to be the invisible force behind the actions taken by such an organisation
(Lorsch 1985). The behaviour of the people in the firm may be shaped by
corporate culture. Hence, culture in any firm has a powerful influence on the
behaviour of managers, where it can strongly affect a firm's ability to shift its
strategic choice and direction. As a result, it may have a major effect on the
achievement and sustainability of the firm's competitive advantage. Schwartz
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and Davis (1981) point out that well-run corporations have distinctive cultures
that are somehow responsible for their ability to create, implement, and
maintain their world leadership positions. Peters and Waterman (1982) argue
that the dominance of culture is an essential ingredient of the excellent
companies they studied; they also state that poor-performing companies tend to
have cultures that focus on internal politics instead of the product or the people
who make it. Denison's (1984) study of thirty-four corporations found, for
example, a significant relationship between culture and corporate performance.
Some researchers (e.g. Smircich 1983) argue that the components of
organisational culture include values, assumptions and beliefs which are as
difficult to purposefully change as they are to describe. Others, however,
describe ways in which an organisational culture can be managed (e.g. Peter,
1978; Tichy, 1983). Therefore, it can be concluded from the previous
discussion, that there are invisible forces behind all actions and decisions.
The managers' perception of the bases of the competitive advantage can
be a powerful tool in strategic decision making, and sometimes trigger a change
in strategic direction. Therefore, if a chief executive officer is strongly
committed to a concept such as the veiw that profitability is driven primarily by
cost control and is further committed to stability and growth of quarterly
earning, it is unlikely that a single unit or division will develop a culture that
values programmes that are innovative, long-term, and expansionary, but risky
(Gordon, 1985). Dess and Davis (1984) used managers' perception in their
empirical investigation of Porter's generic strategies; they compared managerial
perception of competitive strategies with those of academics (or experts). Their
findings, however, show a lack of agreement between experts and managers in
relating the competitive methods used to rate competitive strategies. Thus,
although both managers and experts are looking at the same strategies with
similar circumstances, each group perceives them differently.
Bowman's (1992) empirical investigation into managers' perceptions of a
set of strategic priorities, using Porter's generic strategies, found that when
managers were presented with a set of strategic priorities they were able to
group them differently according to their own perception. Thus, the perceptions
and assumptions of managers about their organisational culture and competitive
strategies will affect the firm's achievement and sustainability of its competitive
advantage. For example, the managing director may think that the firm is
following an efficiency-driven strategy, whilst the sales director may emphasise
marketing differentiation, and the finance director may believe that the firm is
following neither, but be chiefly concerned with competing on price, and so on.
No organisation can function if, in every respect, each manager has a different
view of his or her organisational world (Bowman and Johnson, 1992). Whipp et
al (1989b) conclude that it is not only that more than one culture may exist
within a firm, they also may be in conflict.
•
Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) argue that among several typologies which
conceptualise various aspects of organisational behaviour (such as Etzioni,
1961; Blau and Scott, 1962; Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Segal, 1974;
Anderson and Paine, 1975; Miles and Snow, 1978), the typology of Miles and
Snow (1978) is the only one that characterises an organisation as a complete
system, especially its strategic orientation. In addition to the comprehensiveness
of these typologies which represent strategies, organisational structure and
process, each type represents a dominant culture of the organisation. Johnson
and Scholes (1993) also state that when undertaking a strategic analysis the
Miles and Snow (1978) typology provides a mean of assessing the dominant
culture of the organisation. Therefore, Miles and Snow (1978), for the reasons
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discussed earlier in this section, will be presented in the following discussion as
proxy indicators of the informal control process. A brief description of these
typologies will be discussed, then they will be linked to the four competitive
strategies in the next section.
Prospectors: in general, they devote more resources to entrepreneurial
tasks, monitoring evolving trends in the marketplace, and new product
development, and are led by a dominant coalition that possesses an expertise in
marketing and research and development. These organisations respond rapidly
to early signals concerning areas of opportunity and often lead to a new round of
competitive actions. Furthermore, this type of organisation typically operates
within a broad product-market domain that undergoes periodic redefinition. The
organisation values being "first in" in new product and market area.
In contrast to prospectors are defenders. Defenders: those in which the
prevailing beliefs are conservative; they attempt to locate and maintain a secure
niche in a relatively stable products or services area, where low-risk strategies
are valued. They emphasis control and efficiency, hence they look for a secure
market and tend to offer a more limited range of products or services than their
competitors, therefore they are not in the forefront of development and
innovation in their industry. They also tend to ignore industry changes that have
no direct influence on current areas of operation, and concentrate instead on
doing the best job possible in a limited area.
Analysers: although managers in these organisational types attempt to
maintain a stable limited level of products and services, (at the same time) they
move out quickly to follow a carefully selected set of the more promising new
developments in the industry. Therefore, they will never try to be the "first" in a
new product or service as the prospectors do, but by careful monitoring of the
actions of major competitors in areas compatible with their stable products-
market base, they can frequently be the "second in" with a more cost efficient
product or service.
The fourth organisational type, the reactors, will be excluded in this
study, because such an organisational type, as described by Miles and Snow
(1978), has no consistent pattern of behaviour, and no consistent configuration
of distinctive competencies (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). Reactors also lack
adaptive capabilities because they fail to develop the mechanisms needed to
sense and respond to changes in the market place (Conant et al, 1990; McKee et
al, 1989). Moreover, this type has been excluded by a large number of the
studies that used these typologies (e.g. McDaniel and Kolari, 1987; Meyer,
1982; Hawes and Crittenden, 1984; Segev, 1989; Chaganti and Sambharya,
1987).
Sathe (1983) argues that even though both values and beliefs, and
behavioural norms have "ought to" implicit in them, behavioural norms are
more tactical and procedural than values and beliefs (i.e. culture). He also
argues that people's behaviour patterns may differ from their shared values,
assumptions and beliefs; that is why the "cultural metamorphosis" was directed
at changes in people's behaviour and failed to pay attention to their shared
beliefs and values. As discussed earlier, the changes in the behavioural norms
do not necessarily produce cultural change. However, it is more visible and
hence easier to change people's behaviour than to change their values and
beliefs. Sathe (1983) states that managers should not always strive to create
cultural change, because there are times when only behavioural change is
appropriate or is all that is possible; however, managers should always make the
parallel in changing the behavioural norms and the values, assumptions and
beliefs. Behavioural norms have been considered as the links between the
visible and invisible factors, as illustrated in Figure 5.8.
Even though behavioural norms are complex and multidimensional, risk-
taking propensity will be considered in this study as a summary indicator of
behavioural norms. Pearce and Robinson (1985, 1988) discuss the relationship
between the managerial attitudes toward risk and strategic choice and stated that
managers' attitudes toward risk determine top executives' strategic choices.
Jennings and Lumplcin (1992) argue that the beliefs and expectations of
managers are formalised based on their definitions of what phenomena are
considered to be relevant, important, and desirable. Managers, therefore, may
develop strategies based on their perceptions "to deal" with these situations
(Goleman, 1985; Starbuck, 1983). Hax and Majluf (1984:202) also stated in this
respect that risk assessment involves an exercise of high subjectivity. Jennings
and Lumpkin (1992) note that different attributes exist between managers
practising a differentiation strategy and those employing a cost leadership (price
leadership) strategy. Supporting such argument, Miller and Friesen (1982), for
example, find that entrepreneurial firms have a higher level of risk-taking and
innovation than conservative (bureaucratic) ones. Risk-taking propensity,
therefore, refers to an individual's attitudes toward acceptance of risk in his
decision.
5.4.2 Informal control processes and competitive
strategies
Based on the previous discussion, this section will complement the
discussion of "organisational coherence" (presented in Section 5.3.4). The four
competitive strategies will be linked to the different informal control processes
(as internal factors) as they have been presented in the previous section. Since
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these competitive strategies have been defined, they will be used as a
benchmark in measuring this part of organisational coherence. These links will
then be directly hypothesised and tested in later chapters.
Firms pursue a strategy of price leadership devoting much effort to
controlling the cost of different activities so that above-average returns can be
obtained. These firms need managerial skills and competencies in order to be
able to control costs, manage efficiency, and so on. Therefore, in order to
achieve such control and efficiency, managers in such organisations are
expected to look for a secure market and, hence, tend to offer a more limited
range of products or services than their competitors. Since innovation and new
development require investment rather than cost minimisation, managers are
expected to believe that they are not in the forefront of development and
innovation in their industry. In other words, to believe that they engage in little
development of new products or new markets. Managers of such firms need also
to recognise that their customers care about low price more than about image or
novelty, a case which requires them to believe that the product-line should
remain rather stable, and hence avoid costly changes and innovations.
Therefore, in terms of informal control processes these managers are expected
to take the position of the defenders. Finally, Miller and Toulouse (1986) find
that managers pursuing strategies of cost/price leadership tended to have less
risk-taking propensity, less tolerance for ambiguity, and have less tendancy to
perceive on internal locus of control relative to their counterparts pursuing
strategies of differentiation.
A firm that uses a differentiation competitive strategy aims to create a
product or service that customers see as unique. This require managers to
recognise that they should use the firm's resources, technology and
organisational competencies to offer existing products more efficiently or to
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introduce new products/services. These organisations also aim to lead
competitive actions and to generate such new products/processes faster than
competitors. These activities require managers to believe that their organisation
should respond rapidly to early signals concerning areas of opportunity and be
the first in new product and market areas. Managers are also expected to
recognise the dynamics and change in their business environment, which should
lead them to believe more in the importance of crafting procedures that invoke
strategic responses to achieve survival and success in this dynamic competitive
environment. Therefore, a prospector's culture in these organisations is expected
to be effective in facilitating such activities. Differentiation often involves new
technologies, unforeseen customer and competitor reactions, and the confluence
of many unstructured marketing problems (Hofer and Schendel 1978; Miles and
Snow 1978; Miller and Friesen 1984; Miller, 1988). All these will decrease the
manager's knowledge of future consequences, or even the possible outcome of
each alternative, which leads to the position of uncertainty. Therefore, managers
in such firms are expected to be willing to take a high risk in their decisions.
Low cost differentiation and imitation competitive strategies have the
same supply side as the PL and DIF competitive strategies respectively, but
different demand sides. As argued earlier, the analysers' culture is between the
prospectors and the defenders. Thus, because the demand side activities of LCD
(which is marketing differentiation) require different functional links compared
to those of price competition in the PL, and because the demand side activities
of IMT (which is price competition) require different functional links compared
to those of marketing differentiation in the DIF, both LCD and IMT are
expected to be more effective in organisations that have the characteristics of
the analysers' culture. However, since the LCD competitive strategy has the
same supply side characteristic as the PL strategy, it will be closer to the
defenders' characteristics than to those of the prospectors. Similarly, since the
IMT competitive strategy has the same supply side characteristic as the DIF
strategy, it will be closer to the prospectors characteristics than to those of the
defenders. Because of the uncertainty which is involved with a differentiation
strategy, managers are expected to be risk-takers, while the opposite is true with
PL competitive strategy. Therefore, considering the similarities and differences
in these four competitive strategies, LCD will be closer to PL than to DIF, in
terms of risk-taking propensity in this continuum; and the opposite is true with
IMT competitive strategy.
5.5 Conclusion
The potential internal barriers to achieving competitive advantage have
been discussed in this chapter under two general types of control processes,
which are formal and informal. The formal control processes have been
categorised into six forms: formalisation, authority delegation, liaison devices,
strategic planning, strategic control and financial control. They have then been
linked to the four competitive strategies to form part of the internal
"organisational coherence". The informal control processes have been
categorised into four forms: prospectors, analysers, defenders, and risk-taking
propensity. These have also been linked to the four competitive strategies to
form a complete picture of the internal "organisational coherence". These links
will be hypothesised in Chapter 7 and then will be tested in later chapters. The
next chapter, however, will continue the discussion of the potential barriers to
achieving competitive advantage by discussing the external or environmental
barriers; it will, at the same time, complete the discussion of "organisational
coherence".
Chapter 6
Barriers to achieving competitive
advantage II: External factors
6.1 Introduction
In addressing the issue of the major barriers that may prevent firms from
achieving and sustaining their competitive advantage, this chapter now turns to
the external factors or the environmental barriers. It has been proposed in this
thesis that firms need "strategic coherence" in order to achieve and sustain
competitive advantage. Four competitive strategies have been defined and
considered to be the benchmark in measuring the different aspects of strategic
coherence (as mentioned in the previous chapter and illustrated in Figure 5.1).
Since the internal part of the "organisational coherence" has been discussed in
the previous chapter, the other part (i.e. the external part) of this aspect of
coherence will be the subject of this chapter. This part of the organisational
coherence will be formed and achieved by appropriate links between the four
competitive strategies and different environmental (or external) factors. In other
words, potential barriers to achieving competitive advantage will exist with the
lack of fit between the firm's competitive strategies and the external factors, as
illustrated in Figure 6.1. However, other potential barriers to these factors, such
as those related to public sector activities, can also be identified and considered
where appropriate. Although such activities will have an effect on the
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the scope of this research a line will be drawn (as illustrated in Figure 6.1)
between these external factors and public sector activities.
Figure 6.1: 
External potential barriers to achieving competitive advantage
Potential Barriers
to Competitive Strategies
The discussion of the external potential barriers will be organised as
follows: the following section will review the literature on the organisation's
external environment. Then various environmental factors will be defined and
discussed as environmental elements that have an effect on the achievement and
sustainability of a firm's competitive advantage. These factors will be then
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linked to the four competitive strategies. Finally, these different links between
the external factors and the competitive strategies will form the external part of
"organisational coherence".
6.2 External environment
The purpose of this section is to review the external environment
literature. Lenz and Engledow (1986) identify five approaches to modelling
environment. Each approach varies in terms of assumptions about
environmental structures, assumptions about the process and causes of
environmental change, and assumptions about how managers or researchers
know and understand environments (Lenz and Engledow, 1986:330). These
approaches are:
(1)Industry structure model (Porter, 1980). The environment in this model is a
pattern of competitive forces. Environmental change stems from the actions of
competitors as well as external forces beyond industry b,oundaries. Change is
evolutionary and occurs at an uneven rate. Knowledge of the environment
should be obtained through a formal competitor analysis system.
(2)Cognitive model (Weick, 1977). The environment, in this model, is a mental
representation embodied in a cognitive structure and is fashioned out of
experiences. Environmental change occurs in retrospect as a prevailing
cognitive structure is reformulated (or replaced) to make sense of unanticipated
events. Knowledge of the environment is obtained by enactment and
organisational learning processes.
(3)Organisational field model (Thompson, 1967 and Bourgeois, 1980). The
relevant environment, in this model, is a field of organisations whose actions
affect and are affected by a focal organisation. Environmental change results
either from trends and forces beyond the proximate field of organisations or
from the changing goal structures of organisations comprising the field.
Knowledge of the environment is acquired by designing organisation structures
and decision processes matched to prevailing environmental contingencies.
(4)Ecological and resource dependent model (Glover, 1966a, 1966b; Aldrich,
1979 and Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The environment in this model is a
system of resources and interconnected organisations. Environment change is
continuous and occurs when there is a variation in this system that affects the
resources necessary for an organisation's survival. Environments are largely
enacted by organisational subunits which gave rise to multiple conceptions of
the environment.
(5)Era model (Loge, 1975 and Yankelovich, 1982). The environment in this
model is a set of social structures, values, and role definitions characterising a
particular period of time. Technology and experiments by individuals searching
for self-fulfilment within the context of prevailing institutions (e.g. family) are
primary sources of environmental change. Change occurs through a three-stage
process: existing order-turbulent transition-new order. Through futurists'
forecasts and consulting services, organisations can give knowledge of their
environments.
This thesis recognises the relevance of these approaches to a firm's
environment, as will be discussed further later. However, the industry model
will dominate the discussion in the next section. The second, third and fourth
models will also be considered later in this study. The Era model will not be
discussed in this thesis because it is not relevant to this study.
The organisational environment literature also reflects two over-arching
factors which can also be related to environment change mentioned in the
previous environmental models. The first is that of information uncertainty,
which suggests that the environment is source of information (Duncan, 1972;
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967 and Tung, 1979). Research based on this
perspective focuses on the emphasis on perceived uncertainty and subjective
rather than objective data generated by participants in an organisation. The
second perspective is resource dependence, which suggests that the environment
is a source of scarce resources required by competing organisations (March and
Simon, 1958; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In this respect, Tan and Litschert
(1994) argue that firms are subject to greater uncertainty when the environment
becomes less munificent or more hostile. Milliken (1987) suggests that there are
three types of uncertainty about environments. Effect uncertainty is an inability
to predict the nature of the effect of a future state of the environment on the
organisation. Response uncertainty is an inability to predict the likely
consequences of a response choice. The third type, state uncertainty, is also
referred to as perceived environmental uncertainty. Perceived environmental
uncertainty occurs when administrators perceive an organisation's environment
to be unpredictable.
Despite the different way in which environments are modelled, Prescott
(1986) argues that research findings suggest that their characteristics influence
decision making through managerial perceptions and objective dimensions of
industrial structures. Bourgeois (1980) also concludes that the issue of an
organisation's environment is not whether measures should be objective or
perceptual, but that both the objective and perceived environments are real and
relevant to an organisation's strategy. Therefore, the environments in which
firms operate have a powerful influence on firms' achievements and
sustainability of competitive advantage. For example, Lenz (1980) found that
the combination of environment, strategy, and organisational structure in high-
performance firms differs significantly from that associated with low-
performance firms. Miles and Snow's (1978) research also indicates that
managers enact their domains by focusing on certain conditions, trends, and
events in their environments.
Miles (1980:195) states that environment can be defined in a simple
way: "just take the universe, subtract from it the subset that represents the
organisation and the remainder is environment". Business environments are
mostly not in a state of equilibrium. Instead they can be characterised by some
degree of change. In changing environments, dynamic analysis is required to
understand and predict the relative ability of firms to sustain competitive
advantage.
The relationships between the environment of an organisation and its
strategy have been addressed by Steiner and Miner (1982:43-45) as follows:
1. It is clear that an organisation does not operate'
 in one but in many
different environments.
2. The forces in environments can affect many different parts of an
enterprise. The influence is complex. Some influences may be direct
and dramatic, others are indirect and subtle.
3. The response of an organisation to environmental change is not
always obvious. Much will depend upon managerial philosophy,
profitability, how managers perceive environmental forces, and so on.
4. The influence process is complex because most things influence all
other things.
5. It is obvious that a manager may face serious conflicts in dealing with
environmental forces.
6. The number of forces is so great in an organisation's environment that
it is impossible to monitor, evaluate and forecast trends in all these
forces; and
7. The influence of environment on business is not a unilateral force.
Business firms individually and collectively have an important impact
on environment.
Organisational environment has been hypothesised and empirically
demonstrated to have significant effects on performance (e.g. Porter, 1980;
Scherer, 1980). Different studies have attempted to examine the relationships
between environment, strategy and performance variables (e.g. Hambrick, 1980;
Hitt, Ireland, and Stadter, 1982; Jauch, Osborn and Gluck, 1980). Prescott
(1986), for example, concludes that environments of an industry moderate the
relationship between a firm's strategy and its performance. The general
conclusion is that the environment creates potential for corn' petitive success and
failure. Firms may sense and respond to the local environment (Burns and
Stalker, 1961; Dess and Beard, 1984; Hambrick, 1983b; Miller and Friesen
1984). Firms can also realise their ability to influence their environment by
reinforcing, through profit, their capacity to accumulate skills and resources and
to innovate, which means that there is some latitude for a firm to select its
strategy (Child, 1972; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985). Probably, as Miller (1988)
suggests, both causal directions interact in an iterative, dynamic process where
strategy defines particular niches of an environment, and environment, through
customer needs and competitors' challenges, induces strategic adaptation. Thus,
it could be argued that an appropriate link between environment and strategy
will affect performance positively. Conversely, an inappropriate link will lead to
low performance.
Different environments will have different sets of critical success factors
(Rockart, 1979). Tushman and Rommelli (1985), and others, have argued that
firms existing in different market and competitive contexts develop different
configurations of activities and decisions to achieve competitive advantage.
When Learned, Christensen, Andrews and Guth, (1969) introduce the concept
of environment in the business policy framework, they describe it as a place that
contains opportunities and threats for organisations. Tushman and Romanelli
(1985), and others, also argue that firms existing in different market and
competitive contexts develop different configurations of activities and decisions
to achieve competitive advantage. Day and Wensley (1988) argue that
definitions of competitive advantage suggest a strong association between
competitive advantage and the effectiveness with which organisations adapt to
environmental change.
Therefore, although environments are places where competitive
advantage originates and from which it must be sustained, environmental factors
by themselves will not ensure the success of all firms. Some firms will prosper
while others fail. This is because not all firms have equal skills and resources,
nor can they exploit the environment equally well (Porter, 1990). Hambrick
(1983a) suggests that strategies do not lead to equal success within an industry
and that some strategies are more successful than others, depending on the type
of environment. The strategic literature (e.g. Miller and Friesen, 1983; Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978) indicates that firms operating in competitive environments
need a distinctive strategic orientation in order to exploit critical environmental
resources and achieve competitive advantage. So, taking into consideration the
complexity of relations of other variables (either internal and/or external), one
of the requirements for survival appears to be the ability of a firm to have a
good fit of its competitive strategy with the environment in which it operates. In
other words, managers should be able to scan and interpret the environment and
make the appropriate links to achieve competitive advantage.
Glaister (1991) concludes that competitive success in particular
industries is the result of an effective combination of favourable national
circumstances and appropriate company strategy. Conditions in a nation may
create an environment in which a firm can attain competitive advantage, but it
is up to a company to seize the opportunity (Porter 1990:78). The logic relating
environment to strategy, and in turn to performance, is compelling, but
empirical investigation to demonstrate the relationship, which will be made
later, has only recently been made for developed countries and has yet to be
made for developing countries (Kim and Lim, 1988).
6.3 Environmental factors
The influence of the external environment on a firm's ability to achieve
and sustain competitive advantage will be discussed in this section. This
discussion will be organised according to five main factors. The first three
factors, which are taken from Porter's (1990) study of national competitive
advantage, are factor conditions, demand conditions, and related and supported
industries. The fourth and the fifth factors are environmental stability and
simplicity. This section will be concluded by discussing the links between
environmental stability and simplicity on one the hand, and the two dimensions
of competitive advantage (the supply and demand sides) on the other.
Porter's (1990) study of national competitive advantage is based upon
analysis of the characteristics of the national environment which influence a
firm's ability to achieve and sustain competitive advantage. Porter identifies four
sets of variables which constitute the "diamond" of national advantage. These
are: factor conditions; demand conditions; related and supporting industries; and
a firm's strategy, structure and rivalry. Thus, he sees that companies gain
advantage against their competitors when they benefit from these factors.
Porter's study focuses on national level advantage, while the focus of this study
is on organisational competitive advantage. Furthermore, when competitive
strategies were derived in Chapter 3 the business environment was considered
as a given factor. Therefore, since firms' strategies and the way that they are
organised and managed have been discussed in earlier chapters and since the
two studies have different foci, the fourth factor (firm's strategy, structure and
rivalry) becomes less relevant to the discussion in this section. This factor will
therefore be excluded from the discussion in this chapter. In chapter 4 the
framework of competitive advantage and generic strategies presented by Porter
(1980, 1985) has been developed. Now the first three,environmental factors will
be discussed in this chapter and then linked to the four competitive strategies.
Two of Porter's national level variables, factor conditions and the presence of
the successful related and supported industries, are influential in determining a
firm's resource strength (i.e. to the supply side competitive advantage), while
the third variable, home demand conditions, has its primary influence upon
conditions for success within the immediate market, (i.e. demand side
competitive advantage) (Grant, 1991b).
6.3.1 Factor conditions
Porter (1990) refers, in the context of factor conditions, to the analysis
of factors of production, such as skilled labour or infrastructure, necessary to
compete in a given industry. He distinguishes between basic factors such as
natural resources and unskilled and semi-skilled labour, and advanced factors
such as communication and sophisticated skills. Porter also sees that the most
important factors of production are those that involve sustained and heavy
investment and are specialised to the need of an industry. Therefore, advanced
factors are the most significant for competitive advantage, especially in
knowledge-intensive industries, and they are the product of investment by
individuals, companies, and government. Hence, competitive advantage results
from the presence of world-class institutions that first create specialised factors
and then work to upgrade them. Basic factors which companies can access
easily do not constitute an advantage, especially in knowledge-intensive
industries. However, there are interactive relationships between basic factors
and advanced factors, where the basic factors may provide the basis of
advantage which can be extended by more advanced factors. Therefore, the
relationship between basic and advanced factors is complex. Grant (1991b)
argues that basic factors can provide initial advantages which are subsequently
extended and reinforced through more advanced factors. However,
disadvantage in the basic factors can create pressure to invest in advanced
factors, as for example, if an industry responds to the disadvantage of high
capital cost, energy cost, lack of raw materials, and so on, by investing in
related technologies.
Porter's view of the achievement and sustainability of competitive
advantage is one of a dynamic process, which involves the upgrading of
competitive advantage. However, Grant (1991b) argues that upgrading is not
only about sustainability of competitive advantage, it also involves greater
complexity and sophistication in technology, skills, and customer relationships.
Grant also sees that sustainability, factor complexity, and productivity tend not
to be perfectly correlated, especially in some countries which have competitive
advantage based upon a very basic advantage, yet apparently quite sustainable.
An example of this is Saudi Arabia's competitive advantage in the supply of
crude oil, which is based upon the very basic advantage of a natural resource,
yet seems quite sustainable. In this regard, Kay (1993) emphasises the
importance of strategic assets as sources of corporate competitive advantage,
which implies that a firm may achieve competitive advantage with no
distinctive capability if it holds strategic assets. He also points out that it is
relatively rare for a corporation to lay exclusive claim to a scarce factor -
whether a broadcasting licence or a natural resource - but common for a country
to do so. Furthermore, Porter's view of sustaining competitive advantage
through the process of innovation and the creation of more advanced factors of
production closely parallels the view in Prahalad and Hamel's (1990) analysis of
'core competencies' discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Thus, when the environment
provides propitious factors, companies may gain competitive advantage when
they have an appropriate competitive strategy. However, it is essential for any
firm to understand the environment where those factors which play an
important role in establishing and sustaining competitive advantage are created,
and match them to its competitive strategy, as will be discussed later.
6.3.2 Demand conditions
Porter places particular emphasis on the composition and characteristics
of home market, which have a disproportionate effect on how companies
perceive, interpret and respond to buyers' needs. Therefore, companies that gain
competitive advantage in their industries usually benefit from having local
customers who are among the world's most demanding buyers of their products
and services. Porter also emphasises the role of home demand, in providing
firms with an earlier picture of emerging buyers' needs, and in pressuring them
to innovate faster and achieve more sophisticated competitive advantage. Thus,
this may require that a firm should anticipate the complexity of customer needs,
preferences, buying patterns, and so on. Therefore, a firm may try to appeal to
buyers on the basis of a product's quality, reliability, convenience or prestige
(Scherer, 1980).
Grant (1991b) argues that Porter's discussion of the links between
domestic demand conditions and national competitive advantage extends the
prior analysis of a scale advantage (price competition) associated with large
home markets which is likely to be found in a stable environment (e.g. Grubel,
1967; Krugman, 1980). However, buyers that provide companies with early
warning indicators of market trends; as well as those buyers who are the world's
most sophisticated and demanding buyers for the product or services will help
those companies gain competitive advantage once ihey have the appropriate
strategy, which is likely to be found in a dynamic environment. This is why this
variable has been picked up by all strategies in the empirical work presented in
this study. Therefore, the environment in which an organisation works
determines which customer (demand) conditions are appropriate. Further
discussion on this subject will follow later in this chapter.
6.3.3 Related and supporting industries
In accordance with Porter (1990), the third broad determinant of
national advantage is the presence in the nation of other industries which can be
grouped into clusters of related and supporting industries. These clusters of
industries may provide an individual industry which is investing in advanced
factors of production with other benefits beyond the boundaries of that industry.
This, however, may take different forms, such as home-based suppliers creating
advantages in downstream industries by delivering the most cost-effective
inputs in an efficient, early, rapid, and sometime preferential way. Moreover,
these close working relationships, or value-adding partnerships (Johnston and
Lawrence, 1988), may encourage innovation and they may also provide the
advantage of short lines of communication, quick and constant flow of
information, and so on. Bartmess and Cerny (1993) call these relationships the
external or inter-organisational links connecting the capabilities of the firm.
These competencies allow firms to transfer these close relationships to a source
of competitive advantage. Furthermore, the economies which may be
considered as external to an individual firm or industry are internalised within
the industry's cluster. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section
when the competitive strategies are related to the environmental determinant
factors.
Grant (1991b), referring to the lack of precision in Porter's 'national
diamond' framework, states that the role of supporting and related industries in
promoting competitive advantage appears to be largely through their effect on
factor conditions and demand conditions, which implies the dynamism and
interaction of the environmental factors. However, suppliers and end-users
located near to each other can take advantage of short lines of communication,
quick and constant flow of information, and on-going exchange of ideas and
innovations (Porter, 1990). Therefore, a firm should take advantage of such
elements and consider them when it formulates its competitive strategy, an idea
that will be discussed in more detail below.
6.3.4 Environmental stability and simplicity
A firm's environment can range from stable to dynamic; Mintzberg
(1979:268) describes this as ranging from that of the wood carver, whose
customers demand the same pine sculptures decade after decade, to that of the
detective squad, which never knows what to expect next. A firm's environment
can also range from simple to complex, from that of the manufacturer of folding
boxes who produces his simple products with simple knowledge to that of the
space agency which must use knowledge from a host of the most advanced
scientific fields to produce extremely complex products. These two
environmental dimensions have also been conceptualised by Duncan (1972) as
the two dimensions of environmental uncertainty: stable-dynamic, indicating the
rate of change, or stability, in environmental factors; and simple-complex,
measuring the number of environmental factors that need to be addressed and
the similarity between them.
Environmental complexity and dynamism are related to information
uncertainty (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Environmental uncertainty, therefore,
can be defined as a state in which critical information about organisations,
activities, and events is not known, and cause and effect relationships among
environmental elements are also unclear (Aldrich, 1979; Thompson, 1967;
Huber and Daft, 1987; Bantel, 1993). Research findings have suggested that
uncertain environments are associated with different settings. For example,
Hage and Aiken (1970) find a relationship between uncertain environments and
extensive participation in organisational decision making, less formalised job
design, and rapid programme innovation. March and Simon (1958) also find
that uncertain environments are associated with lower task specialisation, less
internal consensus, and more organisational slack.
Both environmental simplicity and stability are expected to influence the
achievement and the sustainability of the firm's competitive advantage. For
example, there will be minimal learning requirements in stable environments
(Tushman & Keck, 1990), hence managers will feel little need to make changes
in their strategies (Bourgeois, 1985). Miller (1988) argues that users of a
strategy such as price leadership are likely to confront the least environmental
unpredictability and change. In such environments, Bantel (1993) also argues
that managers will use established routines (Aldrich, 1979; Porter, 1980),
including routinised problem solving (Eisenhardt, 1989). On the other hand,
researchers (e.g. Burns and Stalker, 1961; Miles and Snow, 1978; Miller, 1988;
Miller et al, 1988) find a strong relationship between innovation and
environmental complexity and uncertainty. In such environments, where
managers are less able to forecast future events, they are less likely to rely on
routines but more likely to make organisational changes (Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978), and to be flexible in their planning processes (Hrebiniak
and Snow, 1982; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Miller and Friesen, 1983; Bantel,
1993).
These two dimensions of environmental uncertainty can be related to the
two dimensions of competitive advantage which are the supply and demand






Environmental uncertainty and Competitive advantage
Suppliers	 Buyers
Degree of closenessl
There is usually a specialisation role that each organisation will
contribute to the wider value system (Porter, 1985), until the product or service
reaches the consumer. Firms therefore, rarely if not at all, are able to undertake
all of the value activities that they need in their chain of activities from the raw
materials, product design through production and marketing, to the final
consumers. Thus, these activities from either the suppliers' or the buyers' sides
will affect a firm's competitive advantage. However, as discussed in Chapter 3,
the distinctions and the links between the supply and demand sides of any
1 Short arrows mean a close relationship with suppliers and/or buyers, at the same time they are
more widely indicative of a large amount of information and knowledge exchanged in this close
relationship. The reverse is true with the long and thin arrows.
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potential competitive advantage are very important. In discussing
environmental factors, the nature of the firm's relationship with its suppliers and
buyers is also an important factor. The extent of this relationships can be
determined by the degree of closeness between the firm and its suppliers and/or
buyers in different environments. Close and open relationships have been used
by Brook and Remmers (1970) to define the relations between head office and
subsidiaries; if the significant decisions regarding the subsidiaries are taken at
head office, this will be called a "close relationship"; the reverse is called an
"open relationship". In this study, close and open relations are used to describe
the extent of relationships between the firm and its suppliers and buyers, what is
referred to as the degree of closeness of any relationship, as illustrated in Figure
6.2.
The information and knowledge that are exchanged between the firm
and the buyers and/or suppliers depends on the interchange, and relationships
between them. Porter (1990) argues that competitive firms are not spread evenly
through the economy but connected in clusters consisting of industries related
by links of various kinds. Firms, therefore, maY establish relations with
suppliers or customers, or among a group of firms engaged in related activities
which is referred to as architecture (Kay, 1993). This architecture is found
where a group of firms share knowledge, or establish fast response times, on the
basis of a series of relational contracts with each other. A firm may also
establish this relationship with a government agency in a regulated
environment, or with key technology suppliers in fast moving high-tech
industry (Bartmess and Cerny, 1993). Brooke and Remmers (1970) emphasise
the importance of close relationships in firms that are technically-oriented and
which are concerned with manufacturing new inventions or maintaining high
levels of quality. Therefore, the development of distinctive networks often
allows some firms, as Kay (1993) notes, to obtain competitive advantage in
areas of the world which others have found difficult to penetrate. Therefore, the
more information and knowledge that needs to be exchanged between the firm
and the buyers and/or suppliers, the closer they should be to each other, and
vice versa. Therefore, short arrows in Figure 6.2, mean a close relationship with
suppliers and/or buyers; at the same time, they are more widely indicative of a
large amount of information and knowledge that have been exchanged in this
close relationship. The reverse is true with the long and thin arrows. Thus, in an
unstable environment a firm is expected to have a close relationship with both
suwliers and buyers, while in stable environments the firm is expected to have
an open relationship with both sides, as illustrated in Figure 6.2.
6.4 Environmental factors and competitive
strategies
Firms need to maintain "strategic coherence" in order to achieve and
sustain the potential offered by their competitive' advantage. As mentioned
earlier, one aspect of this general strategic coherence is "organisational
coherence". The internal part of this coherence has been discussed in the
previous chapter. The external part of the organisational coherence will be
discussed and thus achieved through appropriate links between firms'
competitive strategies and the external environmental factors. Since competitive
strategies have been defined, they will also be used in this section as a
benchmark in measuring this part of organisational coherence. These links will
then be directly hypothesised and tested in later chapters.
Firms using a price leadership competitive strategy are required to have
the characteristics of cost advantage on the supply side. Such firms, therefore,
devote much effort to cost control so that above-average returns can be
obtained. These characteristics imply a stable supply side to an activity. In
addition, since firms using a price leadership competitive strategy are not
expected to invest largely in the development of distinctive competencies, they
will base their competitive advantage not on capabilities but on strategic assets
(Kay, 1993), economies of scale, natural resource endowment, and other factors.
Thus, a price leadership competitive strategy is expected to be more effective
wlen it is linked to such factor conditions. When the supply side activities are
stable, for reasons that have been discussed earlier, innovative competition
based on differentiated competence is prevented because innovation will disrupt
static efficiency. Thus, a firm may exploit a cost advantage. In this case, factor
conditions, as one of the environmental factors, will be the central feature.
Firms using a price leadership strategy may find that basic factors such as
natural resources, basic physical infrastructure and banking systems are the
most significant source of their competitive advantage. While the competing
product or customer's preferences change quickly in an unstable environment,
they are usually less advantageous in a stable environment (Miller et al, 1988);
hence, firms that are following a price leadership competitive strategy seek out
customers who care more about price than innovation or image (Miller, 1988).
Skivington and Daft (1991) also argue that firms that base their competitive
advantage on low cost are often found in markets where commodity-like
products and price-sensitive buyers collectively pressure them to engage in price
competition. In addition, since consumers are price-sensitive, marketing that is
based on reputation and extended consumer use is unimportant here. Hambrick
(1983b), Miller (1988) and Kim and Lim (1988), among others, have argued
that cost leadership strategies are appropriate in stable and predictable
environments. Miller (1988) argues that complex and dynamic environments
create severe problems for companies trying to be cost/price leaders; hence, a
price leadership strategy is most effective in simple and stable environments,
since environments that are complex or subject to much change will create
severe diseconomies for organisations trying to pursue a price leadership
strategy. Thus, in such stable and simple environments, an open relationship
with either suppliers or buyers is required to achieve competitive advantage.
A firm using a differentiation competitive strategy may achieve its
competitive advantage, on the supply side, by using its resources, technology
and organisational competencies. In this case, a firm is striving to offer an
existing product more efficiently and create the most up-to-date and attractive
ptodnzs. akuns and StaVices (1961), Rage and Aiken (1970), and Miles and
Snow (1978) argue that there is a strong relationship between innovation and
environmental uncertainty. Competing products or customers' preferences alter
significantly and quickly in unstable, dynamic and changing environments
(Bylinsky, 1976; Miller, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979; Duncan, 1972). Miller (1988)
also finds that innovation correlates with, and seems to do best in, complex and
dynamic environments. Spital and Bickford (1992) argue that it seems to be
reasonable to suggest that one reason why Miller found a differentiation strategy
related to and more frequent in the complex and dynamic environment is that it
is perceived to be a successful strategy, and is therefore retained and replicated.
This interpretation is corroborated by McCarthy et al (1987), who reported that
the chief executive officers in their sample perceive that successful firms in
dynamic environments are characterised by product innovation. Since uniquely
appealing offerings are sought to inspire buyer loyalty and reduce price
elasticity (Davies and Lyons, 1982; Porter, 1980), a differentiation competitive
strategy also attempts to create a unique image for a product, which in turn
requires managers to have a good understanding of customer preferences
(Miller, 1988). In addition, a differentiation competitive strategy through
innovative differentiation will involve new technology, unforeseen customer
and competitor reaction, and the confluence of many unstructured marketing
problems (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Mils and Snow, 1978; Miller, 1988;
Miller and Friesen, 1984; Zaltman et al, 1973). All of these factors increase
environmental complexity and dynamism. These will also increase the
importance and the necessity of having a close relationship with customers. In
addition, such factors require firms using a differentiation competitive strategy
to invest more in the development of long-term resources and competencies
rather than in basic factor conditions. Moreover, when a firm targets the most
sophisticated and demanding customers that have the most difficult needs, it can
help establish leadership in quality and innovation (Grant, 1991b). Therefore, a
differentiation competitive strategy can provide more competitive products in
such changing, dynamic and complex markets (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Porter,
1980; Thompson, 1967; Zaltman et al, 1973). To achieve its advantage, a firm
needs also close relationships with related and supporting industries in its
environment in order to provide a quick and constant flow of information to
respond flexibly to changing circumstances.
Each of the price leadership and differentiation competitive strategies
has been derived from two different foundations of the competitive advantage.
Therefore, these two competitive strategies represent two extremes in the
previous discussions, where a PL strategy stands at one end and a DIF strategy
at the other. A PL competitive strategy is more effective in simple and stable
environments, when there are open relationships with buyers and suppliers and
when it is linked to basic factor conditions, while the opposite is true for a
differentiation strategy. The other two competitive strategies, however, which
are low cost differentiation and imitation have the same supply sides as,
respectively, PL and DIF competitive strategies. Thus, both of these two
strategies are expected to be between these two extremes in terms of
environmental factors. The demand side characteristics of low cost
differentiation competitive strategy, which are different from those of the PL
strategy, have the centrality of marketing activities. To achieve a marketing
differentiation advantage on the demand side, a firm needs to exploit close links
with buyers. Such activities make this strategy more necessary and effective in
dynamic and complex environments than PL competitive strategy. However, a
low-cost advantage is needed in a low cost differentiation strategy to generate
supporting funds for the marketing differentiation characteristics. In addition,
such a strategy is not based on innovative competition because innovation will
disrupt the efficiency, and it needs to exploit a cost advantage on the supply
side. Furthermore, unlike DIF competitive strategy, low cost differentiation,
winch bases its supply side activities on cost advantage rather than on
innovation, requires a more stable and simple environment than a DIY
competitive strategy.
Turning to the demand side characteristics of the imitation and
differentiation competitive strategies, it can be seen that the former requires
more emphasis on price than the latter. The price competition characteristic of
the demand side makes the imitation competitive strategy more effective in
simple and stable environments. However, to achieve an innovation advantage
on the supply side, such firms need to improve the technologies and products
first introduced by differentiators after a risk-reducing lag. Thus, since an
imitation competitive strategy has similar supply side characteristics to a
differentiation strategy, it will be closer to a differentiation strategy than to the
PL strategy in terms of the environmental factors.
6.5 Conclusion
Five environmental factors have been discussed in this chapter as
external potential barriers to achieving competitive advantage. These are factor
conditions, demand conditions, related and supported industries, environmental
stability, and environmental simplicity. The lack of fit between these
environmental factors and the four competitive strategies may prevent firms
from achieving their competitive advantage. In other words, the appropriate
links between these factors and the four competitive strategies will form the
external part of the organisational coherence, an aspect of "strategic coherence"
that needs to be maintained in order to achieve and sustain the potential offered
by the competitive advantage. These links will be hypothesised in Chapter 7 and




This chapter describes the procedure followed in conducting this
research. The chapter consists of a discussion of the research objectives,
research hypotheses and research design. It also includes an identification of the
sample size, sample selection techniques used, data collection instruments,
questionnaire design, methods and procedure for data collection, pre-testing
phase, and the techniques for data analysis.
7.2 Research objectives
This study focuses on how organisations achieve and sustain competitive
advantage. It has two main objectives.
The first objective (which has been introduced and developed in
Chapters 3-6) deals with a theoretical framework by examining related literature
in developing a better understanding of competitive advantage and generic
strategies, as well as the important aspects that may affect a firm's achievement
and the sustainability of its competitive advantage. The strategic management
literature on competitive advantage and generic strategies, mainly based on
Porter's (1980, 1985) work, has been extended in these chapters. In particular,
instead of the different generic strategies put forward by Porter, four
competitive strategies are developed. These are (1) price leadership, (2) low cost
differentiation, (3) imitation and (4) differentiation. These competitive strategies
require internal consistency, referred to as 'competitive coherence' which is one
of the three aspects of a 'strategic coherence' model (which has been introduced
in the first chapter and discussed thereafter). The second aspect of strategic
coherence is referred to as 'organisational coherence', which was developed
based on the links between the four competitive strategies and internal and
external elements affecting an organisation's ability to achieve its competitive
advantage. However, the creation of these links is not automatic or simple. The
difficulties increase with growing dynamism and complexity of the environment
in which an organisation is operating. While competitive and organisational
coherence might exist accidentally, the third aspect developed in this study is
called 'cognitive coherence'. Thus, because of the increasing complexity of
markets and competition, firms need a multi-variable approach to strategic
coherence in order to achieve and sustain their competitive advantage; hence the
lack of coherence in one or more of these aspects is a barrier to a firm's
achieving and sustaining its competitive advantage.
The second objective is therefore: to determine the validity of the
theoretical framework as applied to two different industries (petrochemicals and
food) in Saudi Arabia, as will be discussed later. The empirical testing of this
framework will also examine whether western strategic management models are
applicable in a developing country like Saudi Arabia. This chapter will discuss the
methods that will be used to achieve this objective.
7.3 Research hypotheses
The focus of the discussions in the previous chapters was on how
organisations achieve and sustain competitive advantage, and on the presence of
the major barriers that may prevent firms from achieving and sustaining their
competitive advantage. Based on these discussions and for the purpose of
achieving the research objectives, an overall hypothesis which gives a general
guidance to the investigation, and then sub-hypotheses to operationalise this
main hypothesis, have been developed. Each of the first pair of hypotheses tests
a particular aspect of strategic coherence; in addition, the second pair of
hypotheses tests barriers that may prevent firms from achieving their
competitive advantage. As the discussion proceeds additional hypotheses will
be introduced where appropriate.
I. Overall hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.1: Firms that have strong strategic coherence should have high
level of performance.
Hypothesis 1.2: Lack of coherence will prevent lower-performing firms
from achieving their competitive advantage
II. Sub-hypotheses:
Competitive coherence:
Hypothesis 2.1: High performing firms should have high coherence between
two particular foundations of competitive advantage.
Hypothesis 2.2: Lack of coherence predicted in hypothesis 2.1 will prevent
lower performing firms from achieving their competitive
advantage.
Cognitive coherence:
Hypothesis 3.1: High performing firms should have high coherence between
objective and subjective views of the competitive strategies.
Hypothesis 3.2: Lack of coherence predicted in Hypothesis 3.1 will prevent
lower-performing firms from achieving their competitive
advantage.
Organisational coherence:
Hypothesis 4.1: In the high-performing firms, a particular competitive strategy
will be associated (related) with prticular supporting (internal
and external) variables, as described in Table 7.1.
Hypothesis 4.2: The lack of one or more of the associations predicted in
Hypothesis 4.1 will prevent the lower-performing firms from
achieving their competitive advantage.









Formalisation + + + - - -
Authority delegation - - - + + +
Risk avoidance + + + - - -
Liaison devices - - - + + +
Prospectors - - - + + +
Analysers o o o o
Defenders + + + - - -
Strategic planning - - - + + +
Financial control + + + - - -
Strategic control o + + + + o
Environmental stability + + +
,
- - -
Environmental simplicity + + + - - -
Related & supported industries - - - + + +
Demand conditions o o o o
Factor conditions + + - -
Expected relationships: + + high and positive; + moderately posit've; - - high and
negative; - moderately negative; o neutral.
7.4 Research design
The significance of this study is that it combines descriptive and
hypothesis-testing research. In the first part, it is concerned with the
- 160 -
development of a theoretical framework to understand competitive advantage
and generic strategies, as well as the way in which organisations achieve and
sustain competitive advantage, and the presence of the major barriers that may
prevent them from achieving and sustaining their competitive advantage. The
second part of this study, however, is concerned with empirical testing of the
theoretical framework. Furthermore, since this theoretical framework was
developed on the bases of the existing literature which is mainly dealing with
western companies, and since the data were collected from a developing country
which is Saudi Arabia, the empirical testing of this framework will examine
whether western strategic management models are applicable in a developing
country like Saudi Arabia.
7.5 Population of the study
There is a very little strategic research in general and especially in the
area of competitive advantage which has been done in Saudi Arabia, as well as
in many similar countries. Therefore, it is interesting, and at the same time
motivating for the researcher, to see the application of western literature and in
particular that discussed in this research in a developing country such as Saudi
Arabia. The uniqueness of Saudi Arabia in terms of economic, social, and
political characteristics makes it one of the most stable rapidly developing
countries in the world. Empirical tests have been carried out to examine how
organisations achieve and sustain competitive advantage and the presence of
barriers that may prevent Saudi Arabian firms from achieving and sustaining
their competitive advantage. Another reason of choosing Saudi Arabia is that
the researcher originates from Saudi Arabia, therefore he will be more attuned to
the issues relating to the firms in that country.
Most existing studies have developed links between a firm's strategy and
its organisational and/or environmental factors across different industries.
Ginsberg and Venkatraman (1985) revealed that 22 of the 25 studies reviewed
adopted a multi-industry sample for testing the impact of different variables on
strategy. Others, such as Hambrick (1983a), developed a taxonomy of
environmental variables that cut across the boundaries of multiple industries and
then developed a taxonomy of firm position within each environment. However,
those who have studied a single industry have tended to assume environmental
homogeneity. For example, Dess and Davis (1984) assume that the single
industry that they investigated (paint and allied product) has a homogenous
environment at the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) four-digit level.
Porter (1985) argues that segments of industries have structure, just as industries
do, which implies that there are different environments within a single industry.
flatten and Schendel (1977) found that different firms competed differently
within an industry because they view their environment on idiosyncratic bases
and made their resource allocation decisions on those bases. Kim and Lim
(1988) find similar results in Korea, one of the developing countries.
Two industries with different characteristics were chosen to represent
the private sector in Saudi Arabia: petrochemicals and food. Initially, there were
three different industries which are the previous two and the banking industry.
However, after pilot investigation the banking industry was excluded. The
reason for this was mainly because of the small number of operating firms in
Saudi Arabia (only 12 major banks) compared to the other two industries. The
choice of these two industries (petrochemical and food) is for the following two
reasons. First, these two industries with their different characteristics and
different markets represent the private sector in Saudi Arabia. Second, further
analysis can be applied to each industry separately. The advantage of this
analysis is that it allows investigation of the existence of the different ways in
which organisations achieve and sustain their competitive advantage and of the
presence of the major barriers that may prevent firms from achieving and
sustaining their competitive advantage in these two different industries.
7.6 Sampling frame, size, and methods
In order to get the most useful results from the research, two industries
with different characteristics were chosen to represent the private sector in Saudi
Arabia: the petrochemical and food industries. Three main sources for
constructing the sample frame were used. First, the Directory of Saudi
Industries (1993) which is issued by the Ministry of Industry and Electricity.
This directory includes all manufacturing firms in Saudi Arabia, classified on
the basis of their industries. It contains the firm's name, location, address,
products, and other information. Second, the Directory of Saudi Arabia's top
1000 companies (1993), which provides a list of each company's name, type of
business, address, the name of the highest official in that company, type of
ownership, and so on. Third, commercial directories that are issued by the
chambers of commerce and industry in the major cities of Saudi Arabia.
Cochran (1977) states that relative time, cost and desired degree of precision
determines the sample plan and size. Considering such factors in this research,
the sample size was determined to be about 220 firms from these two different
industries. Since this research is not concerned with small firms, the three
sources mentioned above were used together to select the 110 largest
manufacturing firms in each industry.
7.7 Data collection instruments
Methods of collecting the data will be discussed in this section. The
most commonly used instruments for data collection are questionnaires and
interviews (Clover and Balsley, 1979). For deciding which one of these
instruments will be appropriate for this study, we should go through the
theoretical as well as practical advantages and disadvantages of each instrument.
The questionnaire, as a data collection instrument, has several
advantages. The following is a list of the advantages for using the questionnaire
for collecting data (Henerson, Morrise and Gibson, 1978; Ary, Jacob and
Razavieh, 1979; Isaac and Michael, 1990):
1- It permits anonymity.
2- It permits a person a considerable amount of time to think about
answers before responding.
3- It can be given to many people simultaneously.
4- It is less expensive than interview, easy to design, self-administering.
5- It provides a greater uniformity across measurement situations than
do interviews. Each person responds to exactly the same questions.
6- Standard instructions are given to all subjects.
7- In general, the data it provides can be more easily analysed and
interpreted than the data received from oral responses.
8- They can be mailed as well as administered directly to a group of
people.
Ary, Jacob and Razavieh (1979) argued that the questionnaire is
typically an efficient and practical tool, and allows for the use of a larger
sample. Moreover, the drop-off method, or personally distributed questionnaire,
was found to have a higher response rate than the mailed survey (Lovelock et al,
1976), and it provides greater control over sample design (Emory, 1985).
However, there are disadvantages of the questionnaire such as misinterpretation
of the questions, and low response rates. Yet careful demonstration of the
questionnaire will overcome such problems and other disadvantages such as
lack of clarity in the format that may also limit the response rate (Isaac and
Michael, 1990; Kerlinger, 1986). Moreover, to maximise the advantages and
minimise the weaknesses of the mail survey, the following techniques, as
recommended by Dillman (1978) and Emory (1985), were followed:
1. Covering letter: the questionnaire was accompanied by a covering
letter using Sheffield University letterhead. It described the nature, purpose, and
significance of the research, as well as the significance of the respondent's
participation, and it assured the complete confidentiality of information given
by the respondent and that it will be used for academic research only. Another
covering letter was from King Saud University, Saudi Arabia, the sponsor of the
researcher, which was signed by the Dean of the Administrative Sciences
College, requesting the respondent to help the researcher in completing the
questionnaire and indicating the formality of this data collection. A third
covering letter was from the provincial Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(signed by the Secretary General) and attached to each questionnaire distributed
in that province, which asked the respondent to co-operate by completing the
questionnaire and returning it to them.
2. Incentives to increase response: in order to increase the respondent
participation, they have been promised to receive an executive summary of the
findings, at their choice.
3. Return envelope: a stamped addressed envelop was provided for the
respondent, to return the questionnaire to the researcher, to reduce the excuses
and expenses of mailing the survey.
4. Style of the questionnaire: the questionnaire was reviewed by
academic staff and business managers to ensure its simplicity, clarity and
easiness to follow and understand. The Arabic version was also reviewed by
different Arabic-English speakers for proof-reading, and to avoid alteration or
misrepresentation, after the translation, of the meanings of the questions being
asked; and to ensure the accurate translation of the terminology and technical
terms. In addition, the Arabic version was pre-tested in the pilot study and
improved thereafter.
The interview, as another way of collecting data, also has advantages.
Interviews facilitate the gathering of in-depth and detailed information. It also
clarifies the questions, and it is better than the questionnaire for obtaining
information that requires sequencing or from people who can not read
(Henerson, Morrise and Gibson, 1978). However, interviews have
disadvantages, such as the expense and their time-consuming nature, and the
influential role that the interviewer may play on the respondent.
There are important factors, however, that should be considered in
deciding which instrument is to be used. Such factors have been suggested by
Berdie and Anderson (1974):
- Number of cases to be surveyed,
- geographical spread of the cases,
- time limitations,
- financial resource limitations,
- efficiency of communication and transportation systems, and
- cultural attitudes toward each of the approaches and their effect on
response bias and response rate.
Thus, after the discussion of these two instrument and after assessing
each of the factors listed above, in this study the questionnaire will be the main
data collection instrument. However, some respondents were interviewed to
ensure the confidentiality of the respondent information, to answer any
questions they may have concerning the instrument, and to follow-up and
encourage the completion of the questionnaire. The researcher uses the mail and
the drop-off methods to distribute the questionnaires. However, the drop-off
method was used more often as possible, for the reasons discussed earlier and
for other reasons such as to ensure that the questionnaire is taken seriously, and
to increase the response rate which is important for the successful completion of
the study.
7.8 Questionnaire Design
The questionnaire used in this study is designed for the purpose of
collecting relevant data needed to conduct this study, as illustrated in Appendix
A. The questionnaire was reviewed by knowledgeable people in the field from
the Management School in Sheffield University. It was first written in English,
then translated into Arabic by the researcher. To ensure that the meaning of the
questions was not misrepresented after the translation, and to ensure the
simplicity as well as the clarity of the Arabic version, the translated version was
reviewed by academic staff from the Management School and from King Saud
university in Saudi Arabia, and by business managers in Saudi Arabia. The
questionnaire consists of six sections that measure the different variables needed
to conduct this study, as will be discussed next.
The first section of the questionnaire asks questions related to
competitive strategies. In measuring these variables as well as other variables
discussed later, the manager's perception was used to identify the strategy of the
organisation.
Snow and Hambrick (1980) identified four measurement approaches to
identify and measure strategy. These are: (1) investigator inference (researcher
will assesses the organisation's strategy, by using all information available), (2)
external assessment (asking experts, e.g. consultant, industry analysts, and so
on, to identify the strategies of firms in the sample), (3) objective indicators
(using published data, e.g. product-market data, financial reports and other
records, to measure strategy), and (4) self-typing (asking the respondents to
identify or describe their strategy). Detailed discussion of each approach is
presented in Chan and Huff (1991); Conant et al (1990); Ginsberg (1984) and
Snow and Hambrick (1980). The self-typing approach will be used in this
questionnaire. This method is ideal in its currency as well as that organisation's
managers are most up-to-date on the organisation directions and activities
(Snow and Hambrick, 1980), and it is useful with a large sample (Conant et al,
1990). Using this type, the different competitive strategies as well as other
variables were measured.
In Chapter 3 the different generic strategies that firms may pursue to
achieve their competitive advantage were discussed. In the same chapter four
foundations of competitive advantage on which a firm may base its competitive
advantage were also developed. Questions were therefore developed to measure
the four foundations, based on the discussion presented in Chapters 3 and 4, and
on the different studies related to this subject, such as Porter (1980, 1985),
Miller (1988), Bowman (1992), Bowman and Johnson (1992). Two different
ways were used in this study to measure the competitive strategies (objective
and subjective), as will be discussed next.
Managers were asked thirty six questions, in the first section of the
questionnaire (see Appendix A), related to the four foundations of competitive
advantage. Nine questions (3, 9, 18, 20, 27, 29, 32, 33 and 34) were oriented to
cost advantage; nine (1, 7, 11, 13, 15, 22, 25, 30 and 35) to price competition;
nine (2, 5, 10, 17, 21, 23, 24, 28 and 36) to innovative differentiation; and nine
questions (4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 19, 26 and 31) were oriented to marketing
differentiation. The managers were asked to assess the appropriateness to their
organisation of each question statement on a 5-point scale, with 1 = 'this
statement is not relevant to our firm' and 5 = 'this statement accurately describes
the situation in our firm'. These thirty-six questions were used to assess the
objective view of the organisation's managers in identifying the four
competitive strategies (the way of grouping these foundations to get the four
competitive strategies will be discussed later). After completing these questions,
managers were asked (Question '37', the last in the first section, see Appendix
A) to directly rank the four foundations of competitive advantage as are
perceived to be relevant to the attainment of competitive advantage for their
organisations. This procedure is identified with a subjective way of measuring
the competitive strategies that a firm is following.
questions. The three parts of this section were similarly measured on a 5-point
scale.
The third section of the questionnaire asked questions related to
informal control processes, and responses were measured in two different ways.
(1) The top managers' risk preference was measured using the Indiana
University Risk Taking Index (Ali, 1987), with a 5-point scale, with 1 =
strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. (2) The three typologies (prospectors,
analysers, and defenders) identified by Miles and Snow (1978) were used as
proxy indicators of informal control process, as discussed in chapter 5. These
typologies were described in paragraphs, and managers were asked to show (on
a 5-point scale) to what extent these paragraphs describe their organisations (see
Appendix A).
The fourth section of the questionnaire asked questions related to the
external environment, and responses were measured in two different ways.
External environmental variables were initially measured in terms of three
categories (factor conditions, demand conditions, and related and supported
industries) taken from Porter's (1990) study, as discussed in Chapter 6. Seven
questions (1, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 13) to factor conditions; four questions (2, 10, 17
and 18) to demand conditions; and seven (4, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 19) were
oriented to related and supported industries. Respondents were asked to describe
to what extent these variables were relevant to their organisation and provided
them with the possibility of achieving their competitive advantage.
Measurement was, once again, on a 5-point scale, with 1 = 'strongly disagree'
and 5 = 'strongly agree'. Following this, the importance of environmental
simplicity and environmental stability was examined. These two factors were
taken from different studies (Child, 1972; Dess and Beard, 1984; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978; and Miller and Droge, 1986). Three questions (3, 4 and 6) were
oriented to environmental simplicity and four questions (1, 2, 5 and 7) were
oriented to environmental stability. These two variables were measured by using
the same 5-point scale.
The fifth section of the questionnaire asked questions related to
organisation performance. Performance was measured by asking the
respondents to rate their organisation's performance on four items: sales growth,
market share, return on sale and return on assets, which we most the frequently
used measures of performance in the strategic management literature (Lenz,
1980; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986), and on an overall performance
item. This method of measuring performance has been used for different
reasons. First is the availability of data. It is very difficult to get financial data
for most Saudi firms, especially those which have limited ownership. This
problem was confirmed in the pilot study, where the researcher was not able to
collect published performance data except for a few corporations (at different
times). Second is the size of the sample (about 220 firms) used in this study,
which is large. With such a large sample, a self-typing (Snow and Hambrick,
1980) approach is very useful (Conant et al, 1990), as has been discussed
earlier. In this section, the respondents were asked to rate their organisational
performance by comparing it to other organisations with similar size and
activities in their industry. Performance was rated for the current and the
previous three years to assess performance change and stability. Performance
was measured by using the same 5-point scale, ranging from bottom 20% to top
20% (see Appendix A).
The final section of the questionnaire had descriptive questions, such as
position, education, experience in the organisation and in the industry, and the
organisation's name, activity, number of employees, and the ownership status.
The respondent was asked if he had any comments, and if he wanted to receive
a summary of the overall results of the study.
7.9 Pilot study
A pilot study was undertaken for the purpose of checking the
questionnaire and its reliability and validity. A random sample of 26 companies
covering the three (original) industries was drawn from the sampling frame. A
pilot study was conducted, in anticipation of revealing any problems with the
questionnaire or its application in general. This step would allow the researcher
to modify and/or re-articulate the questionnaire. Seventeen questionnaires were
returned. The analysis of the pilot study data provided more confidence about
the theory and the framework developed in the earlier chapters (3-6). For
example, based on the managers' answers to the questions related to the
foundations of the competitive advantage, the four competitive strategies of the
organisations were clearly identified. Even though the sample was small, the
data show that there seems to be a direct relationship between strategic
coherence, as discussed in earlier chapters, and the different levels of
performance.
The researcher was able to get direct feedback from thirteen out of the
seventeen respondents about the study in general and the questionnaire in
particular. In general, the pilot study raised no major questions nor had the
respondents any difficulty in answering the questions. A few minor changes
were made, such as changing or adding some words or questions to clarify the
meaning of information that needed to be obtained from the respondents. For
example, three questions were added to identify more clearly the relationship
with the suppliers and the buyers.
Therefore in order to meet the reliability and validity criteria, the
following points were considered. First, the pilot study was conducted. The
researcher has benefited from meetings with top managers by considering their
views and suggestions about the investigated markets as well as the
questionnaire. Secondly, the pilot study's results were presented to and
discussed with the researcher's supervisor in addition to two professors from the
Management School. Their comments and suggestions were considered to
improve the quality of this study in general and the questionnaire in particular.
Finally, the pilot study's results were a direct indicator of the clarity of the
questionnaire and the validity of the research in general. Further discussion on
reliability and validity will be presented in Section 7.11.
7.10 Data analysis techniques
The collected data were analysed, using computer programmes such as
SPSS and Excel. Different statistical techniques were used in this analysis, and
the selection of techniques was based on their relevance to the research
questions. Therefore, these techniques were applied where applicable:
1. To analyse the characteristics of the firms and managers, means and
frequencies distributions were used.
2. To check the reliability of the questionnaire, Cronbach's alpha was
calculated.
3. To classify firms based on their performance and then on their
competitive strategies, clustering analysis was performed.
4. To test the significant differences between the performance groups as
well as the competitive strategies groups, Analysis of Variance and
the Duncan Multiple Range Test were applied.
5. To asses the overall significance of the competitive strategies groups
with respect to several variables, Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA) was applied.
6. To test which variable(s) contribute(s) to the overall significance of
the competitive strategies groups, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
was applied, then the Duncan Multiple Range test was used to
compare the four groups of competitive strategies in terms of the
variables under study.
7. To test cognitive coherence between the objective and subjective
competitive strategies, Pearson correlation and Chi-square were
used.
8. To test organisational coherence between the competitive strategies
and internal and external variables, Pearson correlation was used; to
test the strength of these relationships at different levels of
performance, the Z test was applied.
9. To assess the change and stability of performance, t tests were
applied. To assess, the change of performance on its different levels,
the overall change of performance with respect to each competitive
strategy in these different levels and with respect to the individual
industry, the same test was also applied.
10. To test the association between the level of performance and the
industry's type, and to test the association between the level of
performance and the four competitive strategies in each of the
industries, the Chi-square test was applied.
7.11 Reliability and validity of the
questionnaire
Reliability refers to the consistency of respondents, responses (in
general) to all items. Kerlinger (1973:446) defines reliability as "the proportion
of the true variance of the total obtained variance of the data yielded by the
measuring instrument". Different terms are related to the definition of reliability
including consistency, stability, equivalence and agreement (Kerlinger, 1986).
Reliability is related to validity in the way that it is necessary and contributes to
the validity of the instrument but, it is not a sufficient condition for its validity
(Emory, 1985). Therefore, to test the reliability of each sub-scale, in this study,
the coefficient of Cronbach's Alpha is calculated using the SPSS package. Flynn
et al (1990) indicate that Cronbach's alpha is one of the most widely accepted
measurements of reliability. Although the score of Cronbach's alpha is more a
subjective matter than an objective one, researchers such as Nunnally (1967)
suggest that a reliability score approaching 0.80 is desirable ., he suggested lhat
in the early stage of research, reliability over 0.50 is acceptable for a new
instrument. However, the appropriate value that is usually accepted is 0.60
(Bausel, 1986; Nunnally, 1967).








Cost Advantage 130 9 .876
Price Competition 132 9 .881
Innovative Differentiation 132 9 .920
Marketing Differentiation 128 9 .914
Financial Control 131 5 .788
Strategic Control 131 5 .716
Strategic Planning 130 5 .785
Formalisation 132 5 .861
Authority delegation 132 9 .889
liaison device 132 3 .816
Risk avoided 132 6 .736
Factor Conditions 131 7 .668
Demand Conditions* 131 4
,
.365
Related & Supported Industries 131 7 .813
Environmental Simplicity 131 3 .775
Environmental Stability 132 4 .737
Current performance 132 5 .895
Previous performance 126 5 .859
* Demand Conditions can be improved to .61 by removing one quest' on (Question
number 10 : Local demand rarely gives us an early signal of customer needs).
Table 7.2 shows the results of testing reliability for the items in the
survey. The reliability coefficients range between .72 and .92 which fall within
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the acceptable range. This indicates that the items in the questionnaire are
acceptably reliable, and provides support for the statistical analysis. The
exception is with the Demand Condition variable which has the score of .365.
This score can be improved to .61 by removing one question. Rather than
removing this question from the Demand Condition variable, the significance of
its reliability will be discussed later.
Having examined the reliability of the research instrument, the validity
of the instrument will also be tested. The validity of a measurement refers to its
ability to measure what it is supposed to measure (Ghiselli and Brown, 1955
and Emory, 1985). The validity of this research questionnaire was of concern
from the early stage of its development, as mentioned in previous discussions.
Each item in the questionnaire, as discussed in Section 7.8 above, was
developed from a theoretical and/or empirical concept from the management
literature. Furthermore, validity can also be tested by comparing the relationship
between the different variables under the study with those of similar
relationships discussed in the literature. When the empirical findings are
consistent with the theory, this is an indication of instrument validity. The pilot
study results, as discussed in Section 7.9, indicate the validity of this research in
general. However, the results of the empirical work are also contributing to this
validity as will be documented and discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter 8
Empirical work and major findings
8.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an aggregate analysis of the data and the statistical
fuldings of the survey. It contains three parts. The first part presents descriptive
results concerning the response rate and the characteristics of the firms and
managers investigated. The second part presents the hypotheses to be tested and
the results appear in two sections. In the first of these sections the performance
levels and the competitive strategies will be identified, then all firms will be
classified based on their performance, and then based on their competitive
strategies. Further analysis of the competitive strategies will be discussed in the
third part by relating the competitive strategies to the internal and external
variables. Finally, firms with unclear competitive strategies will be analysed.
8.2 Descriptive findings
8.2.1 Response rate
Top management-related research is expected to have a response rate of
an average around 50% or below. As Table 8.1 illustrates, a total of 220
questionnaires were distributed, 110 questionnaires to the food industry
companies, and 110 questionnaires to the petrochemical industry companies. A
total of 132 usable returns were received, with a response rate of 60%. Sixty-
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four responses were received from the food companies, with a response rate of
58%, The other sixty eight responses were received from the petrochemical
companies, with a response rate of 62%.
The overall response rate of 60% is considered to be a good rate for a
study with a questionnaire as long as that used in this study. It could also be
considered good because of the limited experience of the managers in
developing countries such as Saudi Arabia in such practical research.
Furthermore, this high rate indicates that top executives in a developing country
(Saudi Arabia) are as co-operative as those in the developed countries when
they are approached correctly. There are three major reasons for such a high
response rate:
First, since the questionnaire was directed to top level executives, it was
important to enclose a formal letter. Therefore, in addition to the improved
format and style of the questionnaire, three covering letters were attached to all
questionnaires:
(1) One from Sheffield University Management School, which explained the
nature of the questionnaire, the general purpose of the study and assuring the
confidentiality of the information given by the respondents, and that it will be
used for academic research only.
(2)The second letter was from King Saud University, Saudi Arabia, the sponsor
of the researcher, signed by the Dean of the Administrative Sciences College,
requesting the respondent to help the researcher in completing the questionnaire.
(3) A third covering letter, from the provincial Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (signed by the Secretary General), for each questionnaire distributed in
that province, which asked the respondent to co-operate by completing the
questionnaire and returning it to them.
Table 8.1: Response rate
Industry Type Sent out Received Usable Total
Food 110 64 (58%) 64 (58%) 64 (48%)
Petrochemical 110 68 (62%) 68	 (62%) 68 (52%)
Not identified 5 -- --	 -- -- --
Total 220 137 (62%) 132 (60%) 132 (100%)
Second, the method of distribution: even though it is very difficult to
schedule a meeting with top executives, the researcher gave about 65
questionnaires personally to the top executives of firms. Meetings were
scheduled with them and during these very short encounters the researcher
briefed each of them on his research, requesting their participation, and if
possible arranged a longer meeting at the time of collecting the questionnaire.
About the same number of questionnaires were distributed by other people. The
rest of the questionnaires were posted.
Third, the subject of the research attracted the managers' attention which
was expressed in their comments and their requests 'for an executive summary of
the findings.
8.2.2 Characteristics of firms and managers
A few questions, in the last section of the questionnaire, were asked to
identify some of the firms' and the managers' characteristics. The discussion of
such characteristics will provide the reader with a better understanding of the
later detailed analysis. It is also important for readers to have beforehand a
general view of the characteristics of the firms and the managers investigated in
this study.
8.2.2.1 Company characteristics
To analyse the characteristics of the firms, frequency distributions were
utilised. Findings, as illustrated in Table 8.2, show that 52% of the respondents
are from the petrochemical industry's firms; 28% of them (i.e. 19 firms) have a
formal written joint venture. The remaining 48% of the respondents are from the
food industry's firms, where 13% of them (i.e. 8 firms) have a joint venture.
Table 8.2: Characteristics of firms
Firms activities: Freq. %
1- food 64 48
2- petrochemical 68 52
Total 132 100% .
Food Petrochemical Total
Joint venture: Freq. %	 Freq. % Freq. %
Yes: 8 13	 19 28 27 20
No: 65 87	 49 72 105 80
Activities with Food Petrochemical Total
government : Freq. %	 Freq. % Freq. %
Less than 20% 23 36	 25 37 48 36
20% - 40% 18 28	 18 27 37 28
40% - 60% 14 22	 13 19 27 21
60% - 80% 7 11	 10 15 17 13
More than 80% 2 3	 2 1 3 2
Food Petrochemical Total
. No. of employees Freq. %	 Freq. % Freq. %
100-500 40 63	 42 62 82 62
500-1000 18 28	 18 26 36 27
1000-1500 4 6	 7 10 11 8
1500-2500 2 3	 - - 2 2
more than 2500 - -	 1 2 1 1
Firms' activities which are directly involved with the government are
another factor that has been investigated. Forty-eight firms (36%, which is the
largest percentage) from both industries have 20% or less of their activities
involved directly with the government, while only three firms (2%) have more
than 80% of their activities involved directly with the government.
The last section in Table 8.2 shows the distribution of the firms in the
two industries based on their size, which is measured by the number of
employees. In the UK, Devine et al (1985) concluded that most firms in
manufacturing are relatively small, with those employing fewer than 100
workers accounting in 1981 for 95% of all firms. They later said that although
the details vary, the general picture remains much the same when size is
measured in terms of assets or net output instead of employment. Based on
published statistics by the Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1994) about
manufacturing firms in the two investigated industries (i.e. food and
petrochemical) in Saudi Arabia, it has been found that the average number of
employees is 100.
Since this study is not concerned with the small firms, the questionnaire
was distributed to firms with more than 100 employees. Accordingly, even
though a choice of less than 100 employees was given in this question, this
choice has no response. As Table 8.2 shows, 62% of firms in both industries
have between 100 and 500 employees, and 27% of firms have between 500 and
1000 employees. Comparing the distribution of firms with different sizes in the
two industries the Chi-square test was utilised. The Chi-square test with
associated values of j=3.75 and p>0.441 indicates that there is no significant
difference between the two industries in the distribution of the number of
employees.
8.2.2.2 Managerial characteristics
To analyse the characteristics of the managers, frequency distributions
were also used. The questions that have been asked to get descriptive
information about the managers' characteristics will be discussed in this section.
One question was asked about the time a manager has spent in his organisation.
As Table 8.3 shows, managers have a reasonable experience in their firms, 44%
of the respondents have between 5 and 10 years, and 22% have between 10 and
15 years of working experience in their organisations.
Table 8.3: Managerial characteristics
Times managers Food Petrochemical Total
spent in their firms Freq. al Freq. _% a_vg,
Less than 5 years 20 31 19 28 39 29
5 - 10 35 55 23 34 58 44
10 - 15 8 12 21 31 29 22
15 - 20 1 2 34 4 3
20 - 25 1 2 1 1
More than 25 years 1 2 1 1
Managers' experience Food Petrochemical Total
level: Fl__q„ N Ereq„. N Fi_q, .°6
"Above average" 41 64 49	 72 90 68
"Average" 23 36 17 25 40 30
"No experience" 2 3 2 2




3High school or below 4 4
Bachelor's degree 44 71 56 83 100 78
Master's degree 13 21 11 17 24 18
Ph.D. degree 1 2 1 1
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Another question was asked about the experience that a manager has in
the same field of work as his present organisation (ranging from above-average,
average, to inexperienced). Findings, as shown in Table 8.3, indicate that
managers have a reasonable experience in the field of their work; 68% have an
above-average experience, 30% average, and only 2% consider themselves as
having no experience.
Finally, a question was asked about the manager's level of education. As
Table 8.3 shows, 78% of the respondents have a bachelor's degree, 19% have a
master' degree, and 1% have a PhD. degree.
8.3 Hypothesised findings
8.3.1 Performance and competitive strategies
Cluster analysis is a class of techniques used to classify objects or cases
into relatively homogenous groups called clusters. Elements in each cluster tend
to be similar to each other and dissimilar to other clusters. Cluster analysis is
also called classification analysis, or numerical taxonomy. Cluster analysis and
discriminate analysis are concerned with classification. However, discriminate
analysis requires prior knowledge of the cluster or group membership for each
object or case included, to develop the classification rule. In contrast, in cluster
analysis there is no a priori information about the group or cluster membership
for any of the objects. Groups or clusters are suggested by the data, not defined
a priori (Malhorta, 1993). Cluster analysis has been used widely in the literature
for strategic grouping; in addition, it has been known to be more useful than
other multivariate techniques in developing empirical taxonomies (Hambrick,
1984; Harrigan, 1985; Kim and Lim, 1988). This approach is used here to
classify the cases (i.e. firms) based on the four foundations of competitive
advantage and on current performance.
There appear to be two methods of clustering firms into performance
groups and into competitive strategies groups. The first method is to use a
multi-tier framework. This can be done by developing a taxonomy of
performance setting, and then a taxonomy of strategic groups within each
performance group or setting, and vice versa. Therefore, in this case the
strategic grouping will follow the performance grouping, or vice versa. The
second method is to develop a clustering of performance groups independent of
strategic groups, and then to relate the two taxonomies to one another. Even
though we find very minimal difference between the two methods, the second
approach has been adopted in this study as it appeared to have two advantages:
(1) it required a single cluster analysis using the full sample and (2) it facilitated
the identification of similarities/differences among different strategic groups
across the boundaries of the performance settings.
8.3.1.1 Performance groups
All firms (total of 132) have been clustered based on their current
performance. This performance has been measured in the questionnaire by five
questions (as shown in Appendix A, Section 5). Following these five questions
managers were asked about the extent of their confidence in answering these
questions (which measure their organisation's performance), and more than 93%
of managers were confident. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter
(see Table 7.2) the reliability test result for these questions was 0.895.
Findings of the cluster analysis, as shown in Table 8.4, indicate that
there are five clusters or groups of firms. The number of firms in each cluster
are 63, 42, 24, 1, and 2 firms, respectively. However, before making any
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conclusion about these groups, we used Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and the
Duncan Multiple Range Test (DMRT) to test whether these clusters differed
significantly (Anderbreg, 1973). Since clusters four and five have, respectively,
1 and 2 firms, they will be discussed later. When testing the significance in
ANOVA, the F-ratio is used. If the F-ratio is significant (i.e. p<0.05), then the
null hypotheses of no overall significance difference in the mean scores among
groups is rejected.
Table 8.4: Characteristics of clusters resulting from
clustering analysis of firms' performance a
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 ANOVA
F= 240.42
P=0.000Performance	 4.36	 3.48	 2.04	 3.20	 2.50
No. of firms	 63	 42	 24	 1	 2
Duncan Multiple Range Tests
1-2	 1-3	 1-4	 1-5	 2-3	 2-4	 2-5 3-4	 3-5	 4-5
**	 **	 **	 **	 **	 ns
	 **	 **	 ns
	 **
a Means are reported.
ns = not significant
** p < 0.05
Findings of the ANOVA test (with F=240.42 and P=0.000), as shown in
Table 8.4, indicate that there is an overall significant difference between the five
clusters at the 0.05 level of significance. As a further analysis, the Duncan
Multiple Range Test was performed to compare these five mean scores. The
results of the Duncan's test, as also shown in Table 8.4, indicate that there are
only two combinations out of ten which are not significantly different from each
other at the 0.05 level of significance.
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However, looking at the number of firms in each cluster, we find that
there is only one firm in the fourth cluster and only two firms in the fifth cluster.
The number of the firms in these two clusters is very small (both counted less
than 3% of the total sample) compared to the other three clusters, therefore they
will be excluded2 . Thus by excluding these three firms (which will analyse
individually later), the following conclusion can be made. It is clear that there
are three major groups of firms which are significantly different from each
other, in terms of their performance, at the 0.05 level of significance.
Thus, looking at the mean scores of the first three clusters, the first
cluster, with 63 firms, can be identified as high-performing firms, the second
cluster, with 42 firms, can be identified as medium-performing firms, and the
third cluster, with 24 firms, can be identified as low-performing firms.
8.3.1.2 Competitive strategies
Clustering analysis will also be used to classify all firms (total of 132)
based on the four foundations of competitive advantage. All of the 36 questions
for measuring the four foundations of the competitive advantage (9 questions
each) have been used for the strategic clustering of all firms, as discussed in
Chapter 7.
Findings of this clustering are illustrated in Table 8.5. These findings
indicate that there are five clusters of firms with 44, 17, 18, 39, and 9 firms in
each cluster, respectively. In addition to the number of firms in each strategic
group, Table 8.5 illustrates the characteristics of these clusters which will be
2 The exclusion of these three firms, in clusters four and five, will improve on power of the
ANOVA test as follows: F= 464.36 and p= 0.000. The Duncan Multiple Range test shows that
all three clusters are significantly different from each other at the 0.05 level of significance.
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discussed as follows: by looking at the mean scores of the four foundations of
the competitive advantage in each cluster, we can see whether each cluster or
group of firms has a competitive strategy or not. It has been discussed in
previous chapters that each competitive strategy is a particular combination of
two of the four foundations of competitive advantage. Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) will be used here to test the difference between the means of the four
foundations in each group. If the F-ratio is significant, then the null hypothesis
of no overall significance difference in the mean scores among the four
foundations is rejected. Furthermore, a comparison procedure was performed to
compare these four foundations. Duncan's test will be used to test the significant
difference of any two combinations among the mean scores of these
foundations. Table 8.5 includes the results of all these three tests.
Table 8.5: Characteristics of clusters resulted from clustering analysis














4 1-2	 1-3	 1-4	 2-3	 2-4	 3-4 ANOVA
Cluster! 44 4.27 4.04 2.37 2.14 N.S	 **	 **	 **	 **	 **	 F=186.92
P=0.000
Cluster 2 17 4.27 2.29 2.10 4.41 **	 **	 N.S	 N.S	 **	 **	 F=148.50
P=0.000
Cluster 3 18 2.21 4.22 4.25 2.00 **	 **	 N.S	 N.S	 **	 **	 F=124.00
P=0.000
Cluster 4 39 3.09 2.54 4.31 4.08 **	 **	 **	 **	 **	 N.S	 F=124.00
P=0.000
Cluster 5 9 2.42 2.51 2.41 2.68 N.S N.S N.S	 N.S	 N.S	 N.S F=0.4527
P=0.717
a Means are reported
N.S = not significant
** p < 0.05
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Results of the ANOVA test for the first four clusters of firms indicate
that there is an overall statistically significant difference between the four mean
scores of the four foundations of the competitive advantage at the 0.05 level of
significance. In the fifth cluster, the ANOVA results show that there is not an
overall significant difference between the four mean scores of the four
foundations of the competitive advantage at the 0.05 level of significance. Thus
it can be concluded that this cluster has no clear competitive strategy. However,
more analysis of these nine firms, in cluster five, will be discussed in more
detail at the end of this chapter.
Analysing cluster one, comparison results of the Duncan's test indicate
that only one combination (CA&PC) among the four foundations of the
competitive advantage is not significantly different at the 0.05 level of
significance. Since the combination of CA and PC form the price leader (PL)
competitive strategy, it can thus be concluded that the first cluster, with 44
firms, can be identified with PL competitive strategy.
Analysing cluster number two, comparison results of the Duncan's test
indicate that there are two combinations among the four foundations of the
competitive advantage that are not significantly different at the 0.05 level of
significance. The first combination, which is between CA&MD, forms the low
cost differentiation (LCD) competitive strategy. The second combination which
is between the PC&ID forms the imitator (IMT) competitive strategy. Since
there are no interactions between the two combinations (i.e. each contain
different foundations), and since all other combinations are significantly
different at the 0.05 level of significance, we can make the following
conclusion: clearly the first combination has higher mean scores of the two
foundations (i.e. firms emphasising these foundations more) than the second
combination. Thus the second cluster, with 17 firms, can be identified with LCD
competitive strategy.
Analysing cluster three, comparison of results of the Duncan's test
indicate again that the same two combinations in cluster two also exist in this
group of firms. However, the mean scores of the second combination (PC&ID)
this time is higher than the first combination (CA&PC). Thus it can be
concluded that the third cluster, with 18 firms, can be identified with IMT
competitive strategy.
Analysing cluster four, comparison of results of the Duncan's test
indicate that only one combination (ID&MD) among the four foundations of the
competitive advantage is not significantly different at the 0.05 level of
significance. Since the combination of ID and MD forms the differentiation
(DIF) competitive strategy, it can be concluded that the fourth cluster, with 39
firms, can be identified with DIF competitive strategy.
Results of the different competitive strategies can therefore be
summarised as follows: out of the five major clusters or groups of firms, the
first four groups of firms have each been clearly identified with one of the
competitive strategies, while the fifth group cannot be clearly identified with
any appropriate combination of the four foundations (i.e. with a clear
competitive strategy). Further analysis will be done later with this group to find
out about the performance as well as the other variables in these firms, which
may explain the unclear nature of their competitive strategies.
8.3.2 Competitive strategies and internal and external
variables
After having classified all firms in terms of their competitive strategies,
a question is now raised concerning the relationships between these competitive
strategies and the other variables (supporting variables) either internal (e.g.
financial control, prospectors, etc.) or external (e.g. environmental stability,
factor conditions, etc.). In other words, we should find out whether a cluster or
group of firms with one of the four competitive strategies has the same
characteristics and attributes as the other groups, in terms of these variables, or
not. These internal and external variables will be explored more fully when we
discuss the barriers that may prevent firms from achieving their competitive
advantage, but in this section we simply use them to test the differences
between the four defined strategic groups. If it is found that each group is
different from each other this will give us more confidence about the validity of
the questionnaire as a classification and research scheme. It will also give us
more confidence that these groups of firms are not only significantly different in
terms of their competitive strategies but also with' other related variables. The
following hypothesis is developed to be tested:
Ho:
Price leadership, low cost differentiation, imitation and
differentiation, are identical in terms of the following variables:
Analysers, Authority Delegation, Defenders, Demand
Conditions, Factor conditions, Financial Control, Formalisation,
Liaison devices, Prospectors, Related and Supported Industries,
Risk avoidance, Strategic Control, Strategic Planning,
Environmental stability and simplicity.
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) is the appropriate
technique to test this hypothesis. MANOVA is an extension of Univariate
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which means that ANOVA is just a special
case of MANOVA, the case with a single dependent variable. In ANOVA, we
measure the relationship between one independent variable (e.g. competitive
strategies) which has more than one category, and one dependent variable (e.g.
financial control). MANOVA, on the other hand, is used to explore the
relationship between one independent variable, with more than one category,
and multiple (more than one) dependent variables (e.g. Analysers, authority
delegation, defenders, demand conditions, factor conditions, financial control).
Thus, this approach is adapted here to test the above hypothesis.
The major purpose of using MANOVA is to test the overall significance
of the group difference in several variables. When using the ANOVA, an F-ratio
is utilised. In MANOVA, the Wilks's Lambda criterion is the appropriate
statistical approach; however, it could be transferred to F-ratio and used to test
the overall significance. If the F-ratio in MANOVA is significant, then the null
hypothesis of no overall variation in the mean vectors between the groups is
rejected. After determining that there is an overall significance, the researcher
must next examine the ANOVA tables which show the contribution of each
variable to the overall significance.
Table 8.6 MANOVA Test of overall significance
Wilks'
	
F-ratio	 Degree of freedom	 Level of
Lambda	 significance
.0327
	 14.31	 3/114	 P<0.000
MANOVA results, as shown in Table 8.6, indicate an overall
significance with Wilks's Lambda of .0327 and F-ratio 14.31 with 3/114 degree
of freedom, and probability of exceeding such a value of less than 0.0001.
Therefore the null hypothesis of equal mean scores is rejected. It can be
concluded that the four groups of competitive strategies have significant
differences in at least one of the internal or external variables.
The ANOVA results indicate which variable(s) contribute(s) to the
overall significance. In addition, multiple compression tests were performed,
using the Duncan Multiple Range Test, to compare the four groups in terms of
the variables under study.
Table 8.7 is a comprehensive table that includes the needed information
for presenting the competitive strategy groups and their relationships with the
internal and external (supporting) variables. It consists of ANOVA (F-ratio) and
its level of significance, mean scores of each of the variables for the four
competitive strategies groups, and Duncan's test of multiple comparisons at the
0.05 level of significance.
The data shown in Table 8.7 are very consistent with the discussion of
the strategic coherence and the literature review done in the previous chapters.
The findings in Table 8.7 will be discussed in two ways: first, by analysing the
contribution of the different supporting variables to the overall differences in the
four competitive strategies; second, by comparing the four competitive
strategies across all the supporting variables.
In the first way of discussing the findings presented in Table 8.7, the
individual variable will be analysed across the four competitive strategies. The
results of the ANOVA test indicate that all variables contribute significantly, at
the 0.05 level of significance, to the overall significance among the four
competitive strategies. Since there are fifteen variables which are classified into
three major variable groups, one or two variables from each group will be
discussed as an example in this way of discussion.
Financial control is one of the formal control processes variables. This
variable contributes significantly to the overall significance among the four
groups of competitive strategies. Its associated F-ratio is 40.43, with p<0.000.
Price leadership has the highest mean score among the four groups in the
financial control variable (4.28), whereas differentiation has the lowest mean
(2.75). However, the mean score of Low cost differentiation (3.55) is
significantly higher than the Imitation mean score (2.99). When the multiple
comparison procedure was performed to compare these four mean scores, using
Duncan's test for multiple comparison, the result indicated that three
competitive strategies were significantly different from each other. Only
imitation and differentiation are not significantly different at the 0.05 level of
significance. These findings indicate that those firms that have been identified
as price leadership emphasise financial control more than those firms following
other competitive strategies, whereas those firms 'with differentiation strategy
emphasise financial control less in their organisation than those firms following
other competitive strategies, and the other firms with other strategies are falling
in between the two groups. Such a finding is consistent with the existing
literature, where cost advantage and price competition are the two foundations
of the price leadership competitive strategy which requires a control process that
emphasises financial control more than anything else.
Environmental stability is one of the environmental factors that also
contributes significantly, (F= 33.78, with p>0.000), to the overall variation
among the four competitive strategies. The mean scores of price leader (3.99),
low cost differentiation (2.39), imitator (2.39), and differentiation (2.70), are
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significantly different from each other at the 0.05 level of significance.
Comparing the four strategies in terms of environmental stability shows that the
firms with PL competitive strategies are emphasising that they work in a stable
environment more than those with differentiation. Moreover, the low cost
differentiation firms are also emphasising that they work in a stable
environment more than those firms with imitation and those with
differentiation. Such findings are consistent with the discussion and review of
the literature in the previous chapters (e.g. Miller, 1988; Scherer, 1980; Burns
and Stalker, 1961; Porter, 1980).
Defenders variable, which has been used as a proxy indicator of the
informal control processes, contributes significantly to the overall differences
among the four groups of competitive strategies. The F-ratio is 68.35 with
p>0.000 level of significance. The mean scores of the price leadership
competitive strategy (4.57), low cost differentiation (2.65), imitation (1.89), and
differentiation (1.90), are significantly different at the 0.05 level of significance.
The PL competitive strategy has the highest mean, which is significantly
different from the other three strategy groups. This finding indicates that firms
with PL competitive strategies make the most attempt to locate and maintain a
secure niche in relatively stable products or services areas. Findings show, on
the other hand, that differentiation firms have the lowest mean score which is in
the opposite to the price leadership firms in terms of their view of the market
and/or of the products or services. Such a finding is also consistent with the
literature that has been discussed in the previous chapters.
Table 8.7: Relationships between competitive strategies and supporting
variables
Foundations of competitive
advantage mean scores 
Supporting variables 	 1	 2	 3	 4
ANOVA PL LCD IMT DIP
Duncan's multiple range test





3.55 2.99 2.75 ** ** ** ** ** ns
Processes Strategic	 F=08.46	 3.12 4.11 3.74 3.64 ** ** ** ns ** ns
Control	 P<0.000




2.09 2.43 2.91 ns ** ** ns ** **
Formalisation F=25.15	 4.31 3.75 2.37 3.22 ** ** ** ** ** **
P<0.000






2.65 1.89 1.90 ** ** ** ** ** RS
Processes Analysers
	 F=57.44 2.27 4.41 4.78 2.10 ** ** ns ns ** **
P<0.000













3.71 3.18 3.63 ns ns ns ** ns **
R& S	 F=32.25 2.84 2.92 3.72 4.08 ** ** ** ** ** ns
Industries	 P<0.000




3.99 3.69 2.39 2.70 ns ** ** ** ** ns
Stability	 P<0.000
PL= Price leadership; LCD=
 Low cost differentiation; IMT= Imitation; DIF= Differentiation.
ns = not significant
** P<0.05
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Authority delegation: This variable contributes significantly to the
overall significance among the four groups of competitive strategies. Its
associated F-ratio is 17.56 with p>0.000. The price leadership firms have the
lowest mean score among the four groups in the authority delegation variable
(1.84), whereas the differentiation have the highest mean (2.91), and the other
competitive strategies are in between. When the multiple comparison procedure
was performed to compare these four means, using Duncan's test for multiple
comparison, the results indicated that most combinations with one of these two
strategies were statistically different at the 0.05 level of significance. These
findings indicate that those firms that have been identified as differentiators are
more willing to delegate authority in their organisation than those firms
following other competitive strategies, whereas those firms with price
leadership strategy are less willing to delegate the authority in their organisation
than those firms following other competitive strategies, and the other firms with
other strategies are falling in between the two groups. Such a finding is
consistent with the existing literature, where the complexity and change in the
products or process create the need for the delegation of authority to experts
most capable of making critical decisions (Miller, 1988; Burns and Stalker,
1961; Miller and Friesen, 1984, Mintzberg, 1979; Thompson, 1967).
The second way of discussing the findings in Table 8.7 is by comparing
the four competitive strategies across all variables. Price leadership and
differentiation competitive strategies (1&4) are significantly different over
almost all variables (total of 15) with the exception of analysers, and demand
conditions. The similarity of the two strategies in terms of the analyser variable,
as one of the informal process variables, can be explained as follows. When we
look at the other variables in the dimensions of the informal control processes,
(prospectors and defenders), we find that price leadership firms have the highest
mean score in the defenders variable, whereas the differentiation firms have the
highest mean score in the prospectors variable. Thus these firms using both
competitive strategies have scored the analysers variable (the middle variable
between prospectors and defenders) with similar scores. The mean scores of
both strategies in the demand conditions are not significantly different. This
means that both of the competitive strategies are emphasising demand
conditions similarly. It has been discussed in earlier chapters that different
competitive strategies may need to consider the demand conditions in their
environments in all circumstances. In addition, it has been found that the
demand conditions variable has a low reliability, which may also explain this
finding. Apart from these two variables, price leadership and differentiation are
significantly different at the 0.05 level of significance across all variables.
Furthermore, analyses of the multiple comparison of the competitive
strategies indicate that PL and LCD, and IMT and DIF, respectively, are similar
or close to each other. In other words, price leadership and low cost
differentiation are not significantly different across almost half of the variables.
This is the same as with imitation and differentiation, which are not
significantly different in more than half of all variables at the 0.05 level of
significance. Moreover analysing LCD and IMT competitive strategies, we find
that they are significantly different across almost all variables (12 out of 15).
Analysing the mean scores of the internal and external variables in the four
competitive strategies, we find the following. When the PL have the highest
mean scores, the DIF will have the lowest mean score. The opposite is also true,
i.e. when the DIF have the highest mean scores, the PL will have the lowest
mean score. The mean score of the other two competitive strategies (i.e. LCD
and IMT) are close to the PL and DIF, respectively. The similarity and
differences in these four competitive strategies support the general relationships
between these strategies and the supporting variables discussed in the links
model (i.e. the barriers to competitive advantage) presented in Chapters 5 and 6
and summarised in table 7.1 in chapter 7. However, it can not be concluded
from these findings that one competitive strategy is necessarily superior to
others, rather this order of the four competitive strategies merely clarifies the
difference between them. More detailed discussions of these four competitive
strategies will be presented in the following chapters by discussing the way in
which firms achieve and sustain their competitive advantage, and the presence
of barriers that may prevent them from achieving competitive advantage. This
finding will also help in understanding how such findings can be related to the
issue of "stuck in the middle" which will be discussed in the final chapter.
8.4 Firms with unclear competitive
strategies
A brief discussion will be presented in this section about the nine firms
that have been classified as having unclear competitive strategies. Table 8.8
gives descriptive information about these firms. By analysing these nine firms,
based on their level of performance, it has been found that six of them, as shown
in Table 8.8, have been classified as low-performing firms, two as medium
performing firms and only one as a high performing firm. This finding may
explain the unclear nature of the competitive strategies. Two of the remaining
three firms, as also shown in Table 8.8, have been classified as medium-
performing, and only one firm has been classified as high-performing. Such
findings regarding these lower-performing firms are supporting sub-hypothesis
2 of this research which was stated as:
Hypothesis 2.1: High performing firms should have a high coherence between
two particular foundations of competitive advantage.
Hypothesis 2.2: Lack of coherence predicted in Hypothesis 2.1 is likely to
prevent lower-performing firms from achieving their
competitive advantage.
Further analysis of this hypothesis will be made in the next chapter.
Analysing the high-performing firm, we found that it has 20-40% of its
activities involved directly with the government. Considering that more than
35% of firms have less than 20% of their activities involved directly with the
government, this firm can be considered as having a high direct involvement
with the government. The activities are usually undertaken with renewable
contracts that last for two to three years, with high payments. This may explain
the high performance with unclear competitive strategy in this firm. Another
variable that may explain this finding can be seen in the managerial
characteristics. This firm has a manager who considers himself as having an
average experience, and only has less than five years working in this firm. Thus
it can be said that this manager either has no clear vision of the firm's
competitive strategy or he is changing its competitive strategy, with his average
experience, in such a way that it has not yet affected its performance. The other
two firms, have a lower level of performance than this firm, but have a higher
direct involvement with the government in their activities. Thus this may also
explain why these firms have an average performance while they have no clear
competitive strategies, for which we have attempted to give an explanations.
However, they still constitute less than 3% of the total sample of this research,
which can be considered a very low percentage.










12 low more than 80% above average 10-15 years
27 low 20%-40% average 5-10 years
68 low less than 20% average less than 5 years
115 low 20%-40% average 5-10 years
119 low less than 20% average less than 5 years
127 low 40%-60% above average 5-10 years
117 high 20%-40% average less than 5 years
123 medium 60%-80% average 5-10 years
92 medium 40%-60% above average 5-10 years
8.5 Conclusion
A response rate of 60% was obtained in this study. 60% of the
investigated firms have 100-500 employees, and 27% have 500-1000
employees. Managers of these firms were found to have a reasonable experience
in their field of work as well as in their organisation.
Three levels of performance were identified: high, medium and low.
These results were obtained by clustering all firms based on their current
performance. The significance of differences between these clusters was also
confirmed by applying different tests such as ANOVA and Duncan's test.
The four possible competitive strategies developed in Chapter 3 were
tested and found to be stable. Thus four competitive strategies were identified.
These are: price leadership, low cost differentiation, imitation and
differentiation. The identification of these strategies was tested in different ways
and found to be stable.
Competitive coherence will be tested in two different ways: firstly, by
testing the number of firms with unclear competitive strategies at the different
levels of performance; secondly, by testing the strength of the coherence within
each competitive strategy at the different levels of performance.






Mean scores of the








26 4.36 4.13 2.21 2.26 Price leadership 4.25**
11 4.33 2.47 2.13 4.44 Low cost
differentiation
4•39*
9 2.07 4.33 4.48 2.17 Imitators 4.41**
16 2.43 1.84 4.53 4.28 Differentiation 4.41**




15 4.16 3.93 2.54 2.04 Price leadership 4.04**
6 4.17 1.96 2.06 4.35 Low cost
differentiation
4.26*
8 2.28 4.08 4.00 1.88 Imitation
,
4•04**
9 3.10 2.80 4.16 4.00 Differentiation 4.08**





3 3.96 3.81 2.93 1.59 Price leadershipb ---
14 3.83 3.16 4.17 3.90 Not Clear ---
5 2.36 2.40 2.49 2.60 Not Clear ---
* and ** indicate that the means of the competitive strategy in the high and medium
levels of performance are significantly different at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels,
respectively, on the basis of a one-tailed t-test.
a CA= cost advantage, PC= price competition, ID= innovative differentiation and
MD= marketing differentiation
b because of few firms (only three) with PL in the low-performing firms, they have
been excluded from the t-test.
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Findings from testing competitive coherence, as shown in Table 9.1,
indicate that the low-performing firms have more than twice the number of
firms with unclear competitive strategies than at the medium-performance level,
and five times as many as those at the high-performance level. Moreover,
adding the second subgroup of firms (14 firms) in the low-performing group to
the third subgroup will increase the percentage of the firms with unclear
competitive strategy at this performance level to 19 firms. Therefore, the
number of firms with clear and unclear strategy in the different levels of
performance can be tested. The Chi-square test will be used to test the
association between the number of firms in these two categories and the
different levels of performance. Table 9.2 shows the distribution of firms with
clear and unclear competitive strategies at the different levels of performance.
Table 9.2: Chi-square test of clear and unclear competitive strategies
Levels of performance
Strategies High Medium Low Total
Clear strategy 62 38 3 103
(98.4%) (95%) (14%) (82%)
Unclear strategy 1 2 19 22
(1.6%) (5%) (86%) (18%)
Total 63 40 22 125
(50%) (32%) (18%) (100%)
X2 =87.25,	 df=2,	 P=0.000
The Chi-square results, (x 2 =87.25, df=2, P=0.000), in Table 9.2,
indicate that the number of firms are different at the 0.01 level of significance at
the three levels of performance, and consequently there is an association
between the levels of performance and the number of firms in the two
categories. Thus, firms with unclear competitive strategy in the low performing
firms are more than those at other levels of performance. Since each competitive
strategies is a combination of particular link between two foundations of
competitive advantage, such findings support Hypothesis 2.1 that high-
performing firms should have high coherence between two particular
foundations of competitive advantage. At the same time, they support
Hypothesis 2.2 that the lack of coherence between two particular foundations of
competitive advantage (i.e. competitive strategy) is most likely to prevent lower
performing firms from achieving their competitive advantage. However, further
discussion of this aspect of strategic coherence is presented next.
Competitive coherence can also be tested through the clear identification
of the competitive strategies. Table 9.1 shows that the competitive strategies are
more clearly identified in the high-performing group of firms than in the lower-
performing group. This can be seen from comparing the mean scores of the two
particular foundations which form each competitive strategy across the different
levels of performance. For example, in Table 9.1, comparing the scores of CA
(4.36) and PC (4.13) of the PL in the high-performing firms on the one hand,
and those of the medium-performing firms (CA (4.16) and PC (3.93)) on the
other, or if we compare them with those of the low-performing firms, we find
that the first is higher than the other two. This is true in all strategies. However,
these are only indicative results which will be tested more formally
(statistically) by analysing the differences between each of the four competitive
strategies at the different levels of performance. Differences between the means
of the competitive strategies can be analysed by using the t-test. Findings of the
t-test are presented in the right column of Table 9.1.
Testing the differences between the mean scores of each of the four
competitive strategies at the different levels of performance, the results of the t-
test indicate that all of the competitive strategies have stronger coherence (i.e. a
significantly higher mean score) at the high level of performance compared to
the lower level of performance. For example, IMT competitive strategy in the
high-performing firms (4.41) has a significant stronger competitive coherence at
the 0.05 level of significance than those in the lower-performing firms (4.04).
Thus, it can be concluded that strategic coherence is stronger (i.e. competitive
strategies are more clearly identified) in the high-performing firms than in the
lower-performing firms. Such findings also support Hypothesis 2.1 that high-
performing firms should have high coherence between two particular
foundations of competitive advantage. At the same time they support
Hypothesis 2.2 that the lack of coherence between two particular foundations of
competitive advantage (i.e. competitive strategy) is most likely to prevent
lower-performing firms from achieving their competitive advantage.
9.2.2 Cognitive coherence
Cognitive coherence will be tested by comparing the two methods (i.e.
objective and subjective) of measuring competitive strategies at the different
levels of performance. However, these methods will first be introduced. In the
previous chapter, all firms were classified into four major groups each with one
of the four competitive strategies based on the clustering of responses to the 36
questions (9 to each foundation). This is considered an objective way of
measuring competitive strategies. Managers were asked in the first section of
the questionnaire, as shown in Appendix A, (Question No. 37) to rank the four
foundations of competitive advantage in the way most appropriate to their
organisation for attaining competitive advantage. This is considered a subjective
way of measuring competitive strategies that a firm is following. Therefore,
based on the four groups of firms, i.e. the four competitive strategy groups, that
have been defined in the objective way, the analysis will be on how well the
same manager(s) recognise(s) the competitive strategy that their organisation(s)
is/are following.
Figure 9.1 shows the findings from the two ways of measuring
competitive strategies. For example, it illustrates that 91% (40 out of 44) of
managers in the first group of firms with PL competitive strategy are able to
recognise their organisations as actually following this strategy. 82% (14 out of
17) of managers in the fourth group of firms with LCD competitive strategy are
able to recognise their organisations as actually following this strategy.
Relating these competitive strategies to the different performance levels,
cognitive coherence between objective and subjective views of the competitive
strategies (Hypothesis 3.1) can be tested. At the same time, the barriers that may
prevent the lower-performing firms from achieving their competitive advantage
can also be tested by comparing these two methods of measuring competitive
strategies (Hypothesis 3.2). In other words, existence of lack of cognitive
coherence in the lower-performing firms will be an indication of the existence
of barriers that prevent such firms from achieving their competitive advantage.
Figure 9.1: 































Testing cognitive coherence can be done by comparing the objective and
the subjective ways of measuring the competitive strategies at the different
levels of performance. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to
analyse the cognitive coherence in these two methods at the different levels of
performance. This correlation coefficient indicates the strength of correlation
between the two variables. Pearson correlation coefficients (r) and their level of
significance for each level of performance are illustrated in Table 9.3.




No. of firms Pearson
correlation*
P
High 62 0.80 0.000
Medium 40 0.58 0.000
Low 19 0.29 0.149
* Pearson correlation between objective and subjective competitive strategies.
-
Findings in Table 9.3 indicate that the correlation between the two
methods of measuring competitive strategies is significant in the high and
medium-performing firms, but not significant in the low-performing firms. The
high-performing firms have a high correlation between the two methods of
measurement (r=0.80) at the 0.001 level of significance, as shown in Table 9.3.
However, the low-performing firms have insignificant correlation between these
two methods of measuring the competitive strategies at the 0.05 level of
significance (r=0.29), as shown in Table 9.3. These findings indicate that high-
performing firms have high coherence between objective and subjective
competitive strategies. Such findings support Hypothesis 3.1.
Furthermore, the existence of cognitive coherence at the different levels
of performance can be tested. Therefore, the number of firms with matched and
unmatched strategy in each level of performance can be tested. For the purpose
of this comparison, a firm that has identified the same strategy in objective and
subjective ways is considered as having a matched strategy and vice versa. The
Chi-square test will be used to test the association between the number of firms
in these two categories (i.e. the number of firms with ma' tched and unmatched
strategies) and the different levels of performance.





Matched 54 30 8 92
(87%) (75%) (42%) (76%)
Unmatched 8 10 11 29
(13%) (25%) (58%) (24%)
Total 62 40 19 121
(51.2%) (33.1%) (15.7%) (100%)
X2_1619	 df =2	 P=0.000
The Chi-square results, (x2= 16.19, df=2, P=0.000), as shown in Table
9.4, indicate that the number of firms are different at the 0.01 level of
significance at the three levels of performance, and consequently there is an
association between the levels of performance and the number of firms in the
two categories. Examining the number of firms in each category, as shown in
Table 9.4, it can be seen that the number of firms with a matched strategy in the
high-performing firms (54) is higher than the number of those with unmatched
strategy (7). The opposite is true with firms at the low level of performance.
These findings indicate that competitive strategies are more recognised by
managers in the high-performing firms than by those in the low performing
firms. Such findings then support Hypothesis 3.1, that high-performing firms
have a high coherence between objective and subjective views of the
competitive strategies. These findings also support Hypothesis 3.2, that the lack
of cognitive coherence may prevent lower-performing firms from achieving
their competitive advantage.
9.2.3 Organisational coherence
In Chapters 5 and 6, certain links (or relations) between the internal and
external (supporting) variables and the competitive strategies have been
developed. As introduced in the first chapter and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6,
the appropriate link between the four competitive strategies and these variables
is called "organisational coherence". Therefore, organisational coherence will be
tested in this section by relating the internal and external (supporting) variables
to the four competitive strategies at the different levels of performance. By
comparing these relationships at the different levels of performance, barriers
(either internal or external) that may prevent firms from achieving their
competitive advantage can be identified.
The Pearson correlation coefficient is used to measure the simple
relation between two variables. It will be used here to test the relationship
between the supporting variables and the four competitive strategies at the
different levels of performance. Table 9.5 illustrates the Pearson correlation
coefficients (r) and their levels of significance. Different levels of significance
have been presented in Table 9.5 for the purpose of comparison. In comparing
the two correlation coefficients at the two levels of performance, the Fisher's Z-
transformation test will be used. Blalock (1972), Spiegel (1972), Davies and
Goldsmith (1972), Stopher and Meyburg (1979), Yule and Kendall (1950) and
others recommend this test as the way of comparing correlation coefficients.
Blalock (1972:406) states that if the two correlations are based on independent
samples, we can transform each of the r's into z's and then make use of the
formula for the standard error of the difference between two z's, which is
analogous to that for the standard error of a difference between means. Such a
test is also used in empirical work such as Miller (1988).









H M H M H M H M
Financial control 0.795 0.579 0.180 0.111 -0.003 -0.127 -0.648 -0.518
**** **** **** ****
Strategic control -0.186 -0.274 0.139 0.142 0.050 0.077 0.330 0.453
* *** ***
Strategic planning -0.743 -0.233 -0.313 -0.305 0.177 0.574 0.619 0.444
**** ** * **** **** ***
Authority -0.602 -0.444 -0.003 -0.140 0.102 0.221 0.668 0.459
delegation **** *** **** ***
Liaison devices -0.772 -0.345 -0.178 -0.310 0.089 0.357 0.689 0.333
**** ** ** ** **** **
Formalisation 0.695 0.414 0.463 0.357 -0.180 -0.369 -0.455 -0.359
**** *** **** ** ** **** **
Prospectors -0.742 -0.411 -0.174 -0.013 0.048 0.207 0.633 0.542
**** *** **** ****
Analysers 0.086 -0.186 -0.059 -0.165 0.245 -0.053 0.047 -0.047
*
Defenders 0.720 0.531 0.112 0.097 -0.200 -0.248 -0.770 -0.609
**** **** **** ****
Risk avoidance 0.575 0.281 0.425 0.266 -0.243 -0.306 -0.412 -0.273
**** * *** * * ** *** *
Factor conditions 0.526 0.325 0.171 0.469 -0.037 -0.273 -0.413 -0.081
**** ** *** * ***
Demand conditions 0.162 -0.094 0.328 0.258 -0.092 -0.131 0.030 0.213
*** *
Related & -0.669 -0.305 -0.306 -0.072 0.234 0.251 0.593 0.432
supported industries **** ** ** *	 , **** ***
Environmental 0.689 0.363 0.459 0.164 -0.284 -0.295 -0.530 -0.434
Simplicity **** ** **** ** * **** ***
Environmental 0.649 0.337 0.390 0.231 -0.334 -0.367 -0.580 -0.414
Stability **** ** *** *** ** **** ***
H= high-performing firms (N=63).
M= medium-performing firms (N=40).







9.2.3.1 Price leadership competitive strategy
Table 9.5 shows that this competitive strategy in the high-performing
firms is positively associated with the following variables: financial control,
formalisation, defenders, risk avoidance, factor conditions, environmental
simplicity, and environmental stability; and negatively associated with strategic
planning, prospectors, related and supported industries, authority delegation,
and liaison devices. Such findings are consistent with the literature that has been
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. These results support Hypothesis 4.1 stated in
Chapter 7.
Comparing these relationships between the PL competitive strategy and
the supporting variables at the two levels of performance, barriers that may
prevent firms from achieving their competitive advantage can be identified.
Findings presented in Table 9.5 indicate two things:
(1) PL competitive strategy has the same associations (either positive or
negative) with all variables in the medium and high-performing firms.
(2) Since all these positive and negative associations in the high-performing
firms are consistent with the literature, and since they have a higher correlation
with the PL for the high-performing firms than for the medium-performing
firms, the links with these variables could be considered as a barrier that may
prevent the medium-performing firms from achieving their competitive
advantage. However, even though these correlations are higher for the high-
performing firms, such a difference could have occurred fairly frequently by
chance. Thus, the differences between these associations at the two levels of
performance can be tested by using the Z-test.
The results of the Z-test, as presented in Table 9.6, indicate that 11 out
of the 15 variables associated with the PL are significantly different at the 0.10
or 0.05 levels of significance. Thus, these variables can be considered as barriers
that prevent medium-performing firms from achieving their competitive
advantage. Such findings support Hypothesis 4.2 stated in Chapter 7.
Table 9.6: Price Leadership and the importance of supporting
variables
Supporting variables HPFa MPF Z-valueb
Strategic planning -0.743 -0.233 3.43149
Liaison devices -0.772 -0.345 3.17271
Prospectors -0.742 -0.411 2.46999
R&SI -0.669 -0.305 2.35465
Environmental Simplicity 0.689 0.363 2.22023
Financial control 0.795 0.579 2.02098
Environmental Stability 0.649 0.337 2.01596
Formalisation 0.695 0.414 1.98864
Risk avoidance 0.575 0.281 1.74578
Defenders 0.72 0.531 1.50701
Analysers 0.086 -0.186 1.30818
Demand conditions 0.162 -0.094 1.22864
Factor conditions 0.526 0.325 1.17931
Authority delegation -0.602 -0.444 1.04442
Strategic control -0.186 -0.274 0.44333
HPF= high-performing firms (N=63) and MPF= medium-perform ng firms (N=40).
b The Z-value must be equal to or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to
reach the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
These variables which are considered as barriers that prevent medium-
performing firms from achieving their competitive advantage are ranked based
on the results of the Z-test, as shown in Table 9.6. As can be seen, strategic
planning, liaison devices, prospectors, and related and supported industries
variables are at the top of the list, and they are all negatively correlated to PL.
Since users of this competitive strategy are devoted to cost control, so that
above-average return can be obtained even with low prices, and since products
are more standardised and less innovative, there is little need for long-term
planning or co-ordination between specialists such as engineers and scientists
who are more useful for handling complex, unstructured problems.
Furthermore, firms using a PL competitive strategy are likely to confront
the least environmental complexity and change (Porter, 1980, Hambrick, 1985;
Miller, 1988) because environments that are complex or subject to much change
will create severe diseconomies for organisations trying to pursue a PL strategy.
These high-performing firms are emphasising that they are working in stable
and simple environments and have open relationships with their related and
supported industries.
Thus, the 11 variables listed in Table 9.6 can be considered (based on
their ranking) as more important variables to be considered by the medium-
performing firms using PL competitive strategy in order to achieve their
competitive advantage. Although the other four variables listed in Table 9.6 are
not as important as the previous 11 variables in terms of differentiating between
the two levels of performance, they should still be considered by the medium-
performing firms in order to achieve their competitive advantage; their
importance is based on the way that they are ranked in Table 9.6.
9.2.3.2 Low cost differentiation competitive strategy
As Table 9.5 shows, this competitive strategy in the high-performing
firms is significantly positively associated with the following variables: risk
avoidance, demand conditions, environmental simplicity, environmental
stability and formalisation; and significantly negatively associated with strategic
planning, and related and supported industries variables. Other results should be
considered before discussing Hypothesis 4.1. These are:
(1) the rest of the variables (with the exception of demand conditions, which
will be explained later) listed in Table 9.5 are correlated with LCD strategy in
the way they were predicted (see table 7.1 in Chapter 7). However, these
relationships did not reach the level of significance as presented in Table 9.5.
(2) in comparing the correlations, in both directions, of all variables with the
LCD in the high-performing firms and those with the PL at the same level of
performance, findings indicate that these variables are less correlated to the
LCD than to the PL competitive strategy. These findings are consistent with the
literature discussed in chapters 5 and 6. Such finding§ therefore are largely
supporting Hypothesis 4.1.
The demand conditions variable is predicted to have a neutral
association with LCD in the high-performing firms; instead, it is significantly
positively correlated to LCD. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the links
between a competitive strategy and demand conditions variable are related to
the degree of environmental certainty that is required. Firms using LCD are
expected to have less environmental certainty than PL, therefore they may need
to emphasise this variable more, as will be discussed later. Moreover, this
variable has a low reliability score, as discussed earlier, which may partly
explain this exception.
By comparing these positive and negative relationships between the
LCD competitive strategy and the supporting variables in the high and medium-
performing firms, barriers that prevent these firms from achieving their
competitive advantage can be identified. Since all these associations in the high-
performing firms are consistent with the literature, and since they are less
emphasised by the medium-performing firms, the links with these variables
could be considered as a barrier that may prevent the medium-performing firms
using LCD competitive strategy from achieving their competitive advantage.
However, by using the Z-test the differences between these relationships at the
two levels of performance can be tested.
The results of the Z-test presented in Table 9.7 indicate that there are
two variables (environmental simplicity and factor conditions) that are
significantly different between the high and the medium-performing firms at the
0.10 or 0.05 levels of significance. Thus, it can be concluded that these two
variables may be considered as barriers that prevent lower-performing firms
from achieving their competitive advantage. Such findings support the
Hypothesis 4.2.
Although firms with LCD are not expected to be in environments as
stable or simple as those firms using PL competitive strategy, they still need
more simple environments than those firms using a DIP competitive strategy
because of their different supply side characteristics. Medium-performing firms
seem to overemphasise the factor conditions variable. Such an emphasis will
make LCD closer to the PL competitive strategy than being an LCD. Firms
using LCD need to balance their emphasising of this variable to satisfy the
demand side characteristics of marketing differentiation.
Table 9.7: Low cost differentiation and the importance of supporting
variables
Supporting variables HPFa 1VIPF Z-valueb
Factor conditions 0.171 0.469 1.602280
Environmental Simplicity 0.459 0.164 1.575857
R&SI
-0.306 -0.072 1.163250
Risk avoidance 0.425 0.266 0.863967
Environmental Stability 0.39 0.231 0.841704
Prospectors -0.174 -0.013 0.776070
Liaison devices -0.178 -0.31 0.670433
Authority delegation -0.003 -0.14 0.657545
Formalisation 0.463 0.357 0.608699
Analysers
-0.059 -0.165 0.512274
Demand conditions 0.328 0.258 0.365282
Financial control 0.18 0.111 0.336213
Defenders 0.112 0.097 , 0.072302
Strategic planning
-0.313 -0.305 0.042170
Strategic control 0.139 0.142 0.014590
HPF= high-performing firms (N=63) and MPF= medium-performing firms (N=40).
bThe Z-value must be equal or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to reach
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
However, it can be noted that both of these variables (i.e. environmental
simplicity and factor conditions) are environmental variables. Therefore, it
seems that external environmental links differentiate the two performance
groups in terms of the LCD competitive strategy. Finally, although these two
variables are the most important for medium-performing firms with LCD
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strategy in order to achieve their competitive advantage, there are other
variables that can also be considered. Table 9.7 lists all variables based on their
importance as differentiators between the two levels of performance; thus they
should be considered by medium-performing firms as they have been ranked in
Table 9.7.
9.2.3.3 Imitation competitive strategy
Table 9.5 shows this competitive strategy in the high-performing firms
is significantly positively associated with analysers, and related and supported
industries; and negatively correlated with risk avoidance, environmental
stability, and environmental simplicity. Other results should be considered
before discussing Hypothesis 4.1. These are: (1) the rest of variables listed in
Table 9.5 are correlated with IMT strategy in the way they were predicted, but
these relationships did not reach the level of significance, as presented in Table
9.5. (2) in comparing the correlations, in both directions, of all variables with
IMT in the high-performing firms and those with DIP at the same level of
performance, findings indicate that these variables are less correlated to the IMT
than to the DIF competitive strategy. These findings are consistent with the
literature discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Such findings, therefore, largely
support Hypothesis 4.1.
Table 9.8: Imitation and the importance of supporting variables
Supporting variables HPFa 1V1PF Z-valueb
Strategic planning 0.177 0.574 2.26253
Analysers 0.245 -0.053 1.44516
Liaison devices 0.089 0.357 1.35493
Factor conditions -0.037 -0.273 1.15888
Formalisation -0.18 -0.369 0.97866
Prospectors 0.048 0.207 0.77231
Financial control -0.003 -0.127 0.59444
Authority delegation 0.102 0.221 0.58330
Risk avoidance -0.243 -0.306 0.32497










HPF= high-performing firms (N=63) and MPF= medium-performing firms (N=40).
b The Z-value must be equal to or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to
reach the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
Since there was no IMT competitive strategy identified in the low-
performing firms, the discussion of this competitive strategy will be between the
high and the medium-performing firms with IMT competitive strategy. In
comparing these positive and negative relationships between the IMT
competitive strategy and these variables in the high and medium-performing
firms, barriers that may prevent firms with IMT from achieving their
competitive advantage can be identified. Findings indicate that both the positive
and the negative relationships between the supporting variables and IMT are
more associated with the IMT in the high-performing firms than in the medium-
performing firms. Since these associations are consistent with the existing
literature as discussed earlier, these links could be considered as barriers that
may prevent the medium-performing firms using IMT from achieving their
competitive advantage. However, the results of the Z-test, as shown in Table
9.8, indicate that there are three variables (strategic planning, analysers and
liaison devices) that are significantly different, at the 0.10 or 0.05 levels of
significance, between the high and the medium-performing firms. Thus, it can
be concluded that these variables are barriers that prevent lower-performing
firms from achieving their competitive advantage. Such findings support
Hypothesis 4.2.
Variables presented in Table 9.8 are ranked based on their importance as
barriers that may prevent lower-performing firms from achieving their
competitive advantage. At the top of the list are ' the three significant
differentiator factors. It can be noted, as illustrated in Table 9.5, that all three
variables are internal variables. Therefore, it seems that internal links
differentiate the two subgroups of performing firms in terms of the IMT
competitive strategy. It was discussed in the previous section that environmental
links differentiate the two subgroups of performing firms in terms of the LCD
competitive strategy. This comparison indicates that the internal links are more
important for firms using IMT competitive strategy than those with LCD
strategy, and vice versa. Since firms with IMT competitive strategy are
emphasising price competition in terms of their demand side links, the
innovation of competitors will be imitated only after a considerable risk-
reducing lag. However, medium-performing firms with IMT seem to
overemphasis the two formal control processes variables (strategic planning and
liaison devices), as shown in tables 9.5 and 9.8. In addition, as discussed earlier,
the analysers' culture is between those of the prospectors and the defenders.
Therefore, because the demand side activities of IMT (price competition) which
require different functional links compared to that of the marketing
differentiation in the DIF, IMT is expected to be more effective in organisations
that have the characteristics of the analysers' culture. Thus, such variable should
be more emphasised by medium-performing firms with IMT competitive
strategy in order to achieve their competitive advantage. Finally, although these
three variables are the most important variables to be considered by the
medium-performing firms with IMT strategy in order to achieve their
competitive advantage, there are other variables that can also be considered.
Table 9.8 lists all variables that are related to IMT based on their
importance as a differentiators between the two levels of performance; thus they
should be considered by medium-performing firms as they have been ranked in
Table 9.8, noting that most of these variables are oVeremphasised by the
medium performing firms which make them closer to the DIF than to the IMT
competitive strategy.
9.2.3.4 Differentiation competitive strategy
Table 9.5 indicates that the DIF competitive strategy in high-performing
firms is significantly positively associated with the following variables:
strategic planning, strategic control, prospectors, related and supported
industries, authority delegation, and liaison devices; and negatively positively
associated with: financial control, defenders, risk avoidance, factor conditions,
environmental simplicity, environmental stability, and formalisation. These
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findings are consistent with the literature that has been discussed in Chapters 5
and 6. Such findings support Hypothesis 4.1.
Comparing these relationships between the DIF competitive strategy and
the supporting variables at the two levels of performance, barriers that may
prevent firms from achieving their competitive advantage can be identified.
Findings presented in Table 9.5 indicate two things:
(1) DIF competitive strategy has the same associations (either positive and
negative) with all variables in the medium and in the high-performing firms.
(2) Since all these positive and negative associations in the high-performing
firms are consistent with the literature, and since they have a higher correlation
with the DIF for the high-performing firms than for the medium-performing
firms, the links with these variables could be considered as a barrier that may
prevent the medium-performing firms from achieving their competitive
advantage. However, even though these correlations are higher for the high-
performing firms, such a difference could have occurred fairly frequently by
chance. Thus, the differences between these relationships at the two levels of
performance can be tested by using the Z-test.
Table 9.9: Differentiation and the importance of supporting variables
Supporting variables HPFa MPF Z-valueb
Liaison devices 0.689 0.333 2.38298
Factor conditions -0.413 -0.081 1.70694
Defenders -0.77 -0.609 1.49218
Authority delegation 0.668 0.459 1.48303
Strategic planning 0.619 0.444 1.17363
Environmental Stability -0.58 -0.414 1.05852
R&SI 0.593 0.432 1.04848
Financial control -0.648 -0.518 0.94509
Prospectors 0.663 0.542 0.91135
Demand conditions 0.03 0.213 0.88818
Risk avoidance
-0.412 -0.273 0.75284







Analysers 0.047 -0.047 0.44846
HPF= high-performing  rms (N=63) and MPF = medium-performing firms (N=40).
b The Z-value must be equal to or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to
reach the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
The results of the Z-test indicate that there are four variables (liaison
devices, factors conditions, defenders, and authority delegation) associated with
the DIF which are significantly different at the 0.10 or 0.05 levels of
significance, as shown in Table 9.9. Thus, these variables can be considered as
barriers that prevent medium-performing firms from achieving their competitive
advantage. Such findings are supporting Hypothesis 4.2.
It can be seen from Table 9.9 that the liaison devices variable (Z-value
2.38) is the most important variable to be considered by medium-performing
firms in order to achieve their competitive advantage, followed by factor
conditions, defenders, and authority delegation. Since these firms are concerned
with innovation to offer existing products more efficiently or to introduce new
products/services, such firms need an organisational structure which encourages
and motivates development and innovation, hence co-ordination between
business units, which helps to provide the collaboration of specialists from
different areas, is essential. These complexities, as discussed earlier, create
reciprocal interdependencies that require close contact, through integrative
liaison devices, among managers; at the same time, these complexities require
the delegation of authority to experts in the firm.
Furthermore, since these organisations aim to lead competitive actions
and to generate such new products/processes faster than competitors, they can
be expected to respond rapidly to early signals concerning areas of opportunity
and be first in new product and market areas. Therefore, a prospectors' culture in
these organisations is expected to be effective in facilitating such activities
rather than a defenders' culture.
As discussed in Chapter 6, firms using differentiation competitive
strategy are required to invest more in the development of long-term resources
and competencies rather than in basic factor conditions, a variable that has been
less emphasised in the high-performing firms, as has been predicted.
Finally, although the four variables at the top of the list in Table 9.9 are
the most important to be considered by the medium-performing firms with DIF
strategy in order to achieve their competitive advantage, there are other
variables that can also be considered. Table 9.9 lists all variables based on their
importance as differentiators between the two levels of performance. Since the
correlations of these variables with DIF are consistent with the literature, they
should also be considered by medium-performing firms as they have been
ranked in Table 9.9.
9.2.3.5 Comparing competitive strategies
Based on the previous analysis of the four competitive strategies, the
following statement can be made:
(1) analysing the four competitive strategies in the high-performing firms, as
shown in Table 9.5, we find that all variables that are significantly positively
correlated to the PL are significantly but negatively correlated to the DIP
competitive strategy. The opposite is also true.
(2)analysing the LCD and IMT we find the following: (a) All variables that are
significantly correlated with PL in the high performing firms (either positively
or negatively) are also correlated in the same way with the LCD at the same
level of performance, but with lower significance. (b) All variables that are
significantly correlated with DIP in the high-performing firms (either positively
or negatively) are also correlated in the same way with the IMT at the same
level of performance, but with lower significance.
Based on the analysis of these competitive strategies, we were able to
identify the barriers that may prevent firms with each one of these competitive
strategies from achieving their competitive advantage. These findings are based,
however, on the aggregate analysis of the two industries. Therefore, further
analysis of barriers that may prevent firms from achieving their competitive
advantage will be discussed in the next chapter when the two industries are
discussed separately. Therefore, different barriers may exist with respect to each
competitive strategy in each industry. All these barriers will then be summarised
and discussed together in Chapter 11.
9.3 Analysis of performance groups
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the same five questions
concerning current performance were used to evaluate firm performance three
years ago (which we will call 'previous' performance), as shown in Appendix A.
All firms have been classified in the previous chapter based on their current
performance, hence previous performance can be used to compare the change of
performance in the different groups of firms with different competitive
strategies. Since all firms have been classified into three performance groups
(i.e. high, medium, and low) based on current performance, in this section we
will test the change of performance within each group of firms. A brief
discussion will be given about these changes in performance, then we will relate
them to the previous discussions on the competitive strategies groups.
Figure 9.2 shows the relationship between current and previous
performance in the high-performing firms. The change in performance has been
calculated by subtracting the previous performance from the current
performance. Therefore, zero indicate that there is no change in the performance
of the firm(s), while positive results indicate an improvement in the
performance, and negative results indicate a decrease in performance. It can be
seen clearly in Figure 9.2 that there are more firms in this group which have on
the whole made an improvement in their current performance. In other words,
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performance. The differences between means of the current and previous
performance of the high-performing firms were tested by using the t-test.
Findings show that the mean scores of performance of this group have increased
significantly at the 0.05 level of significance from 3.78 three years ago to 4.36
in the current year, as shown in Table 9.10.
Figure 9.2:
Current and previous performance in high performing firms
Change of performance *
* Arithmetic difference between current and preN&us performance








High-performing firms 63 4.36 3.78**
Medium-performing firms 42 3.48 3.48
Low-performing firms 20 1.97 2.32*
* and ** indicate that the means of the current and previous performance are
significantly different at the 0.10 and 0.05, respectively, on the basis of the two-
tailed t-test.
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In the medium-performing group of firms, as shown in Figure 9.3, some
firms have improved their performance while others have not. However, the
mean score of the current and previous performance of the medium performing
firms was analysed using the t-test, as presented in Table 9.10. Findings indicate
that the mean score of the current performance of this group is the same as three
years ago, as shown in Table 9.10.
Figure 9.3: 
Current and previous performance in medium-performing firms
Figure 9.5 shows the relationship between the current and the previous
performance in the low-performing firms. It can be seen clearly that there are
more firms in this group have on the whole a better level of performance three
years ago than in the current year. Using the t-test, the difference between the
current and previous performance was tested. Findings show that the mean
scores of performance of this group have decreased significantly at the 0.10
level of significance from 2.32 three years ago to 1.97 in the current year, as
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shown in Table 9.10 (four firms have been excluded from the comparison made
in this performing group because they did not respond to the previous
performance questions).
From the findings presented in Figures 1, 2, 3, and Table 9.10, the
following conclusions can be drawn. The change in performance is different in
the high, medium, and low-performing firms. Current performance is mainly
above previous performance in the high-performing firms, while it is below
previous performance in the low-performing firms, and almost the same as
previous performance in the medium-performing firms. Moreover, in analysing
the mean scores of the three levels of performance it has been found that the
ranking of the mean scores is unchanged (i.e. the ranking of the previous
performance is the same as the current performance), but the dispersion is wider
between the different levels of performance.
Figure 9.4: 
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Relating these changes in performance to the four competitive strategies,
the sustainability of competitive advantage can be tested. This is to test whether
the results presented in Table 9.10 hold for the different competitive strategies
or not. In other words, is the current performance, in the high-performing firms,
higher than the previous performance in firms using different competitive
strategies?
Results of testing the differences in performance with respect to the four
competitive strategies are presented in Table 9.11. Findings show that the mean
scores of current performance in the high-performing firms using these four
competitive strategies is significantly higher than previous performance at the
0.05 level of significance. For example, the mean scores of performance of
firms using PL competitive strategy have increased from 3.76 three years ago to
4.35 in the current year; this difference is significant at the 0.05 level of
significance. The mean scores of performance of firms using IMT competitive
strategy have also increased from 3.67 three years ago to 4.24 in the current
year, where this difference is also significant at 0.05 level of significance. In
short, these results indicate that high-performing firm § with all of the four
competitive strategies are able to sustain their competitive advantage over time.











High 26 4.35 3.76**
Medium 15 3.52 3.63*
Lowa 2 2.70 3.60
Low Cost
Differentiation
High 11 4.27 3.69**
Medium 6 3.53 3.57
Imitation High 9 4.24 3.67**
Medium 8 3.48 3.40
Differentiation High 16 4.49 3•93**
Medium 9 3.38 3.07
a because of few numbers of firms, this competitive strategy has been excluded from
the t-test.
* and ** indicate that the means of the current and previous performance are
significantly different at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively, on the basis of the
two-tailed t-test.
In relating these changes in performance to the previous discussions on
the different groups of firms using the different competitive strategies within
each of the performance levels, the following conclusion can also be drawn. It
has been found that high-performing firms have more strategic coherence than
the lower-performing firms, in all three different aspects of strategic coherence
discussed earlier. Findings presented in Table 9.11 indicate that high-
performing firms not only have a high performance level in the current year but
have also improved their performance significantly in the last three years.
Therefore, high-performing firms which have maintained strategic coherence
- 235 -
(with respect to all aspects of strategic coherence) are able not only to achieve
their competitive advantage but also to sustain it over time.
As a further discussion, since these four competitive strategies are a
development of Porter's different competitive strategies, and since Porter's two
competitive strategies (i.e. cost leadership and differentiation) are similar to our
PL and DIF competitive strategies respectively, it can be argued that firms using
these two competitive strategies, as well as those firms using the other
competitive strategies (i.e. LCD and IMT), can achieve and sustain their
competitive advantage.
In medium-performing firms it has been found that the performance of
firms using PL and LCD competitive strategies has decreased, while the
performance of firms using the other competitive strategies, i.e. IMT and DIF
have increased, as shown in Table 9.11. Even though these changes in
performance are not significant (with the exception of PL competitive strategy)
they will be used as indicative results. For example, the mean performance
scores of firms using PL competitive strategy decreased from 3.63 three years
ago to 3.52 in the current year, while the mean scores of performance of firms
using DIF competitive strategy have increased from 3.07 three years ago to 3.38
in the current year, as shown in Table 9.11. These findings suggest that as it is
difficult for firms to afford to achieve their competitive advantage and
consequently get a high level of performance (i.e. cannot maintain a high level
of strategic coherence), DIF competitive strategies will be the best competitive
strategies for them to follow, then IMT. Since these results are related to the two
different industries together, different results might be obtained when these two
industries are analysed separately. Therefore, this issue will also be discussed in
the next chapter when the two industries are discussed separately.
9.4 Conclusion
It has been found that high-performing firms were able to maintain a
high level of strategic coherence ( with respect to all three aspects of strategic
coherence) than lower-performing firms. By relating the competitive strategies
to the different levels of performance, strategic coherence was tested in three
different ways with respect to its three aspects. These are:
First, the competitive coherence, tested in two different ways (1) by the number
of firms with unclear competitive strategy at the different levels of performance;
(2) by the consistency (strength of the coherence) within each competitive
strategy at the different levels of performance.
Second, the cognitive coherence, tested by comparing the two methods of
measuring the competitive strategies at the different levels of performance.
Third, the organisational coherence, tested by linking the four competitive
strategies to the internal and external (supporting) variables.
Barriers that may prevent lower-performing firms with different
competitive strategies from achieving their competitive advantage were
identified. All barriers that have been discussed in this chapter and those that
will be discussed in the next chapter will be summarised in Chapter 11.
Findings indicate that high-performing firms which have more strategic
coherence than the lower-performing firms are able not only to achieve their
competitive advantage but also to sustain it over time. Such findings were
obtained by relating the findings in the first two sections to the change of
performance.
Finally, findings presented in this chapter are based on the analysis of
the data from the two different industries (food and petrochemical) investigated.
However, different barriers to achieving and sustaining competitive advantage
might be found when the two industries are analysed separately. The next
chapter will therefore analyses and compare results related to these two
industries.
Chapter 10
Strategic coherence and barriers to
achieving competitive advantage:
food and petrochemical industries
10.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the food and petrochemicals
industries which have been investigated in this research. However, rather than
analysing each industry separately, they will be analysed and compared
together. In Chapter 8, all firms were classified independently into performance
groups and into different competitive strategy groups. In this chapter these two
groups will be related to one another in each industry to analyse the way in
which firms achieve and sustain their competitive advantage, and the presence
of different barriers that may prevent firms in each industry from achieving their
competitive advantage.
The three different aspects of strategic coherence (competitive, cognitive
and organisational) will be tested in this chapter with regard to the two
industries. The lack of coherence (in one or more of these aspects) is considered
as a barrier that may prevent firms from achieving their competitive advantage.
Therefore, barriers to achieving competitive advantage will be discussed at the
same time as discussing the different aspects of strategic coherence.
Performance change (i.e. previous and current performance) will then be related
to the discussion of strategic coherence in each industry. Before we analyse the
different aspects of strategic coherence and the barriers, findings of the
performance classification regarding each industry will be discussed.
10.2 Performance in the two industries
A total of 132 usable questionnaires returns were received. Sixty-four
respondents were from the food industry, and sixty-eight were received from the
petrochemical industry. All firms were clustered in terms of their performance,
in Chapter 8, by using cluster analysis, then tested by using ANOVA and the
Duncan Multiple Range Test. The results of these tests indicate that there are
three levels of performance (i.e. high, medium, and low). In this chapter firms
have been classified based on their activities as food industry and petrochemical
industry firms.
Table 10.1: Performance classification of firm in two industries
Levels of
performance









High 37 4.38 26 4.32
Medium 19 3.49 23 3.47
Low 12 2.17 12 1.92
Table 10.1 shows the classified firms and their performance mean scores
at each level of performance within each industry. Findings, as presented in
Table 10.1, indicate that all the three levels of performance (i.e. high, medium,
and low) exist among the firms in the food and in the petrochemical industries.
It also shows the number of firms at each level of performance in the two
industries.
Having classified all firms in the two industries based on their
performance, they can be compared by testing the relationship between the
industry's type and the level of performance. Comparing the two industries in
terms of their performance, the following hypothesis was developed:
HO: There is no association between the level of performance and
the industry type.
The Chi-square test for independence is the appropriate test to determine
if there is an association between the industry and the level of performance. The
Chi-square test results (i =1.92742, df =2, P =0.38148), as shown in Table
10.2, indicate that petrochemical and food industries are not significantly
different in the three levels of performance, and consequently there is no
association between the industry type and the level of performance.






Food 26 23 12 61
(41.3 %) (54.8 %) (50 %) (47.3 %)
Petrochemical 37 19 12 68
(58.7 %) 45.2 (50 %) (52.7 %)
Total 63 42 24 129







To test the different aspects of strategic coherence (competitive
coherence, cognitive coherence and organisational coherence), the three levels
of performance and the four competitive strategies identified previously in
Chapter 8 will be linked together in this section. The different hypotheses that
are related to these different aspects of strategic coherence as well as those that
are related to the barriers to achieving competitive advantage were presented in
Chapter 7 will be tested in this chapter with regard to each of the two industries
separately. As discussed in Chapter 9, the lack of coherence in these aspects of
strategic coherence is considered as a barrier that may prevent firms from
achieving their competitive advantage; therefore these barriers will then be
tested, in the two industries, at the same time as discussing the different aspects
of strategic coherence.
10.3.1 Competitive coherence
This aspect of strategic coherence, in each industry, will be tested in two
different ways: firstly, by testing the number of firms with unclear competitive
strategy at the different levels of performance; secondly, by testing the strength
of the coherence (internal consistency) within each competitive strategy at the
different levels of performance.




















1 14 4.40 4.31 2.14 2.29 PL 4.35*
2 5 4.47 2.47 2.27 4.53 LCD 4.50*
3 8 2.10 4.31 4.51 1.90 IMT 4.41*




1 4 4.11 3.92 2.00 2.03 PL 4.01*
2 4 4.17 1.81 2.06 4.31 LCD 4.24*
3 4 2.42 4.03 4.14 1.81 IMT 4.08*
4 5 3.09 2.93 4.18 4.07 DIF 4.12*




1 2 4.22 4.00 2.94 1.61
,
PL --
2 8 3.96 2.99 4.10 3.96 NC --
3 1 2.00 2.56 2.67 2.89 NC --
PL= Price leadership; LCD= Low cost differentiation; IMT= Imitation; DIF=
Differentiation; NC= not clear.
* means of competitive strategy at high and medium-levels of performance are
significantly different at 0.05 level on basis oft-test.
a CA= cost advantage, PC= price competition, ID= innovative differentiation, and
MD= marketing differentiation.
b because of few firms (only two) with PL in the low-performing firms they have been
excluded from t-test.


























2 6 4.22 2.48 2.02 4.37 LCD
3 6 2.11 1.54 4.52 4.11 DIF
4 1 1.89 4.56 4.22 4.33 IMTa









2 2 4.17 2.28 2.06 4.44 LCDa
3 4 3.11 2.64 4.14 3.92 DIF
4 4 2.14 4.14 3.86 1.94 IMT




1 1 4.22 3.44 2.89 1.56 PLb --
--
--
2 6 3.65 3.39 4.28 3.81 NC
3 4 2.44 2.36 2.44 2.53 NC
PL= Price leadership; LCD= Low cost differentiation; IMT= Imitation; DIF=
Differentiation; NC= not clear.
a CA= cost advantage, PC= price competition, ID= innovative differentiation, and
MD= marketing differentiation.
b because of few firms with these competitive strategies, they have been excluded
from the t-test.
Competitive strategies and performance levels in the petrochemical and
food industries are respectively presented in Tables 10.3 and 10.4. These tables
contain descriptive information about the different classifications that have been
analysed in Chapter 8. Therefore, they illustrate the number of firms that have
been identified with different competitive strategies within each performance
group. They also illustrate the mean scores of each of the four foundations of
competitive advantage within each subgroup of the competitive strategy in the
two industries.
Testing strategic coherence through the number of firms with unclear
competitive strategies, in each industry, the performance groups (i.e. high,
medium, and low) need to be related to the competitive strategy groups to
identify the competitive strategies that exist within each of the performance
levels. At the same time, other findings from these relationships in the two
industries will be discussed and compared. Therefore, within each performance
level, firms with all of the competitive strategy groups will be compared in the
two industries, then the number of firms with unclear competitive strategies will
be compared across the different levels of performance idboth industries.
Comparing the high-performing groups in the two industries, Table 10.3
shows that the high-performing firms in the petrochemical industry are
classified into four subgroups. The first subgroup (with 14 firms) has been
identified as PL, the second subgroup (with 5 firms) has been identified as LCD,
the third subgroup (with 8 firms) has been identified as IMT, and the last
subgroup (with 10 firms) has been classified as DIF competitive strategy.
Table 10.4 shows that high-performing firms in the food industry have
been classified into five subgroups, the first, second, and third subgroups being
identified as PL, LCD, and DIF, respectively. However, only one firm in the
fourth subgroup has been identified as IMT. Although this firm which have
identified initially with IMT, the strategy of this firm is not as clear as it is on
the other levels of performance or in the petrochemical industry. The fifth
subgroup, also with only one firm, cannot be regarded as having any of the four
competitive strategies.
Thus, the differences between the two industries in the high-performing
groups can be summarised as follows:
(1) there are no firms that have been classified as having no clear
strategy among the petrochemical industry firms;
(2) four firms have been identified as IMT in the petrochemical
industry, while there is only one firm among the food industry firms,
which has been initially identified as IMT;
(3) DIF competitive strategy has been followed by ten firms in the
petrochemical industry, and by six firms in the food industry,
however, in terms of their distribution, the other competitive
strategies (i.e. PL and LCD) are very similar in the two industries.
The number of firms at each level of performance, in each industry, will
be tested by the end of this discussion. In addition, the difference of the two
industries in terms of the number of competitive strategies, can be explained by
the different nature of the two markets. This will also be explained further after
discussing the other levels of performance.
Comparing the medium-performing groups in the two industries, five
subgroups have been identified in each industry. Four of them have been
identified with the four competitive strategies, while the fifth subgroup with
only one firm in each industry cannot be identified with any competitive
strategy, as shown in Tables 10.3 and 10.4. The only difference between the two
industries in this medium-performing group is that there are more firms (11) in
the food industry following the PL competitive strategy than firms (4) following
the same strategy in the petrochemical industry.
Classifying the third group of firms, i.e. the low-performing firms in
both industries, it has been found that there are three subgroups in each industry
as shown in Tables 10.3 and 10.4. The first subgroup in each industry has been
classified as PL. However, there are only two firms in the petrochemical
industry and only one firm in the food industry, as shown respectively in Tables
10.3 and 10.4, that have been identified with this competitive strategy. Although
the second and the third subgroups in the low-performing firms are identified as
having no clear competitive strategy, they are different. The last subgroups in
both industries have been already classified (in the previous chapters) as having
no clear competitive strategies. The second subgroups in both industries (6
firms in the food industry and 8 firms in the petrochemical industry) are those
firms which have initially been identified with DIF competitive strategy, as
discussed in Chapter 9. However, these firms have been 'analysed and discussed
in the previous chapter when competitive strategies were related to the
performance groups. It was concluded there that when these firms (i.e. low-
performing firms) are separated from other levels of performing firms, their DIF
competitive strategy is not as clear as it is at the other levels of performance.
Still, when this subgroup of firms is split into two subgroups in the two
industries, it has been found that each subgroup is not as clear as it is at the
other levels of performance. For example, in the petrochemical industry (which
has a large number of firms in this subgroup compared to the food industry) as
shown in Table 10.3, it was found that this subgroup has the highest mean score
in the ID, and that it has the same mean scores in MD and CA; whereas the DIF
competitive strategy is the combination of the MD and ID only. Therefore, these
subgroups in both industries cannot be clearly identified with DIF competitive
strategy. Thus, with the exception of the three firms with the PL in this group of
performing firms (i.e. the low-performing group), there are no clear competitive
strategies that can be assigned to the low-performing group in both industries.
Based on the analysis of these two levels of performance (i.e. high and
medium) some findings can be discussed. It seems that there are more firms in
the food industry with PL competitive strategy (23) than firms with PL (18) in
the petrochemical industry. However, the result seems to be the opposite with
the DIF competitive strategy; in the petrochemical industry 15 firms, in the food
industry 10 firms. It can be argued that the petrochemical market is more
technological-oriented than the food market. Therefore, considering the nature
of the two markets, it is expected that the food market is less dynamic and less
changing than the petrochemical market. Thus, firms in such a market are
expected to be less innovative and therefore adopt the PL competitive strategy
more than firms in the petrochemical industry. The opposite is also true with the
DIF competitive strategy. There will be further discussion of the different
number of firms existing in the two industries, with these two strategies as well
as the other two competitive strategies (i.e. LCD and IMT), at the end of this
section.
Thus it could be concluded from this analysis of the three levels of
performance that the four competitive strategies in the high and medium-
performing firms in both industries can be clearly identified. The difference
between the two industries in this regard is that one firm in the high-performing
firms in the food industry has no clear competitive strategy. However, the four
competitive strategies cannot be clearly identified (with the exception of the
three firms in both industries) in the low-performing firms. Comparing the
number of firms with unclear competitive strategies across the different levels
of performance in both industries, findings can be summarised as follows. The
number of firms with unclear competitive strategies in the food industry were 2,
1, and 10 in the high, medium, and low-performing firms respectively.
However, in the petrochemical industry there were no firms with unclear
competitive strategy in the high-performing firms, one firm among the medium-
performing firms, and nine firms among the low-performing. Thus, the number
of firms with unclear competitive strategy in the low-performing firms is higher
than those in other levels of performance in both industries.
Such findings in both industries support Hypothesis 2.1 that high-
performing firms should have a high coherence between two particular
foundations of competitive advantage. At the same time, they support
Hypothesis 2.2 that the lack of coherence between two particular foundations of
competitive advantage may prevent lower-performing firms from achieving
their competitive advantage.
In testing competitive coherence through the internal consistency of each
competitive strategy, the information presented in Tables 10.3 and 10.4 will be
used. The strength of this coherence can be seen from comparing the mean
scores of the two particular foundations which form each competitive strategy
across the different levels of performance. Then it can also be seen from
comparing each competitive strategy across the different levels of performance.
The mean scores of the foundations of the competitive advantage for the
petrochemical and food industries are illustrated respectively in Tables 10.3 and
10.4. Comparing the mean scores of the two foundations of the competitive
advantage (which form each of the competitive strategies) at the different levels
of performance, findings indicate that the competitive strategies are more
clearly identified in the high-performing group of firms than in the lower-
performing group. Considering one (or both) of the two particular foundations
of competitive advantage which form one of the four competitive strategies in
the high-performing firms and comparing it with the same foundation in a lower
level of performance, findings indicate that the former is higher than the latter.
For example, considering the scores of CA (4.40) and of PC (4.31) of the PL in
the high-performing firms in Table 10.3, and comparing them with those of the
medium-performing firms in the same industry (CA (4.11) and PC (3.92)), or
comparing them with those of the medium-performing firms in the other
industry (i.e. the food industry firms, in Table 10.4), findings indicate that the
first is higher than the other two in both industries. This is true of all strategies.
Such findings indicate that competitive strategies are more clearly
identified in the high-performing group of firms than in the lower-performing
group of firms in each industry as well as across industries. Although such
findings are indicative in both industries, they also support Hypothesis 2.1 that
high-performing firms should have a high coherence between two particular
foundations of competitive advantage. At the same time, they support
Hypothesis 2.2 that the lack of coherence between two particular foundations of
competitive advantage is likely to prevent lower-performing firms from
achieving their competitive advantage.
Finally, competitive coherence can be tested by comparing the
differences between the mean scores of each of the four competitive strategies at
the different levels of performance. The t-test will be used for testing the
difference between these means. The results of the t-test, in Table 10.3,
indicates that all of the competitive strategies are significantly different (at the
0.05 level of significance) at the two levels of performance. In other words,
competitive strategies have a significantly stronger coherence (i.e. a higher
mean score) at the high level of performance compared to the lower level of
performance in the petrochemical industry. For example, DIF competitive
strategy in the high-performing firms (4.46) has a significant stronger
competitive coherence at 0.05 level of significance than those in the lower-
performing firms (4.12). This is true with all of the competitive strategies in the
petrochemical industry. Because of the small number of firms in the food
industry only PL and DIF will be compared. As Table 10.4 shows, the results of
the t-test indicate that the differences between the mean scores of the
competitive strategies are not significant. Although the differences between
these means are not significantly different, both PL and DIF strategies have
higher mean scores in the high-performing firms than at the lower level of
performance. Such results can be used as an indicative of competitive coherence
in the food industry.
Thus, based on these three different ways of testing competitive
coherence, it can be concluded that competitive coherence is stronger (i.e.
competitive strategies are more clearly identified or internally consistent) in the
high-performing firms than in the lower-performing firms in each of the two
industries. Such findings, in these two industries, support Hypothesis 2.1 that
high-performing firms should have a high coherence between two particular
foundations of competitive advantage. At the same time, they support
Hypothesis 2.2 that the lack of coherence between two particular foundations of
competitive advantage is likely to prevent lower-performing firms from
achieving their competitive advantage.
As a further comparison of the two industries, the different number of
firms with the four competitive strategies at the different levels of performance
will be tested, as mentioned earlier in this section. Since it has been found that
there are no clear competitive strategies in the low-performing firms, the four
competitive strategies at the two levels of performance (i.e. high and medium
levels of performance) will be tested. The following hypothesis was developed
to be tested:
HO: In the petrochemical industry there is no association between the
four competitive strategies and the levels of performance.






Price leadership 14 4
(37.8 %) (23.5 %)
5 4
Low cost differentiation (13.5 %) (23.5 %)
8 4
Imitation (21.6 %) (23.5 %)
10 5
Differentiation (27 %) (29.4 %)
37 17
Column Total (68.5%) (31.5%)
i=1.45946
	 df =3	 P=0.69166
To test the nature of the distribution of the four competitive strategies in
the two levels of performance, the Chi-square is used. The finding, as shown in
Table 10.5 (2,2 =1.45946, df =3, P =0.69166), indicates that the four competitive
strategies in the petrochemical industry are not significantly different at the two
performance levels. Thus it can be concluded that the four competitive strategies
are not different in terms of performance in the petrochemical industry.
For the food industry the following hypothesis was developed to test the
number of firms with the four competitive strategies at the different levels of
performance:
HO: In the food industry there is no association between the four
competitive strategies and the levels of performance.
The results in Table 10.6, where Chi-square value =3.9253, df =3, and
p=0.2696, indicate that the above hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus, it can be
concluded that the four competitive strategies are not different in terms of
performance in the food industry.
Table 10.6: Association between competitive strategies and levels of
performance
Competitive strategies




(48 %)	 (52 %)












	 df =3	 p =0.26964
10.3.2 Cognitive coherence
Cognitive coherence will be tested by comparing subjective and
objective ways of measuring competitive strategies at the different levels of
performance. These two methods have been discussed in the previous chapter,
therefore we will move directly to compare them in the two industries to find
out if there is any difference between them. For each industry, the Pearson
correlation coefficient between the subjective and objective competitive
strategies was calculated to analyse the cognitive coherence. Pearson correlation
coefficients (r) and their level of significance for each level of performance in
the food and petrochemical industries industry, are illustrated respectively in
Tables 10.7 and 10.8.
Findings in Tables 10.7 and 10.8 indicate that the correlation between
the two methods of measuring the competitive strategies is significant in the
high and medium-performing firms, but not significant in the low-performing
firms in both industries. For example, the high-performing firms in the food
industry show a high correlation between the two methods of measurement
(r=0.81) at the 0.000 level of significance, as shown in Table 10.7. However, the
low-performing firms have insignificant correlation between these two methods
of measuring the competitive strategies at the 0.05 level of significance
(r=0.11). This is also true of the petrochemical industry firms, as shown in
Table 10.8. These findings, in both industries, means that competitive strategies
are more recognised by managers in the high-performing firms than by
managers in the lower-performing firms in both industries. Such findings
support Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 10.7: Pearson correlation between objective and subjective
competitive strategies in food industry
Level of
performance
No. of firms Pearson
correlation*
P
High 25 0.81 0.000
Medium 22 0.63 0.002
Low 9 0.11 0.785
* Pearson correlation between objective and subjective competitive strategies.
Table 10.8: Pearson correlation between objective and
subjective competitive strategies in petrochemical industry
Level of performance No. of firms Pearson correlation* P
High 37 0.79 0.000
Medium 18 0.54 0.020
Low 10 0.47 0.175
* Pearson correlation between objective and subjective competitive strategies.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the existence of cognitive
coherence at the different levels of performance can be tested by comparing the
number of firms with matched and unmatched strategy at each level of
performance in each industry. For the purpose of this comparison, a firm that
has identified the same strategy in the objective and subjective way is
considered as having a matched strategy, and vice versa. The Chi-square test
will be used to test the association between the number of firms in these two
categories (i.e. the number of firms with matched and unmatched strategies) and
the different levels of performance.
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Table 10.9: Comparison of objective and subjective competitive




Matched 20 15 2 37
(80%) (68%) (22%) (66%)
Unmatched 5 7 7 19
(20%) (32%) (78%) (34%)
Total 25 22 9 56
(44%) (40%) (16%) (100%)
x2= 9 	 df =2
	 p =0.007
Table 10.10: Comparison of objective and subjective competitive




Matched 34 15 6 55
(92%) (83%) (60%) (85%)
Unmatched 3 3 4 10
(.08%) (17%) (40%) (15%)
Total 37 18 10 65
(57%) (28%) (15%) (100%)
X2= 6.18
	
df =2	 p =0.04
The results of the Chi-square tests of the food and petrochemical
industries are shown in Tables 10.9 and 10.10, respectively. Findings in both
industries indicate that the number of firms are different at the 0.01 level of
significance at the three levels of performance, and consequently there is an
association between the levels of performance and the number of firms in the
two categories in each industry. Examining the number of firms, in the food
industry, in each category, as shown in Table 10.9, it can be seen that the
number of firms with a matched strategy in the high-performing firms (20) is
higher than those with unmatched strategy (5). The opposite is true with firms at
the low level of performance. Similar findings can be seen in the petrochemical
industry firms, as shown in Table 10.10.
These findings indicate that competitive strategies are more recognised
by managers in the high-performing firms in both industries than by those in the
lower-performing firms. Such findings, in the food and petrochemical
industries, support Hypothesis 3.1, that high-performing firms have high
cognitive coherence between objective and subjective views of the competitive
strategies. These findings also support Hypothesis 3.2, that the lack of cognitive
coherence may prevent lower-performing firms from achieving their
competitive advantage.
10.3.3 Organisational coherence
Relating internal and external (supporting) variables to the four
competitive strategies at the different levels of performance, organisational
coherence can be tested in each of the two industries. Certain links (or relations)
between these variables and the competitive strategies have been discussed in
previous chapters. These relationships will be tested in this section by
comparing them at the different levels of performance; barriers (either internal
or external) that may prevent firms from achieving their competitive advantage
can also be identified.
As discussed in Chapter 9, Pearson correlation coefficients will be used
to test the relationship between these variables and the four competitive
strategies at the different levels of performance in each industry. The Fisher's Z-
transformation test will be used in this section to compare the two correlation
coefficients at the different levels of performance in each industry. Each
competitive strategy within the performance groups will be analysed and
compared in terms of its relationship with the supporting variables in each
industry. Since there are no clear competitive strategies in the low-performing
firms, with the exception of the three PL in both industries, the four competitive
strategies will be compared at this section in the high and medium levels of
performance.
The structure of this analysis, therefore, will be as follows: the four
competitive strategies will be analysed one by one in both industries. The order
of analysing these strategies will be: price leadership (PL), differentiation (DIF),
low cost differentiation (LCD), and then imitation (IMT). Both the positive and
the negative relationships between the competitive strategies and the supporting
variables will be analysed. By comparing these relationships between the
different levels of performance, barriers that may prevent firms from achieving
their competitive advantage will be identified. The two industries will be
compared to analyse the different barriers that may exist in each industry in
terms of the analysed competitive strategy.
10.3.3.1 Price leadership competitive strategy
The PL competitive strategy in the high-performing firms of the
petrochemical and food industries, as Table 10.11 shows, is significantly
positively associated with the following variables: financial control,
formalisation, defenders, risk avoidance, environmental simplicity,
environmental stability, and factor conditions. On the other hand, this
competitive strategy, in both industries, is significantly negatively correlated
with the following variables: strategic planning, authority delegation, liaison
devices, prospectors and related and supported industries.
Findings indicate that the PL competitive strategy in the high-
performing firms in the two industries is very similar in terms of its association
with all variables. These results in both industries are consistent with the
literature discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Such findings support Hypothesis 4.1
in Chapter 7.
Comparing these relationships between the PL competitive strategy and
the supporting variables at the two levels of performance, barriers that may
prevent firms in each industry from achieving their competitive advantage can
be identified. Findings presented in Table 10.11 indicate two things:
(1) PL competitive strategy has the same associations (either positive or
negative) with all variables in the medium and in the high-performing firms.
This is true in both industries.
n rr lati n e en corn s etiti s rate 4







PH PM FH FM
Financial control 0.72 0.59 0.87 0.58
**** *** **** ***
Formal Strategic control -0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.32
control Strategic planning -0.78 -0.14 -0.70 -0.36
**** ****
processes Authority delegation -0.55 -0.32 -0.74 -0.51
*** **** **
Formalisation 0.58 0.46 0.85 0.29
*** * ****
Internal Liaison devices -0.76 -0.34 -0.81 -0.40
**** **** *
Variables Prospectors -0.64 -0.64 -0.85 -0.29
**** *** ****
Informal Analysers 0.16 -0.07 -0.02 -0.25
control Defenders 0.73 0.62 0.74 0.49
**** *** **** **
processes Risk avoidance 0.59 0.25 0.55 0.28
- ***	 • **
Env. Simplicity 0.56 0.49 0.89 0.22
*** ** ****
External Environmental Env. Stability 0.54 0.22 0.78 0.41
*** **** *
variables variables Demand conditions 0.26 0.08 0.07 -0.15




-0.63 -0.16 -0.75 -0.34
PH= high-performing firms in petrochemical industry (N=37); PM= medium-performing
firms in petrochemical industry (N=18), FH= high-performing firms in food industry






(2) Since all these positive and negative associations in the high-performing
firms in the two industries are consistent with the literature, and since they have
a higher correlation with the PL for the high-performing firms than for the
medium-performing firms, the links with these variables could be considered as
a barrier that may prevent the medium-performing firms in the two industries
from achieving their competitive advantage. However, even though these
correlations are higher for the high-performing firms, such a difference could
have occurred by chance. Thus, the differences between these associations at the
two levels of performance can be tested by using the Z-test.
The results of the Z-test, as presented in Table 10.12, indicate that there
are 4 and 9 out of the 15 variables associated with the PL in the petrochemical
and food industries, respectively, which are significantly different at the 0.10 or
0.05 levels of significance. Thus, these variables, in each of these two
industries, can be considered as primary barriers that prevent lower-performing
firms from achieving their competitive advantage. Such findings support
Hypothesis 4.2 in Chapter 7.
These variables that prevent medium-performing firms in the two
industries from achieving their competitive advantage are ranked on the basis of
their Z-values, as shown in Table 10.12. Although these firms in the two
industries are using the same competitive strategy it seems that barriers to
achieving competitive advantage are different from one industry to the other.
Table 10.12: Price Leadership and the importance of supporting
variables 









Strategic planning -0.78 -0.14
_
-2.942 Env. Simplicity 0.89 0.22 3.906
Liaison devices -0.76 -0.34 -2.063 Formalisation 0.85 0.29 3.067
R&SI -0.63 -0.16 -1.889 Prospectors -0.85 -0.29 -3.045
Risk avoidance 0.59 0.25 1.400 Liaison devices -0.81 -0.40 -2.243
Env. Stability 0.54 0.22 1.207 Financial control 0.87 0.58 2.188
Authority delegation -0.55 -0.32 -0.924 R&SI -0.75 -0.34 -1.992
Financial control 0.72 0.59 0.764 Env. Stability 0.78 0.41 1.985
Analysers 0.16 -0.07 0.731 Strategic planning -0.70 -0.36 -1.606
Defenders 0.73 0.62 0.682 Defenders 0.74 0.49 1.369
Demand conditions 0.26 0.08 0.602 Factor conditions 0.62 0.33 1.247
Factor conditions 0.44 0.29 0.562 Authority delegation -0.74 -0.51 -1.225
Formalisation 0.58 0.46 0.544 Risk avoidance 0.55 0.28 1.042
Env. Simplicity 0.56 0.49 0.290 Analysers -0.02 -0.25 0.744
Strategic control -0.20 -0.17 -0.116 Demand conditions 0.07 -0.15 0.710
Prospectors -0.64 -0.64 -0.040 Strategic control -0.18 -0.32 0.493
PH= high-performing firms in petrochemical industry (N=37); PM= medium-performing
firms in petrochemical industry (N=18), FH= high-performing firms in food industry
(N=26), and FM= medium-performing firms in food industry (N=22).
b Z-value must be equal to or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to reach 0.10,
0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
As can be seen from Table 10.12, three of the four variables which
should be considered by the medium-performing petrochemical firms in order to
achieve their competitive advantage, are internal variables. However, both
internal and external variables need to be considered more by the medium-
performing food industry firms in order to achieve their competitive advantage.
Therefore, environmental links seem to be more important in the food industry
than in the petrochemical industry. The nature of the petrochemical market,
which is more technical and complex and less stable than the food market, may
explain this difference; therefore, medium-performing firms in the
petrochemical industry need to give more emphasis to these variables (strategic
planning, liaison devices, risk avoidance, and related and supported industries)
in order to achieve their competitive advantage.
The importance of these variables can be explained by considering the
following: (1) Since medium-performing firms with PL in both industries are
emphasising (with significant positive correlation, see Table 10.11) financial
control as one of the formal control processes, they need on the other hand to
minimise the efforts in strategic planning, as discussed in previous chapters. (2)
These firms, as has also been discussed in previous chapters, are expected to
have open relationships with firms in the related and supported industries,
because their customers care more about the price than about quality, image or
novelty, which can be delivered through the close relationships.
Since firms with PL are expected to have a routine nature of operation
which causes managerial interdependencies to be pooled and co-ordination to be
effected through formal controls and hierarchies; and since these firms in both
industries are emphasising financial control and formalisation in their
organisations (see Table 10.11), then the liaison devices should not be
emphasised by medium-performing firms in both industries, nor should
authority delegation be emphasised in the medium-performing firms in the food
industry.
Furthermore, because of the stability and simplicity of the demand side,
managers of firms using PL competitive strategy should avoid taking risks in
their decisions and should also consider themselves as defenders rather than
prospectors, as discussed in Chapter 5. Findings, in Table 10.12, indicate that
there is a trade-off between these two variables in the two industries.
Considering the simplicity and stability of the environment in which these firms
are working, the prospectors and risk avoidance variables should be considered
by the medium-performing firms in the food and petrochemical industries
respectively, in order to achieve their competitive advantage.
Finally, although the other variables listed in Table 10.12 are less
important differentiators (i.e. have not reached the level of significance)
between the two levels of performance, they also should be considered by the
medium-performing firms in order to achieve their competitive advantage. In
other words, these variables can be considered as secondary barriers. The
importance of these variables in each industry is based on the way that they are
ranked in Table 10.12 with respect to the two industries.
•
10.3.3.2 Differentiation competitive strategy
Analysing the correlation results presented in Table 10.13, DIF in the
high-performing firms in the petrochemical industry is associated significantly
positively with the following variables: strategic planning, prospectors, related
and supported industries, authority delegation, and liaison devices. In addition
to these variables, the DIF in the high-performing firms in the food industry is
associated also significantly positively with the strategic control variable. With
the exception of this variable (which will be discussed later), these associations
in both industries are consistent with the existing literature that has been
discussed in previous chapters. Table 10.13 also shows that DIF in the high-
performing firms in the petrochemical and food industries is significantly
negatively associated with the following variables: financial control, defenders,
risk avoidance, factor conditions, environmental simplicity, environmental
stability, and formalisation. These findings are also consistent with the existing
literature discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. They also indicate the similarity of the
two industries with regard to these correlations with the DIF. These results
support Hypothesis 4.1 in Chapter 7.
The correlation of the strategic control variable with DIF in the food
industry, however, can be explained by the different nature of the two markets.
It has been discussed that the food market seems to be more stable and simple
than the petrochemical market. However, since DIF in the food industry's firms
is negatively associated with the environmental stability and environmental
simplicity variables (as shown in Table 10.13), this association will be more
clarified more when we discuss the barriers to achieving competitive advantage
with regard to DIF competitive strategy.
Table 10.13: Pearson correlation between DIF competitive strategy and






PH PM FH FM
Financial control -0.63 -0.61 -0.69 -0.38
**** *** **** *
Formal Strategic control 0.27 0.27 0.41 0.57
** ***
control Strategic planning 0.72 0.51 0.49 0.40
**** ** ** *
processes Authority delegation 0.62 0.54 0.73 0.45
**** *** **** **
Formalisation -0.38 -0.34 -0.58 -0.33
** ***
Internal Liaison devices 0.65 0.32 0.74 0.39
**** **** *
Variables Prospectors 0.66 0.52 0.62 0.65
**** ** *** ***
Informal Analysers -0.17 -0.27 0.29 0.14
control Defenders -0.77 -0.80 -0.77 -0.44
**** **** **** **
processes Risk avoidance -0.47 -0.26 -0.37 -0.23
*** *
Env. Simplicity -0.49 -0.26 -0.58 -0.59
*** *** ***






variables variables Demand conditions -0.20 0.17 0.33 0.21
Factor conditions -0.36 -0.10 -0.52 -0.02
** ***
R&SI 0.61 0.31 0.57 0.49
**** *** **
PH= high-performing firms in petrochemical industry (N=37); PM= medium-performing
firms in petrochemical industry (N=18), FH= high-performing firms in food industry






In analysing the barriers that may prevent medium-performing firms
from achieving their competitive advantage, the positively and negatively
associated variables with the DIF at the two levels of performance will be
compared. At the same time, we will compare the existence of these barriers in
the two industries with regard to this competitive strategy. Findings presented in
Table 10.13 indicate two things:
(1) DIF competitive strategy has the same associations (i.e. the significant
correlations either positive or negative) with all variables in the medium and in
the high-performing firms. This is true of both industries.
(2) Since all these positive and negative associations in the high-performing
firms of the two industries are consistent with the literature discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6, and since they have a higher correlation with the DIF for the
high-performing firms than for the medium-performing firms, the links with
these variables could be considered as a barrier that may prevent the medium-
performing firms in the two industries from achieving their competitive
advantage.
For the comparison of the high and the medium-performing firms, the
differences between these associations at the two levels of performance can be
tested by using the Z-test, as discussed in the previous section. The results of the
Z-test, as presented in Table 10.14, indicate that there are 1 and 6 out of the
supporting variables associated with the DIF in the petrochemical and food
industries, respectively, which are significantly different at 0.10 or 0.05 levels
of significance. Thus, these variables, in each of these two industries, can be
considered as primary barriers that prevent lower-performing firms from
achieving their competitive advantage. Such findings support Hypothesis 4.2 in
Chapter 7.
Table 10.14: Differentiation and the importance of supporting
variables





Supporting variables FH FM Z-
valueb
Liaison devices 0.65 0.32 1.427 Factor conditions -0.52 -0.02 1.793
R&SI 0.61 0.31 1.252 Defenders -0.77 -0.44 1.786
Demand conditions -0.20 0.17 -1.232 Env. Stability -0.83 -0.56 1.721
Strategic planning 0.72 0.51 1.105 Liaison devices 0.74 0.39 -1.716
Factor conditions -0.36 -0.10 -0.911 Authority delegation 0.73 0.45 -1.467
Env. Simplicity -0.49 -0.26 -0.893 Financial control -0.69 -0.38 1.433
Risk avoidance -0.47 -0.26 -0.782 Formalisation -0.58 -0.33 1.010
Env. Stability -0.38 -0.18 -0.716 Strategic control 0.41 0.57 0.668
Prospectors 0.66 0.52 0.675 Risk avoidance -0.37 -0.23 0.514
Authority delegation 0.62 0.54 0.401 Analysers 0.29 0.14 -0.507
Analysers -0.17 -0.27 0.349 Demand conditions 0.33 0.21 -0.426
Defenders -0.77 -0.80 0.324 R&SI 0.57 0.49 -0.365
Formalisation -0.38 -0.34 -0.145 Strategic planning 0.49 0.40 -0.358
Financial control -0.63 -0.61
_
-0.099 Prospectors 0.62 0.65 0.191
Strategic control 0.27 0.27 -0.009 Env. Simplicity -0.58 -0.59 -0.082
PH= high-performing firms in petrochemical industry (N =37); PM= medium-performing
firms in petrochemical industry (N=18), FH= high-performing firms in food industry
(N=26), and FM= medium-performing firms in food industry (N=22).
b Z-value must be equal to or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to reach 0.10,
0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
Variables in Table 10.14 are ranked on the basis of their Z-test value.
This ranking indicates the importance of these variables as differentiators
between the two levels of performance. In the petrochemical industry firms, the
liaison devices variable (which is significantly different at the two levels of
performance) is at the top of this list. In addition to this variable, the following
variables are on the top of the list with regard to the food industry firms: factor
conditions, defenders, environmental stability, authority delegation, and
financial control. These variables should have the priority to be considered by
the medium-performing firms in each industry in order to achieve their
competitive advantage.
Although the liaison device variable is significantly associated with the
DIF in the medium-performing firms in both industries, it has a very low degree
of significance compared to the high-performing firms in both industries, as can
be seen in Tables 10.13 and 10.14. For firms with DIF which are expected to
introduce new products and methods, liaison devices will provide the forum in
which to lobby for the required ideas. Thus this variable needs to be emphasised
more by the medium-performing firms in both industries'.
Although the related and supported industries variable is not
significantly different at the two levels of performance, it seems to be more
important in the petrochemical industry than in the food industry, as shown in
Table 10.14. This variable is also not significantly emphasised by the medium-
performing firms in the petrochemical industry, as shown in Table 10.13. Firms
with DIP, which are usually technically-oriented and which maintain high
quality, need to have a close relationship with the related and supported
industries to ensure their high quality. It has also been discussed that firms in
the complex and dynamic environments need to maintain these close
relationships more than those firms that are working in less complex and
dynamic environments. Thus the importance of this variable in the
petrochemical industry can be explained again by the different nature of the
markets of the two industries. However, for the same reasons discussed above,
other environmental variables such as factor conditions and environmental
stability are more important to be considered by medium-performing firms in
the food industry than those in the petrochemical industry, as illustrated in Table
10.14.
Furthermore, findings in Table 10.14 indicate that there is a trade-off
between financial control and strategic planning in the two industries' firms.
Findings indicate that the financial control variable is more negatively
associated with DIF in the high-performing firms than in the medium-
performing firms in both industries. However, this variable seems to be more
important in the food industry than in the petrochemical industry. Firms with
DIF are expected to be flexible in their budgeting and financial control, on the
other hand they are expected to emphasise long-term planning. This difference
between the two industries can be explained by the association that these firms
have with the other formal control processes variables, as shown in Table 10.14.
For example, firms in the food industry are not strongly emphasising strategic
planning but instead they are emphasising financial control. Therefore these DIF
firms, in the two industries, seem to be either clearly away from financial
control or have more emphasis on strategic planning. This will also explain the
previous point concerning the strategic control in the food industry that has been
discussed with the positively associated variables.
Finally, it has been discussed that all the variables significantly
associated (either negatively or positively) with the DIF in the high-performing
firms, in both industries, are consistent with the literature. Therefore, although
the other variables listed in Table 10.14 are less important differentiators (i.e.
have not reach the level of significance) between the two levels of performance,
they also should be considered by the medium-performing firm, in each
industry, in order to achieve their competitive advantage. The importance of
these variables is based on the way that they are ranked in Table 10.14 by the
two industries.
Before moving to the discussion of the third competitive strategy, there
are some common findings in the last two competitive strategies (i.e. PL and
DIF) in both industries that can be noted. In analysing the high-performing
firms with PL in both industries, it has been found that these PL values are very
similar in terms of their relationships with supporting variables (see Table
10.11). In analysing the high-performing firms with DIF in both industries, it
has been found that these DIF values are also very similar in terms of these
relationships, with the exception of strategic control which has been discussed
(see Table 10.13). Having noted this, and by comparing the two strategies in
high-performing firms in the two industries, it has been found that all the
variables negatively-related to the PL are positively related to the DIF, and vice
versa, which is true of both industries. This indicates thai these two competitive
strategies are completely different in terms of all the links with the internal and
external (supporting) variables. The other competitive strategies (i.e. LCD and
IMT), are therefore expected to be in between these two competitive strategies.
10.3.3.3 Low cost differentiation
Table 10.15 shows that the LCD in the high-performing firms in the
petrochemical industry is significantly positively associated with the following
variables: formalisation, risk avoidance, environmental stability, environmental
simplicity and demand conditions; and significantly negatively associated with
the following variables: analysers, and related and supported industries. Results
of the correlation, as shown also in Table 10.15, indicate that the LCD in the
high-performing firms in the food industry is significantly positively associated
with the following variables: strategic control, analysers, environmental
simplicity, and demand conditions; and significantly negatively associated with
the following variables: strategic planning and prospectors. These findings
indicate that all these associations between the LCD and the supporting
variables in both industries (with the exception of the analysers variable which
will be explained later) are consistent with the existing literature discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6. Although other variables have not reached the level of
significance as they were predicted, such findings are generally supporting
Hypothesis 4.1 in Chapter 7.
With the exception of environmental simplicity and demand conditions,
the LCD competitive strategy in the two industries seems to be different in
terms of the positive and negative associations between the supporting variables
and LCD. These differences will be analysed with the analysis of barriers that
may also exist in these two industries. In analysing the barriers that may prevent
medium-performing firms from achieving their competitive advantage, the
variables positively and negatively associated with LCD at the two levels of
performance will be compared. At the same time, the existence of these barriers
in the two industries with regard to this competitive strategy will be compared.
Table 10.15: Pearson correlation between LCD competitive strategy and






PH PM FH FM
Financial control 0.23 0.28 0.13 0.17
Formal Strategic control 0.01 0.24 0.39 0.00
**
control Strategic planning -0.19 -0.42 -0.55 -0.21
* ***
processes Authority delegation 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.25
Formalisation 0.56 0.45 0.31 0.38
**** * *
Internal Liaison devices -0.20 -0.39 -0.13 -0.23
Variables Prospectors -0.01 -0.16 -0.46 0.07
**
Informal Analysers -0.43 -0.18 0.65 -0.17
*** ****
control Defenders 0.24 -0.02 -0.17 0.34
processes Risk avoidance 0.54 0.52 0.28 0.12
*** **
Env. Simplicity 0.48 0.32 0.40 0.07
*** **
External Environmental Env. Stability 0.52 0.45 0.19 0.16s
*** *
variables variables Demand conditions 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.30
* *
Factor conditions 0.18 0.65 0.22 0.42
*** *
R&SI -0.30 -0.52 -0.31 0.20
* **
PH= high-performing firms in petrochemical industry (N=37); PM= medium-performing
firms in petrochemical industry (N=18), FH= high-performing firms in food industry






Findings in Table 10.15 indicate that all these positive and negative
associations in the high-performing firms of the two industries that have been
discussed previously are consistent with the literature. Since they have a higher
correlation with the LCD for the high-performing firms than for the medium-
performing firms, the links with these variables could be considered as a barrier
that may prevent the medium-performing firms in the two industries from
achieving their competitive advantage. However, even though these correlations
are higher for the high-performing firms, such a difference could have occurred
fairly frequently by chance. Thus, the differences between these associations at
the two levels of performance can be tested by using the Z-test.
The results of the Z-test, as presented in Table 10.16, indicate that there
are 1 and 6 out of the 15 variables associated with the LCD in the petrochemical
and food industries, respectively, which are significantly different at the 0.10 or
0.05 level of significance at the two levels of performance. Thus, these
variables, in each of these two industries, can be considered as primary barriers
that prevent lower-performing firms from achieving their competitive
advantage. Such findings support Hypothesis 4.2 in Chapter 7.
Table 10.16: Low cost differentiation and the importance of
supporting variables 









Factor conditions 0.18 0.65 -1.892 Analysers 0.65 -0.17 3.012
Analysers -0.43 -0.18 -0.888 Prospectors -0.46 0.07 -1.829
Defenders 0.24 -0.02 0.866 Defenders -0.17 0.34 -1.707
R&SI -0.30 -0.52 0.842 R&SI -0.31 0.20 -1.680
Strategic planning -0.19 -0.42 0.806 Strategic control 0.39 0.00 1.311
Strategic control 0.01 0.24 -0.748 Strategic planning -0.55 -0.21 -1.296
Liaison devices -0.20 -0.39 0.670 Env. Simplicity 0.40 0.07 1.137
Env. Simplicity 0.48 0.32 0.624 Authority delegation -0.02 -0.25 0.757
Demand conditions 0.33 0.17 0.565 Factor conditions 0.22 0.42 -0.719
Prospectors -0.01 -0.16 0.475 Risk avoidance 0.28 0.12 0.561
Formalisation 0.56 0.45 0.445 Liaison devices -0.13 -0.23 0.337
Env. Stability 0.52 0.45 0.291 Formalisation 0.31 0.38 -0.224
Financial control 0.23 0.28 -0.187 Financial control 0.13 0.17 -0.139
Risk avoidance 0.54 0.52 0.082 Demand conditions 0.33 0.30 0.123
Authority delegation 0.04 0.03 0.030 Env. Stability 0.19 0.16 0.112
PH= high-performing firms in petrochemical industry (N=37); PM = medium-performing
firms in petrochemical industry (N= 18), FH= high-performing firms in food industry
(N=26), and FM= medium-performing firms in food industry (N=22).
b Z-value must be equal to or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to reach 0.10,
0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
The supporting variables in Table 10.16 are ranked on the basis of their
Z-test value. This ranking indicates the importance of these variables as
differentiators between the two levels of performance. In the petrochemical
industry firms, the factor conditions variable (which is significantly different at
the two levels of performance) is at the top of this list. This should have the
priority to be considered by the medium-performing firms with LCD in the
petrochemical industry in order to achieve their competitive advantage. With
regard to the food industry firms, the following variables are at the top of the
list: analysers, prospectors, defenders, related and supported industries, strategic
control, and strategic planning. These variables should have the priority to be
considered by the medium-performing firms with LCD in the food industry in
order to achieve their competitive advantage.
On analysis of these variables with the LCD in the food industry,
findings as shown in Table 10.16 indicate that the analysers variable is the most
important one. This variable is significantly positively correlated with the LCD
in the high-performing firms, while on the other hand it is correlated negatively
with the LCD in the medium-performing firms. This can be explained by the
analysis of the other variables that are associated with the LCD in the food
industry. Such analysis indicates that high-performing firms in the food industry
are emphasising the work in a simple environment, as shown in Table 10.15.
Firms in such environments, do not need to be always 'first' in a new product or
market (i.e. prospectors) because the environment is not that complex nor so
quickly changing. On the other hand, these firms are not expected just to look
for a secure market to offer a limited range of products or services (i.e.
defenders), because their environment is not that stable for such actions. Thus
firms with LCD need to move quickly to follow a carefully selected set of more
promising new developments in the food industry in order to achieve their
competitive advantage.
With regard to the association between the analysers variable and the
LCD competitive strategy, the case of the petrochemical industry seems to be
quite different from that of the food industry. Although this variable does not
significantly differentiate the two levels of performance in the petrochemical
industry, it is still the second important variable, as shown in the list in Table
10.16. Findings in Table 10.15 indicate that the high-performing firms in the
petrochemical industry have no positive association between the LCD and any
of the informal control processes, nor with the formal control processes
variables (with the exception of the formalisation variable). Instead, there is a
negative relationship between the LCD and the analysers variable as one of the
informal control processes variables. However, these findings can be explained
by the analysis of the other relationships between the LCD and other variables
of high-performing firms in this industry. LCD in the high-performing firms is
significantly positively associated with environmental stability, risk avoidance,
and formalisation, as shown in Table 10.15. Considering these variables
together, the following conclusion can be drawn. Once the firms with the LCD
are working in a stable environment, emphasising formalisation in their
organisations, and with managers who are not willing to take any risk in their
decisions, then the formal and informal control processes require less emphasis.
Since this situation is different from that of the food industry, such findings can
be also seen by analysing the findings in Table 10.15 which also indicate that all
these three variables (environmental stability, risk avoidance and formalisation)
are not significantly associated with the LCD, as discussed earlier.
Furthermore, findings in Table 10.16 indicate that strategic planning is
another variable that is significantly different at the two levels of performance in
the food industry. This variable is significantly correlated with the LCD in the
high-performing firms but not with the LCD in the medium-performing firms in
the food industry. However, in the petrochemical industry this variable is more
emphasised by the medium-performing firms than by the high-performing
firms. Although this emphasis is not significantly different at the two levels of
performance in the petrochemical industry, these findings support the previous
argument made regarding the formal control processes variables with LCD in
the positively correlated variables. Thus firms in the food industry should
minimise their efforts towards this formal control processes variable (strategic
planning) where it is not as important as for the petrochemical industry's firms
with this competitive strategy.
Strategic control and environmental simplicity are other variables that
are significantly different at the two levels of performance in the food industry,
as shown in Table 10.16. Findings indicate that these variables are significantly
positively correlated to the LCD in the high-performing firms in the food
industry but not correlated with the LCD in the medium-performing firms in
this industry. As discussed earlier, high-performing firms in the food industry
are considered to be analysers, working in a dynamic but simple environment,
and have a clear identification of their formal control processes. Thus, it could
be concluded from the previous discussion that these variables positively
correlated with LCD in the high-performing firms should be considered more by
the medium-performing firms in the food industry in order to achieve their
competitive advantage.
Findings in Table 10.16 indicate that the related and supported industries
variable is significantly different at the two levels of performance in the food
industry firms with LCD. As discussed in the earlier chapters, firms with LCD
are not expected to have close relationships with related and supported
- 278 -
industries. Therefore, medium-performing firms in the food industry need to
reconsider their emphasis on this variable in order to achieve their competitive
advantage. The case is different with firms in the petrochemical industry. It
seems that the medium-performing firms in this industry have more emphasis
on LCD and this variable than the high-performing firms, which means that
medium-performing firms are emphasising more open relationships than the
high-performing firms. Although the related and supported variable should be
negatively correlated to LCD as has been discussed earlier, it seems that the
medium-performing firms with LCD in the petrochemical industry are closer to
PL than to LCD by emphasising this variable. Therefore, medium-performing
firms in the food industry need to reconsider their emphasis on this variable in
order to achieve their competitive advantage.
The factor conditions variable is significantly different at the two levels
of performance in the petrochemical industry firms with LCD. Medium-
performing firms in this industry, as shown in Table 10.16, seem to emphasise
the factor conditions variable more than the high-performing firms. Even though
this variable is expected to be positively correlated With LCD competitive
strategy, medium-performing firms seem to be closer to PL than LCD
competitive strategy by this emphasis. Moreover, considering the characteristics
of the supply and demand sides of the LCD competitive strategy, and the
findings of the IMT competitive strategy which will be discussed in the next
section (where only one of the high-performing firms uses IMT), it seems that it
is more difficult for a firm to be high-performing.
Finally, considering the overall comparisons that have been made of the
last three competitive strategies (i.e. PL, DIF and LCD) with the internal and
external variables, it seems generally that the LCD competitive strategy is closer
to the PL strategy than to the DIF. However, further discussion in this regard
will be made at the end of this section when all of the four competitive
strategies are analysed.
10.3.3.4 Imitation competitive strategy
Findings of the clustering analysis of the competitive strategies show
that there is only one firm with IMT competitive strategy in the high-performing
firms in the food industry. Therefore, as there was not sufficient data to help
with any conclusion, this level of performance will be excluded from analysis.
Table 10.17 shows that IMT in the high-performing firms of the petrochemical
industry is significantly positively correlated with the following variables:
analysers, and related and supported industries; and significantly negatively
correlated with the following variables: defenders, risk avoidance, demand
conditions, environmental stability, environmental simplicity and formalisation.
These findings indicate that all these associations between the IMT and the
supporting variables (with the exception of the analysers variable, which will be
explained later) are consistent with the existing literature discussed in Chapters
5 and 6. Although other variables have not reached the level of significance as
they were predicted, such findings in the petrochemical industry generally
support Hypothesis 4.1 in Chapter 7.
Table 10.17: Pearson correlation between IMT competitive strategy and













Financial control -0.21 -0.37 -0.04
Strategic control 0.10 -0.10 0.32
Strategic planning 0.21 0.77
****
0.32











































H=high-performing firms in petrochemical industry (N=37); PM= medium-
performing firms in petrochemical industry (N=18), and FM= medium-performing







Comparing these correlations between IMT and the supporting variables
in the high-performing firms with those in the medium-performing firms,
barriers that may prevent firms in the petrochemical industry from achieving
their competitive advantage can be identified.
Findings in Table 10.17 indicate that all these positive and negative
associations in the high-performing firms that have been discussed previously
are consistent with the literature. Since they have a higher correlation with the
IMT for the high-performing firms than for the medium-performing firms (with
the exception of risk avoidance and RIS variables), the links with these
variables could be considered as a barrier that may prevent the medium-
performing firms in the petrochemical industry from achieving their competitive
advantage. However, even though these correlations are higher for the high-
performing firms, such a difference could have occurred fairly frequently by
chance. Thus, the differences between these associations at the two levels of
performance can be tested by using the Z-test.
The results of the Z-test, as presented in Table 10.18, indicate that 4 out
of the 15 variables associated with the IMT in the petrOchemical industry are
significantly different at 0.10 or 0.05 levels of significance. Thus, these
variables can be considered as primary barriers that prevent lower-performing
firms from achieving their competitive advantage. Such findings support
Hypothesis 4.2 in Chapter 7.
The supporting variables in Table 10.18 are ranked on the basis of their
Z-test value. This ranking indicates the importance of these variables as
differentiators between the two levels of performance. At the top of this list,
four variables are significantly different at the two levels of performance, which
are strategic planning, analysers, environmental simplicity, and demand
conditions. As can be seen, these variables are representing formal and informal
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control processes variables as well as environmental variables. These four
variables should have the priority to be considered by the medium-performing
firms with IMT in the petrochemical industry in order to achieve their
competitive advantage.
Table 10.18: Imitation and the importance of supporting variables
_	
Supporting variables H M Z-valueb
Strategic planning 0.21 0.77 -2.585
Analysers 0.49 -0.15 2.223
Env. Simplicity -0.55 -0.15 -1.501
Demand conditions -0.35 0.08 -1.413
R&SI 0.38 0.65 -1.214
Factor conditions -0.15 -0.47 1.131
Liaison devices 0.16 0.40 -0.854
Strategic control 0.10 -0.10 0.633
Financial control -0.21 -0.37	 s 0.577
Defenders
-0.40 -0.25 -0.553
Authority delegation 0.10 0.23 -0.439
Formalisation -0.44 -0.38 -0.255
Env. Stability -0.46 -0.41 -0.183
Prospectors 0.09 0.13 -0.134
Risk avoidance -0.53 -0.54 0.046
H= high-performing firms (N =37) and M= medium-performing firms.
b Z-value must be equal to or greater than 1.28, 1.645 and 2.33, respectively, to reach
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance (Bolded).
The strategic planning variable, as shown in Table 10.18, seems to be
the most important variable to be considered by the medium-performing firms
in the petrochemical industry. Although the strategic planning variable should
be positively correlated to IMT, as discussed earlier, it seems that the medium-
performing firms with IMT in the petrochemical industry are closer to DIP than
to IMT in emphasising this variable. Since firms with IMT are expected not to
be as innovative as those with DIF competitive strategy, they are expected not
to have very close relationships with their related and supported industries as
those with DIF. Although this variable has not reached the level of significance
at the two levels of performance, it is expected to be positively correlated with
this competitive strategy. However, similar to the strategic planning variable,
this variable is also over emphasised by medium-performing firms. Therefore,
these firms seem to be closer to DIP than IMT competitive strategy in this
emphasis.
Thus, medium-performing firms need to balance these relationships (i.e.
with strategic planning, and the related and supported industries) with the view
of the environment and the other variables such as deman" d conditions, in order
to achieve their competitive advantage.
Finally, findings in Table 10.17 indicate that the risk avoidance,
environmental simplicity, environmental stability, and formalisation variables
are the most important in the petrochemical industry's high-performing firms
with IMT. It was found that these variables are also the most important
variables in high-performing firms when the LCD was discussed earlier in Table
10.15, but in the opposite direction (i.e. positively correlated). Such findings
indicate that the direction of association between these variables and the IMT is
similar to those with DIP, i.e. all these variables are also negatively associated
with DIP in the high-performing firms. A similar direction of association also
exists between these variables and the other two competitive strategies which
are PL and LCD. More details of these relationships will be discussed in the
next section.
10.3.3.5 Comparing competitive strategies
Based on the previous discussions, the four competitive strategies can be
compared with each other in terms of their links with the supporting variables. It
has been found that PL and DIF competitive strategies each have the same
relationships (either positive or negative) with the internal and external
(supporting) variables in the two industries. However, the PL values will always
be opposite to the DIF values in all variables in both industries. Thus, these two
competitive strategies were found to be completely different in terms of the
links with the supporting variables.
Moreover, it has been found that each of the other two competitive
strategies (i.e. LCD and IMT) does not have the same relationships with the
supporting variables in the two industries, but they are closer to the PL and DIF
competitive strategies, respectively. Since it has been found that LCD is closer
to PL than IMT is, then in terms of these relationships with the supporting
variables, the four competitive strategies can be ranked on the "strategic
spectrum" as follows: PL, LCD, IMT, and DIF. Similar findings have been
found when the mean scores of these supporting variables were compared in the
discussion of the classification of these competitive strategies in Chapter 8.
These results can merely clarify the difference between the four competitive
strategies. However, it can not be concluded from these findings that one
competitive strategy is necessarily superior to others. These findings will also
help in understanding how such findings can be related to the issue of "stuck in
the middle" which will be discussed in the final chapter.
10.4 Strategic coherence and performance
changes
Finally, changes in the performance of firms in both industries will be
discussed. As discussed in previous chapters, the same five questions regarding
the current performance were asked to evaluate the firm's performance three
years ago, as shown in Appendix A. Since all firms have been classified into
three performance groups (i.e. high, medium, and low), the change of
performance within each group of firms in each industry will be tested. A brief
discussion will be given on these changes in performance, then the changes will
be related to the four competitive strategies at the different levels of
performance.
Figures 10.1 and 10.2 show the relationship between current and
previous performance in the high-performing firms in the food and
petrochemical industries, respectively. The same procedures used in chapter 9 to
calculate the performance change were applied here. It can be seen clearly from
Figures 10.1 and 10.2 that high-performing firms, in bOth industries, have an
improvement in their performance. In other words, there are more firms that
have on the whole improved their performance, either in the food industry or in
the petrochemical industry. The mean score of the high-performing firms in
both industries was analysed by using the t-test. Findings, as shown in Table
10.19, indicate that the mean scores of performance of this group in the food
industry increased significantly at the 0.05 level of significance, from 3.82 three
years ago to 4.32 in the current year. The mean scores of high-performing firms
in the petrochemical industry increased also significantly at the 0.05 level of
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Figure 10.1: 
Current and previous performance in high-performing firms in food
industry
Figure 10.2: 
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Table 10.19: Current and previous performance by performance








High-performing firms 26 4.32 3.82**
Medium-performing firms 23 3.47 3.55
Low-performing firms 12 1.92 2.27**
* and ** indicate means of current and previous performance significantly different at
0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively, on basis of two-tailed t-test.
Table 10.20: Current and previous performance by performance








High-performing firms 37 4.38 3.76**
Medium-performing firms 19 3.49 3.39
Low-performing firms 8 2.05 2.40
* and ** indicate means of current and previous performance significantly different at
0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively, on basis of two-tailed t-test.
In the medium-performing group of firms, as shown in Figures 10.3 and
10.4, some firms have improved their performance while others have not, in
both industries. As Table 10.19 shows, the mean scores of current performance
of the medium-performing firms in the food industry are 3.47, compared to 3.55
three years ago. In the petrochemical industry, we found that the mean scores of
current performance of the medium-performing firms are 3.49 compared to 3.39
three years ago, as shown in Table 10.20. Therefore the difference between the
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minimal. So the mean scores of current performance of medium-performing
firms in both industries are almost the same as three years ago.
Figure 10.3: 
Current and previous performance in medium-performing firms in
food industry
Figure 10.4: 
Current and previous performance in medium-performing firms in
petrochemical industry
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Figures 10.5 and 10.6 show the relationship between current and
previous performance in the low-performing firms. Findings in these two
figures indicate that more firms in both industries had a better level of
performance three years ago than in the current year. It can also be seen that the
mean scores of performance of the low-performing firms in the food industry
have been decreased significantly at the 0.05 level of significance, from 2.27
three years ago to 1.92 in the current year, as shown in Table 10.19. The mean
scores of the low-performing firms in the petrochemical industry decreased
from 2.40 three years ago to 2.05 in the current year, as shown also in Table
10.20 (four firms have been excluded because they did not respond on previous
performance).
Figure 10.5: 
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Figure 10.6: 
Current and previous performance in low-performing firms in
petrochemical industry
In relating the previous discussions of firms with the four competitive
strategies at the different levels of performance in the two industries (i.e. the
different aspects of strategic coherence) to the changes in performance, the
following conclusion can be drawn. It has been found, in both industries, that
high-performing firms have more strategic coherence than the lower-performing
firms in all the three different aspects of strategic coherence. It has also been
found that high-performing firms, in both industries, have a significant
improvement in their current performance compared to that of three years ago,
while low-performing firms had a better performance three years ago than in the
current year. Medium-performing firms seem to maintain the same level of
performance. Thus high-performing firms, in both industries, not only have a
high performance level in the current year but also have improved their
performance in the last three years significantly at the 0.05 level of significance.
In other words, high-performing firms which have more strategic coherence
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than lower-performing firms are able not only to achieve their competitive
advantage but also to sustain it over time. The same conclusion was made when
we discussed the two industries together in the previous chapter. However, it
has been found that there were different barriers with each of the four
competitive strategies in the two industries. These differences, as well as the
similarities, will be summarised in the next chapter.
As a further discussion of this sustainability of competitive advantage,
the change in the performance of firms using different competitive strategies in
the two industries can also be tested. Tables 10.21 and 10.22 show current and
previous performance of firms using different competitive strategies in the food
and petrochemical industries, respectively.
In the medium-performing firms, the performance of some firms has
increased while the performance of others has decreased. All of these changes
are not significant (with the exception of the DIP in the food industry).
Therefore, these results indicate that medium-performing firms are able to
maintain their level of performance.
It can be seen clearly that high-performing firms (which have high
strategic coherence) using any one of the four competitive strategies are able to
achieve and sustain their competitive advantage over time. This is true in both
industries. In other words, as long as the high-performing firms maintain a high
level of strategic coherence, they can achieve and sustain their competitive
advantage, no matter what strategy they use or type of industry in which they
work, as illustrated in Tables 10.21 and 10.22. For example, the mean scores of
performance of the high-performing firms using PL competitive strategy in the
food industry have increased significantly at the 0.05 level of significance, from
3.68 three years ago to 4.30 in the current year, as shown in Table 10.21.
Similarly, the mean scores of performance of the high-performing firms using
the same competitive strategy in the petrochemical industry have also increased
significantly at the 0.05 level of significance, from 3.83 three years ago to 4.40
in the current year, as shown in Table 10.22. Another example is the mean
scores of performance of the high-performing firms using LCD competitive
strategy in the food industry which increased significantly at the 0.05 level of
significance from 3.73 three years ago to 4.17 in the current year, as shown in
Table 10.21. The mean scores of performance of the high-performing firms
using the same competitive strategy in the petrochemical industry also increased
significantly at the 0.05 level of significance, from 3.64 three years ago to 4.40
in the current year, as shown in Table 10.22. Thus it can be concluded that high-
performing firms in both industries which have maintained more strategic
coherence (with respect to all aspects of strategic coherence) than lower-
performing firms are able not only to achieve their competitive advantage but
also to sustain it over time.










Price leadership High 12 4.30 3.68**
Medium 11 3.53 3.75
Low cost
differentiation
High 6 4.17 3•73**
Mediuma 2 3.60 3.50
Imitation Higha 1 4.20 4.20
Medium 4 3.45 3.65
Differentiation High 6 4.53 4•07*
Medium 4 3.40 2.90**
a because of few firms this competitive strategy has been excluded from t-test.
* and ** indicate that the means of current and previous performance significantly
different at 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively, on basis of two-tailed t-test.
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Price leaders High 14 4.40 3.83**
Medium 4 3.50 3.30
Low cost
differentiators
High 5 4.40 3.64**
Medium 4 3.50 3.60
Imitators High 8 4.25 3.60**
Medium 4 3.50 3.15
Differentiators High 10 4.46 3.84**
Medium 5 3.36 3.20
* and ** indicate that the means of current and previous performance significantly
different at 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively, on basis of two-tailed t-test.
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented discussion of the results on strategic
coherence and barriers to achieving competitive advantage regarding the food
and petrochemical industries. Findings have indicated that there is no
association between the level of performance and the type of industry to which
firms are related. It has been found that high-performing firms were able to
identify their competitive strategies more clearly than the lower-performing
firms. Such results have been tested in different ways, such as the number of
firms with clear and unclear strategies and the internal consistency of these
competitive strategies (competitive coherence). It also been found that these
competitive strategies are not associated with the different level of performance
in both industries.
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Managers in the high-performing firms were able to recognise more
explicitly their firms' competitive strategies than those in the lower-performing
firms. Such findings were obtained by comparing the objective and subjective
competitive strategies at the different levels of performance.
High-performing firms have achieved a stronger organisational
coherence than the lower-performing firms. This aspect of strategic coherence
was tested by analysing the links between the four competitive strategies and
the supporting variables, based on the links model that has been developed in
Chapters 5 and 6.
Although it has been found that strategic coherence was maintained
(with respect to all its three aspects), different barriers exist with respect to each
of the competitive strategies in the two industries. These barriers will be
summarised in the next chapter.
Finally by relating the idea of strategic coherence to the change of
performance, the sustainability of competitive advantage was analysed. It has
been found that high-performing firms which have more strategic coherence
than lower-performing firms are able not only to achieve their competitive




This study has been conducted to investigate competitive strategies and
the resulting barriers to achieving competitive advantage. It takes the
petrochemical and food industries in Saudi Arabia for its empirical applications.
Based on the findings of this research, it is fair to say that firms can achieve
competitive advantage through different means. Competitive strategies are those
means that enable firms to achieve and sustain their competitive advantage.
Based on the review and discussion of the existing literature, this research
clarifies the concept of competitive advantage as well as the means of achieving
it. It also provides firms with a wider selection of means (four different generic
competitive strategies) to achieve and sustain their competitive advantage.
These competitive strategies have been tested and confirmed to be stable in this
research. The findings of this research are basically consistent with the previous
theoretical and empirical work of many scholars which has been highlighted in
different places in this study.
It seems more difficult to find out why firms cannot achieve and sustain
their competitive advantage than to provide alternative ways of achieving them.
Therefore this research raises and explores this issue. It discusses and analyses
the various barriers that prevent firms from achieving their competitive
advantage. Again, based on a review and discussion of the existing literature, a
model of ideal links between the four competitive strategies and the internal and
external (supporting) variables has been developed. It has been hypothesised
that high-performing firms will be closer to such a model than lower-performing
firms. This hypothesis has been empirically tested in different ways and at
different levels and found to be accepted.
This chapter presents a summary and conclusions to the thesis. It will
contain three major parts. The first will summarise and draw conclusions based
on the findings related to the conceptualisation of the nature of competitive
advantage and competitive strategies, and possible barriers to achieving
competitive advantage. The second part will summarise and present a
conclusion to the empirical findings that have been discussed in Chapters 8-10.
The final part will present possible implications of the findings, the
contributions of the present study, limitations, and suggestions for further
research.
11.1 Theoretical framework
It has been suggested in this study that generic strategies, as usually
formulated, fail to accommodate a number of important issues. This failure
places limits on the extent to which the literature in the area can offer insights
into strategic management. The problems involved have been discussed under
three general points: it is important to differentiate supply and demand side
effects; competitive strategies are derived from particular foundations of
competitive advantage; finally, the coherence of particular generic strategies is
specific to a market-industry strategic position.
This study extends the strategic management literature on competitive
advantage and generic strategies, mainly based on Porter's (1980, 1985) work.
In particular, instead of the different generic strategies put forward by Porter,
four competitive strategies are developed. These are (1) price leadership, (2) low
cost differentiation, (3) imitation and (4) differentiation. The development of
these strategies is based on the distinction and links between particular
foundations of competitive advantage. The two competing approaches of
sustainable competitive advantage, which are resource-based and market
position approaches, have been discussed to develop four foundations of
competitive advantage. Both of these approaches are needed for current and
future competition. An important theme, which derived from the discussion of
the existing literature related to these two approaches, is that a firm should
distinguish between the supply and demand sides of its competitive advantage
in order to understand the competitive dynamics and position of a particular
industry-market. Therefore, two of the four foundations of competitive
advantages discussed in this study operate on the supply side: cost advantage
(CA) and innovative differentiation (ID). The other two foundations are derived
from demand side factors: price competition (PC) and marketing differentiation
(MD).
The distinction and links between these foundations which define the
limits to particular generic strategies that can be developed by firms implies that
a 'stuck in the middle' problem does not exist at thi§ level, because these
foundations to competitive advantage can be combined to produce coherent
strategies - an aspect of the discussion that will be presented later in this final
chapter. Finally, it can be concluded that this repositioning of Porter's work has
two important effects: it removes the ambiguities about Porter's two generic
strategies (cost leadership and differentiation) that have been highlighted and
discussed in Chapter 3, and it expands the ways in which the firms might
achieve and sustain a competitive advantage.
It has also been argued in this study that competitive strategies require
internal consistency, referred to as 'competitive coherence', which is one of the
three aspects of a 'strategic coherence' model. Therefore, the distinction between
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foundations of competitive advantage and the ways in which these are used to
develop competitive strategies allow us to measure the internal consistency of
these competitive strategies. In addition 'organisational coherence' needs to be
built, involving the structure of internal and external elements affecting an
organisation's ability to achieve its competitive advantage. The creation of this
structure is not automatic. The difficulties increase with the growing dynamism
and complexity of the environment in which an organisation is operating. Based
on the discussion and review of the literature related to the achievement and
sustainability of competitive advantage, certain links between the four
competitive strategies and the internal and external variables have been
developed. These links, which are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, have been
referred to as organisational coherence (a summary of these links is also
presented in Table 7.1 in Chapter 7). While competitive and organisational
coherence might exist accidentally, the third aspect of strategic coherence which
is called 'cognitive coherence', has also been developed. Based on the
developments of these aspects of strategic coherence, it has been proposed in
this study that the lack of coherence in one or more of these aspects is a barrier
that may prevent a firm from achieving and sustaining competitive advantage.
The empirical findings related to these aspects of strategic coherence and to
competitive strategies will be summarised in the next section.
11.2 The empirical work
The results of the empirical work will be summarised in four sections.
The first section considers competitive strategies. The second summarises the
barriers that prevent firms using these competitive strategies. The third section
will summarise findings on the subject of strategic coherence. The final section
will summarise findings related to the issue of "stuck in the middle". These
summaries, however, are not to be used as a substitute for previous chapters,
and readers are encouraged to refer to those chapters for further analysis and
discussion of these results.
11.2.1 Competitive strategies
Four competitive strategies (price leadership 'PL', low cost
differentiation 'LCD', imitation 'IMT , and differentiation 'DIF') are clearly
identified, based on the results of the data analysis. As discussed earlier, each of
the competitive strategies is a combination of two particular foundations of
competitive advantage (with a total of 4 foundations). Using cluster analyses on
these four foundations (with 36 questions), five clusters have been found; four
of them have been identified with the four competitive strategies. Different
tests, such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Duncan's Multiple Range
Test (DMRT), have been used to test the identification of each competitive
strategy within each cluster. Furthermore, to confirm the identification of the
different clusters from each other, not only on the basis of the four foundations
of competitive advantage but also among the different internal and external
variables, different tests have been applied. Such tests are Multivariate Analysis
of Variance (MANOVA), NOVA and DMRT, as shown in table 8.8.
Having confirmed the existence and stability of these competitive
strategies, we can argue that firms will have more alternative ways to achieve
and sustain competitive advantage than those suggested by Porter (1980, 1985).
This argument refers back to the earlier discussion of Porter's competitive
strategies where he assumes that firms need to use either cost leadership or
differentiation strategies, or they will be "stuck in the middle". Further
discussion of this issue will be presented later. After having clearly identified
the four competitive strategies, the coherence between the two particular
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foundations in each competitive strategy was tested across the different levels of
performance. Results relating to this coherence will be presented later when the
concept of strategic coherence is discussed.
11.2.2 Barriers to achieving competitive advantage
In Chapters 5 and 6 the ideal model of links between each competitive
strategy and the internal and external variables was discussed. It was
hypothesised that high-performing firms will have better links than lower-
performing ones. In Chapters 9 and 10 these links have been tested and
analysed, respectively, at the aggregate level, and in terms of the two different
industries. From these analyses the following general conclusions can be drawn.
At the aggregate level of analysis different barriers exist with different
competitive strategies. This is also true when it is applied to the two industries
separately. Results regarding these general conclusions can be summarised in
two different ways. First, we will summarise the general barriers that prevent
firms with different competitive strategies from achieving their competitive
advantage; then we will move to a more detailed discussion of how the specific
barriers relate to each competitive strategy in the two industries.
In the analysis of general barriers that may prevent firms from achieving
their competitive advantage, it has been found that there is some priority in
those barriers that face firms using each competitive strategy. In other words,
lower-performing firms using a particular competitive strategy need to consider
some barriers more than others. In the development and discussion of the ideal
model, it has been discussed that firms need to have positive links with some
variables and negative links with others (see Chapters 5 and 6). However, when
these links were analysed, it was found that even though there are some
variables which need to be emphasised positively by firms using one of the
competitive strategies, such variables have been over-emphasised by lower-
performing firms. This over-emphasis prevents these firms from achieving their
competitive advantage. In this summary we will refer to such variables as those
that should not be positively prioritised. The same can be applied to the negative
links, where such variables will be classified as those which should not be
negatively prioritised. Thus, each competitive strategy will be presented below
with all variables that have been considered as potential barriers for those firms
using a particular strategy. These variables will be ranked according to their
importance: the ranking of these variables indicates the priority in terms of
consideration and efforts that lower-performing firms with such competitive
strategy need to direct to the links (either positive or negative) with these
variables.
Table 11.1 presents a summary of the barriers that prevent medium-
performing firms from achieving their competitive advantage. The detailed
analysis and discussion of these barriers is presented in Chapter 9. It has been
concluded that firms using different competitive strategies face different barriers
for achieving competitive advantage. These barriers exist with the lack of
appropriate links, either positive or negative, that these firms have between the
competitive strategies and the internal and external variables (Chapter 5 and 6).
For example, medium-performing firms using a PL competitive strategy need to
be positively linked to some variables (e.g. environmental simplicity, financial
control, environmental stability, formalisation, and risk avoidance) and
negatively to other variables (e.g. strategic planning, liaison devices,
prospectors, and related and supported industries) in order to achieve their
competitive advantage.
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Table 11.1: Barriers to achieving competitive advantage: 
Aggregate analysis
(ranked from important to least important in each strategy)
Competitive
strategies
Variables that should be linked Variables that should not be
prioritised





































































































It can be seen from Table 11.1 that these links are different when firms
are using PL, DIF, IMT or LCD competitive strategies. The ranking of these
variables (either negatively or positively) with respect to each competitive
strategy shows the importance of their consideration by the medium-performing
firm. For example, the most important variable, among those that should be
positively considered by the medium-performing firms using LCD competitive
strategy, is environmental simplicity, while the least important one among these
variables is the defenders, as shown in Table 11.1. It can also be seen that the
liaison devices variable needs to be emphasised positively by medium-
performing firms using DIF strategy, while this variable is over-emphasised by
medium-performing firms using IMT competitive strategy. Thus, it can be
concluded that the barriers that are faced by firms using different competitive
strategies are also different.
Tables 11.2 and 11.3 present a summary of the detailed analysis of the
barriers that prevent medium-performing firms in the food and petrochemical
industries, respectively, from achieving their competitive advantage. On
comparing the links between the supporting variables and the four competitive
strategies, a conclusion was drawn. In terms of the barriers to achieving
competitive advantage in the two industries, it has been found that due to the
different nature of the two investigated industries different barriers exist with
each competitive strategy in each industry. This conclusion can be highlighted
in the following two points.
Table 11.2: Barriers to achieving competitive advantage: 
food industry
(ranked from important to least important in each strategy)
Competitive
strategies
Variables that should be linked Variables that
be prioritised
should not
























































































Table 11.2: Barriers to achieving competitive advantage: 
petrochemical industry
(ranked from important to least important in each strategy)
Competitive
strategies
Variables that should be linked Variables that
be prioritised
should not






































































































First, in general (i.e. with a few exceptions that have been discussed in
Chapter 10), variables that should be considered (either positively or negatively)
by the medium-performing firms using PL competitive strategy in the
petrochemical industry are the same variables that should be considered by
those firms using the same competitive strategy in the food industry. The same
can be also applied to the DIF competitive strategy. This might be seen as an
indication of the general application of these two competitive strategies.
However, although the links between either of these competitive strategies and
these variables are similar in both industries, the priority for considering these
variables is different. For example, the most important variable to be considered
positively by the medium-performing firms using PL competitive strategy in the
food industry is environmental simplicity, while the most important to be
considered positively by the medium-performing firms using this competitive
strategy in the petrochemical industry is risk avoidance. It can also be seen from
Tables 11.2 and 11.3 that the most important variable to be considered
negatively by the medium-performing firms using DIF competitive strategy in
the food industry is factor conditions, while the most important to be considered
negatively by the medium-performing firms with the same competitive strategy
in the petrochemical industry is demand conditions.
It can be concluded from these findings that these differences in the
barriers to achieving the competitive advantage, associated with the same
competitive strategy, reflect the different nature of the product-market
conditions of the two industries. These differences, as well as the detailed
analysis of these barriers, are presented in chapter 10.
Second, turning to the other two competitive strategies which are IMT
and LCD, because there are not enough data with regard to IMT in the food
industry, as discussed in Chapter 10, only LCD can be discussed at this point.
The case with LCD is different from that with PL and DIF competitive
strategies. Generally speaking, in addition to the difference in priority of
consideration, the variables that should be considered (either positively or
negatively) by the medium-performing firms using LCD in the petrochemical
industry are different from those that should be considered by other firms using
the same competitive strategy in the food industry, as shown in Table 11.3. For
example, the most important variable to be considered positively by the
medium-performing firms using LCD competitive strategy in the food industry
is analysers, while the least important is environmental stability. On the other
hand, the most important variable to be considered positively by the medium-
performing firms using LCD in the petrochemical industry is defenders, while
the least important is authority delegation. It can be concluded from these
findings that (1) the nature of the two industries is different, (2) PL and DIF are
more general competitive strategies than LCD, a point that we shall return to
when we discuss the concept of "stuck in the middle".
11.2.3 Strategic coherence
It has been proposed in this study that firms need strategic coherence to
achieve and sustain their competitive advantage. The different aspects of
strategic coherence were discussed at the same time as the barriers to achieving
competitive advantage were analysed in Chapters 9 and 10, although they are in
fact different. It was concluded from the previous section that firms using
different competitive strategies face different barriers to achieving and
sustaining their competitive advantage. It was also concluded that due to the
different nature of the two markets, firms using the same competitive strategies
face different barriers in each industry. But the situation with strategic
coherence is different. All the three aspects of strategic coherence (competitive,
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organisational and cognitive) have been maintained by high-performing firms
using any of the competitive strategies, either at the aggregate level of analysis
or at the individual level of each industry. Findings related to these aspects will
be summarised in the following discussion.
Once the stability of the four competitive strategies had been confirmed,
they were linked to differential performance to test the implications of strategic
coherence. Then the sustainability of competitive advantage by firms using
these different competitive strategies at the different levels of performance was
tested. Using cluster analysis, firms have been grouped based on their current
performance. Three major groups of firms were found. These firms were
identified as high, medium and low-performing firms (Chapter 8). Different
tests such as ANOVA and DMRT have been used to confirm the identification
of each performance group of firms in these clusters.
Based on findings from the different clusters with regard to the
identification of the three levels of performance and the identification of the
four competitive strategies (which have been discussed earlier), the idea of
strategic coherence has been tested in three major ways. These methods of
testing strategic coherence were conducted when the four competitive strategies
were linked to the different performance levels.
The first method tested the identification and internal consistency of the
four competitive strategies at the different levels of performance (competitive
coherence). In this method, the coherence between the two particular
foundations of competitive advantage in each competitive strategy was tested
across the different levels of performance. This test was applied first at the
aggregate level of analysis (i.e. in the two industries together), then in each
industry separately. In both cases it was found that high-performing firms have
more competitive coherence than those at the other levels of performance (see
Chapters 9 and 10). These findings have been identified in two different ways.
The first way shows that each competitive strategy is more clearly identified
(i.e. internally consistent) by the high-performing firms than by firms at the
other levels of performance. The second way shows that there are more firms
with unclear competitive strategies among firms at the lower-performing level
than those at other levels of performance.
The second method of testing strategic coherence was through analysis
of the links between the four competitive strategies and the supporting
variables, as presented in Chapters 9 and 10. This aspect of strategic coherence
(which was referred to as organisational coherence) was tested against the
model that was discussed and developed in Chapters 5 and 6 (barriers to
achieving competitive advantage). It has been concluded that different barriers
(i.e. links with the supporting variables) exist with different competitive
strategies. It has also been concluded that high-performing firms have more
organisational coherence than those at the other levels of performance.
Furthermore, from the discussions of the barrier's to achieving competitive
advantage in the two different industries separately, it was also concluded that
there is more organisational coherence between the competitive strategies and
the internal and external variables in the high-performing firms than in firms at
the other performing levels (see Chapter 10).
Finally, it has been found that the competitive strategies are not
accidentally identified. Therefore, the third method of testing the strategic
coherence was regarding the explicit recognition of managers of their
competitive strategies. In this method, objective and subjective competitive
strategies have been compared in cognitive coherence (see Chapter 9). In other
words, this way tests the coherence between the explicit recognition of
managers of their competitive strategies and the implicit or objective
identification of these competitive strategies. Managers in high-performing
firms are able to recognise their competitive strategies more than managers at
the other levels of performance. Thus, cognitive coherence is found to be
stronger in the high-performing firms than in the others.
These methods of testing strategic coherence have also been applied to
the two industries (i.e. food and petrochemical, see Chapter 10) separately. It
has been found that the three aspects of strategic coherence (competitive,
organisational and cognitive) have been maintained to a greater extent by high-
performing firms than by firms at other performing levels in both industries.
These aspects of strategic coherence were related to changes in performance i.e.
current performance compared to previous performance (see Chapter 9 and 10).
It has been found that high-performing firms in both industries (either at the
aggregate level of analysis or on the basis of the individual industry) are able
not only to achieve their competitive advantage but also to sustain it over time.
Based on this discussion, it can be concluded that firms will achieve and
sustain their competitive advantage when their strategies are coherent. This
strategic coherence is achieved in three different ways: (1) consistency of the
particular foundations of competitive advantage that form a competitive
strategy, i.e. "competitive coherence"; (2) consistency of the appropriate links
between the competitive strategy and the internal and external variables, i.e.
"organisational coherence", and (3) consistency between the objective and
subjective strategies, i.e. "cognitive coherence".
11.2.4 Stuck in the middle
Four foundations of competitive advantage have been developed in a
model (Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3) with two dimensions, namely: supply/demand
and stable/innovative, to form particular competitive strategies that can be
developed by firms. In Chapter 8, four competitive strategies have been tested
and found to be coherent. These are price leadership, low cost differentiation,
imitation and differentiation.
Although these competitive strategies were a development of Porter's
competitive strategies (as has been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4), it has been
found that Porter's competitive strategies are broad and over-simplified, taking
into consideration the following: (1) the analysis and critique of Porter's
competitive strategies discussed in earlier chapters; (2) the fact that a firm needs
to be unique in such a way that it can perform better than its competitors; and
(3) the increasing complexity and nature of competition in markets. Thus the
four competitive strategies will provide firms with more alternative ways of
being unique and consequently give them more power to cope with the
increasing competition successfully. This leads to the discussion of the issue of
'stuck in the middle'.
These findings can be related to the discussion of the issue of 'stuck in
the middle', articulated originally by Michael Porter (1980, 1985). The term
"stuck in the middle" has been used by Porter to indicate the characteristics of a
firm that engages in more than one generic strategy but fails to achieve any one
of them. The idea of 'stuck in the middle' therefore suggests that successful
companies should pursue only one strategy and avoid being stuck between
several strategies. Discussing the different generic strategies, Porter argues that
a firm which is stuck in the middle tries to achieve competitive advantage
through every means but achieves none. Although this argument has been
generally accepted, many studies have empirically tested Porter's work (e.g.
Murray, 1988; Phillips, Chang, and Buzzell, 1983; Hill, 1988; Woodruffe,
1993) and concluded that there are firms which are not simply following either
cost leadership or differentiation strategies but following both strategies
simultaneously, and yet maintaining an above-average performance. Oskarsson
and Sjoberg (1994) conclude in their study that rather than a 'stuck in the
middle', firms found a 'luck in the middle' strategy. As discussed in Chapter 3
the same principle used by Porter (with regard to the independence of
competitive strategies) has been followed in the development of the competitive
strategies framework. However, it has been concluded that the classification of
these competitive strategies is more complex than Porter suggested. Although
the issue of "stuck in the middle" has been discussed in more detail in Chapter
3, the relevance of this issue to the framework developed in this study will be
presented in this section. This issue has different interpretations (e.g. Cronshaw
and Davis, 1990; Bowman, 1992; Cronshaw, Davis and Kay, 1994).
Cronshaw, Davis and Kay (1994), discussing the issue of "stuck in the
middle", argue that the idea that successful companies should pursue only one
strategy and avoid being stuck between several strategies has become an
important tenet of corporate thinking. They, however, distinguish and appraise
three different interpretations of this concept. First, when interpreted narrowly
as referring to the appeal of a product to its target buyers, Porter's proposition
implies that companies must be down-market or up-market, but nothing in-
between. Such a view, as they discuss it, is belied by the evident success of
companies such as Sainsbury's, which earns substantial economic rents in a
mid-market position. Cronshaw and Davis (1990) also argue that many of the
world's most successful companies are based on mid-market positioning:
Sainsbury's is between Kwik Save and Marks and Spencer, Trust House Forte is
between Holiday Inns and the Hilton chain, Barclays fall between the Co-op
bank and Coutts for current account services, and so on (Cronshaw and Davis,
1990: 106). Second, Porter can be interpreted more broadly as suggesting that
firms need strategic clarity and that they will do better to pursue either cost or
quality objectives rather than to seek a mix of the two. PIMS data and other
evidence as discussed by Cronshaw, Davis and Kay (1994), shows however,
that intermediate positions are indeed profitable and are successfully exploited
by many firms; more discussion of this issue is also presented in Chapter 3.
Finally they concluded that Porter's strategy is best employed as a classification
scheme of strategic outcomes - it says that firms which fail in both cost and
quality dimensions perform poorly.
Therefore, since this study investigates the different barriers that may
prevent firms from achieving and sustaining their competitive advantage,
relating the results obtained in this study to the idea of "stuck in the middle" we
will be able to underline more clearly these firms that may be "stuck in the
middle". Considering the concept of strategic coherence' that has been discussed
in the previous section (in all its three levels: competitive coherence,
organisational coherence and cognitive coherence), it has been found that firms
need to have strategic coherence in order to achieve and sustain their
competitive advantage. The issue of stuck in the middle, with the three
interpretations proposed by Cronshaw, Davis and Kay (1994) and others, is
related to competitive coherence. In other words, when Porter talks about firms
that fail to achieve their competitive advantage or are stuck in the middle
(whether stuck in the middle is interpreted as being stuck between strategies or
between markets), he was talking about one aspect of the strategic coherence
mentioned earlier, which is competitive coherence. Therefore, considering the
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similarity of Porter's two competitive strategies, cost leadership and
differentiation, to PL and DIF competitive strategies respectively, and also
considering the issue of "stuck in the middle" as defined by Porter, we may turn
to the example of Sainsbury's, in which Cronshaw, Davis and Kay (1994) make
their conclusion and agree that Sainsbury's is not suck in the middle. However,
it will be argued that Sainsbury's is not using either of the two competitive
strategies (i.e. cost leadership and differentiation) but using another one, i.e. low
cost differentiation. Thus following the development of the four competitive
strategies, those firms which are considered by Porter as being stuck in the
middle can be identified as using different competitive strategies. This argument
can be also generalised to other studies (e.g. Murray, 1988; Phillips, Chang, and
Buzzell, 1983; Hill, 1988; Woodruffe, 1993) which argue that firms can pursue
both cost leadership and differentiation simultaneously.
Thus, even though our development of Porter's competitive strategies
provides firms with more alternative ways of achieving their competitive
advantage (i.e. not being stuck in the middle between cost leadership and
differentiation), stuck in the middle is an expression wiih a meaning that is more
general than only failing to have an appropriate competitive strategy. Therefore,
in addition to being stuck in the middle with respect to competitive coherence,
organisational coherence as well as cognitive coherence need to be maintained.
Firms may then be stuck in the middle in terms of their competitive
strategies. As discussed earlier, firms need to have an appropriate link between
two particular foundations of the four foundations of competitive advantage
(competitive coherence). Firms that are unable to identify clearly their
competitive strategies, by having an appropriate link as discussed in Chapters 8,
9 and 10, will be considered as being stuck in the middle.
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, this study has developed an ideal
model of links between internal and external variables and competitive
strategies in order for firms to achieve and sustain their competitive advantage.
This model has been empirically tested in different ways and levels and found to
be accepted. Firms, therefore, can be considered as being stuck in the middle
when they have an inappropriate link between competitive strategies and the
different supporting variables. Examples of such inappropriate links are
discussed in Chapters 9 and 10 and summarised in the previous section. Finally,
as it has been found that managers' explicit recognition of their firms'
competitive strategies (cognitive coherence) is related to the achievement and
sustainability of competitive advantage, firms may be stuck in the middle when
managers have no explicit recognition of their firms' competitive strategies.
Therefore, it has been found that a firm can be stuck in the middle in three
different places. These are as follows: (1) when a firm identifies its competitive
strategy; (2) when the firm forms the links either in the internal or external
environments; (3) when managers recognise or perceive the strategies that their
organisations are following. 	 .
Thus, since firms need to maintain all the three different aspects of the
strategic coherence in order to achieve and sustain their competitive advantage
and not be stuck in the middle, in failing to maintain one or more of these
coherences, firms are unlikely to achieve their competitive advantage.
Therefore, it can be suggested that further research in this area will improve
understanding of the competitive strategies and the achievement and
sustainability of competitive advantage.
11.3 Implication of findings
Although the literature which has been used in the discussion of this
research, either on competitive strategies or on barriers to achieving competitive
advantage, was mainly related to western markets and western companies, the
findings of this research, as presented by the Saudi top executives, are
applicable to the western companies and markets. The findings also show that
the theories developed on and for the western companies can be applied to the
non-western countries such as Saudi Arabia. However, these findings will
undoubtedly be more beneficial to the Saudi companies than to any other
companies. Thus the findings of this research show that strategic research
related to competitive strategies and the achievement and sustainability of
competitive advantage is fruitful, even in developing countries such as Saudi
Arabia, and that it can help identify theories unique to developing countries and
increase at the same time the external validity of theories developed in
industrialised countries.
11.4 Contributions of the study
It is believed that the present study makes a contribution to the strategic
management literature in general and to the concept of competitive advantage
and generic strategies in particular. It also develops different ways of analysing
and determining barriers to achieving competitive advantage. It offers useful
information to the food and petrochemical industries firms in particular, and to
the Saudi Arabian firms in general.
1 Different approaches to the market position of the firm have been
discussed and related to the resource-based approach to develop the
concept of competitive advantage and the generic strategies. Based on
this development, the present study provides firms with four competitive
strategies (price leadership, low cost differentiation, imitation and
differentiation), to compete in their market. The development of these
strategies involves two aspects: theoretical and empirical. Therefore, In
these two ways competitive strategies are derived rather than being
imposed. The study also develops an ideal model of links between
internal and external variables and competitive strategies in order for
firms to achieve and sustain their competitive advantage. It also
develops the concept of strategic coherence, that firms will achieve and
sustain their competitive advantage when their strategies are coherent.
2 In addition to the body of literature contributed by this study, it provides
useful empirical data and information that help in analysing and testing
the theoretical framework presented in the study. The results of this
analysis could help firms to see alternative ways of competing in their
markets and to benefit from adapting and pursuing an effective and
coherent competitive strategy in order to achieve their competitive
advantage. This contribution is also of special benefit to tie Saudi
Arabian firms and, in particular, in the two investigated industries.
3 To the knowledge of the researcher, this study addresses an issue that
has not been addressed in Saudi Arabian industries, namely that of
competitive strategies and barriers to achieving competitive advantage.
In addition to the special contribution to the Saudi Arabian firms, this
study aims to extend developed (Western) strategy models and literature
to a developing country (Saudi Arabia) and to determine whether that
literature is relevant to Saudi Arabia. The results are consistent with
those found in the existing literature, lending support to the view that
western strategy models seem to be applicable to developing countries
such as Saudi Arabia. These results also contributed toward the external
validity of these models.
11.5 Limitations
This study, like any other, has its limitations. This section will highlight
some of these limitations.
1 The firms investigated in this study were from two different Saudi
Arabian industries: food and petrochemical. One may suspect that
findings related to the barriers to achieving competitive advantage could
have been different when competitive strategies are used in other
industries with drastically different technological and/or economic
structure.
2 The difficulty of deciding the effect of the non-respondents. The
response rate was 60%. Those who did not respond were assumed to be
normally distributed across the variables of this study. This is a potential
cause of any possible confusion in the results.
3 The lack of availability of publicly published data about Saudi Arabian
firms. This limitation has forced the adoption of subjective and self-
reporting methodologies.
4 Closely associated with the previous limitation is the questionnaire as
the main method of data collection. This method relies on self-reporting
as a basic source of data. The benefits and limitation of using
questionnaires in this study were discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
Validation procedures and techniques used in this study have tried to
minimise the limitations of using questionnaires. However, questions
may still remain on these limitations.
Taking account of these limitations, we can now recommend other areas
for future research.
11.6 Areas for further research
The study focused on the barriers to achieving competitive advantage
and how the lack of the different aspects of strategic coherence prevent firms
from achieving and sustaining their competitive advantage. Although the
objectives of this study have been achieved, this study does not claim its
findings are conclusive, but rather lay the groundwork for subsequent research.
The following areas that remain unexplored could benefit from further
investigation:
1 A replication of this study is recommended to be applied to other
countries and/or to other industries in Saudi Arabia, using the two
available versions of the questionnaire. RepliCation could enhance the
value and general applicability of the results in the present study,
particularly in the competitive strategies and the barriers to achieving
and sustaining competitive advantage. Additional empirical work needs
to be done to see if these findings may be generalised to other countries
and/or industries.
2 With appropriate funding and time, other methods of collecting data
such interviews with the respondents and/or more detailed case studies
are recommended. Such methods will provide the researcher with more
information about the investigated firms and industries and minimise the
limitations of the questionnaire mentioned earlier.
information about the investigated firms and industries and minimise the
limitations of the questionnaire mentioned earlier.
3	 Further research can be conducted to explore the idea of "stuck in the
middle", as mentioned earlier.
4 Other external potential barriers to the achievement and sustainability of
the competitive advantage, such as public activities and institutional
activities, are worth consideration in future research. The same can also
be applied to other internal potential barriers to the organising strategy,
such as those related to individual careers, perceptions, cognition and so
on (which are referred to as "individual (or behavioural) strategies" in
Chapter 5). Since these potential barriers were considered outside its
scope, they have not been discussed in this study.
5 Finally, it is hoped that this study contributes to a better understanding
of the competitive advantage and competitive strategies, as well as the
barriers that may prevent firms from achieving and sustaining
competitive advantage. It is also hoped that th,e present study has laid
some basis for future research.
References
Aalcer, D. A. (1992) Strategic Market Management, New York, NY: John Wiley
& Sons.
Aiken, Michael and Jerald, Hage (1966) Organizational alienation: A
comparative analysis, American Sociological Review, Vol. 31
(August), pp. 497-507.
Alchian, A.A. (1950) Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory, American
Economic Review, Vol. 58, pp. 388-401.
Aldrich, H.E. (1979) Organizations and environments, Englewood Cliffs. NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Ali, A. (1987) Survey of management and organisations in Arab world, South
Bend, Indiana: Bureau of Business Research in Indiana University South
Bend.
Amit, R. and Schoemaker, P.H. (1993) Strategic assets and organizational rent,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol., 14, No, 1, pp, 33-46.
Amit, R. and Schoemaker, P.H. (1990) Key success factors: their foundations
and application, Working paper, University of British Columbia and
university of Chicago, June.
Anastos, D, Bedos, A. and Seaman, B. (1980) The development of modern
management practices in Saudi Arabia, Columbia Journal of World
Business, Summer, pp. 81-92. 	 .
Anderbreg, M.R. (1973) Cluster analysis for applications, New York: Academic
Press.
Anderson, C.R. and Paine, F.T. (1975) Managerial perceptions and managerial
behaviour, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 18, pp. 811-823.
Anderson, C.R. and Zeithmal, C.P. (1984) Saga of product life cycle, business
strategy, and business performance, Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 5-24.
Anderson, Earl (1992) Petrochemical Capacity Rises in Middle East, Chemical
& Engineering News, Vol. 70, No. 39, Sept. 28, pp. 32-33.
Andrews, K.R. (1971) The concept of the corporate strategy, Homewood, Ill.:
Irwin.
Ansoff, H. Igor (1965) Corporate strategy, McGraw Hill Inc.
Ansoff, H. Igor (1976) Managing strategic surprise by response to weak signals,
California Management Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 21-33.
Ansoff, H. Igor (1991) Critique of Henry Mintzberg's "The design school",
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 449-461.
Ansoff, H. Igor and McDonnell, M. (1990) Implementing strategic management,
2nd ed., Prentice Hall, New York.
Arabian American Oil Company (1968) ARAMCO handbook: Oil and the
Middle East , Dahran, Saudi Arabia.
Ary, D., Jacobs, L. and Razavieh, A. (1979) Introduction to research in
education, New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston.
Azzam, Henry T. (1993) Saudi Arabia: Joint ventures in the Kingdom (Part 2),
Middle East Executive Reports, Vol. 16, No. 4, Apr., pp. 9, 12.
Bamberger, I. (1989) Developing competitive advantage in small and medium-
size firms, Long Range Planning, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 80-88.
Bantel, K.A. (1993) Top team, environment, and performance effects on strategic
planning formality, Group and Organization Management, Dec., Vol.
18, No. 4, p. 436.
Barney, J. B. (1985) Information cost and the governance of economic
transactions, In Nacamalli, R.D. and Rugiadini, A. (Ed.), Organisations 
and markets, Milan, Italy: Societa Editrice it Milano, pp. 347-372.
Barney, J.B. (1986a) Types of competition and the theory of strategy: Toward
an integrative framework. Academy of Management Review, 11(4):
791-800.
Barney, J.B. (1986b) Organisational culture: can it be a source of sustained
competitive advantage? Academy of Management Review, Vol. 11, No.
3, pp. 656-665.
Barney, J.B. (1988) Returns to bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions:
Reconsidering the relatedness hypothesis. Strategic Management
Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 71-78.
Barney, J.B. (1991) Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,
Journal of Management, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 99-120.
Bartmess, A. and Cerny, K. (1993) Building competitive advantage through a
global network of capability, California Management Review, Winter,
pp. 78-103.
Bausel, R. B. (1986) A practical guide to conducting empirical research, New
York: Harper & Row.
- 323 -
Berdie, D.R. and Anderson, J.F. (1974) Questionnaires: design and use,
Metuchen, NJ.: Scarerow Press, Inc.
Bjork, L.E. (1975) An experiment in work satisfaction, Scientific American,
March, pp. 17-23.
Blackburn, R.S. (1982) Dimensions of structure: a review and reappraisal,
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 59-66.
Blalock, Hurbert M. (1972) Social statistics, 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Blau, P.M. and Scott, W.R. (1962) Formal organisations: A comparative
approach, San Francisco; Chandler.
Blau, P. and Schoenherr, R. (1971) The structure of organizations, New York:
Basic Books.
Bolman, L.G. and Deal, T.E. (1984) Modern approaches to understanding and
managing organisations, San Francisco-Bass.
Boston Consulting Group, Inc. (1976) Perspective on experience, Boston MA:
Boston Consulting Group.
Bourgeois, L.J. (1980) Strategy and environment: A conceptual integration,
Academy of 	 Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 25-39.
Bourgeois, L.J. (1980a) Performance and consensus, Strategic Management
Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 227-248.
Bourgeois, L.J. (1985) Strategic goals, perceived uncertainty, and economic
performance in volatile environments, Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 28, pp. 548-573.
Bowman, Cliff (1990) The essence of strategic management, Prentice Hall
International, UK.
Bowman, Cliff (1992) Interpreting competitive strategy, British Academy of
Management Conference, University of Bradford, 14-16 September.
Bowman, Cliff and Johnson, G. (1992) Surfacing competitive strategy, European
Management Journal, Vol. 10, No 2, pp 210-219.
Brooke, M.Z. and Remmers, H.L. (1970) The strategy of multinational
enterprise, Longman Group Limited.
Burns, T. and Stalker, G. (1961) The management of innovation, London:
Tavi stock.
Bylinsky, G. (1976) The innovation millionaires, New York: Scribners.
Cartwright, D. (1965) Influence, leadership, control. In March, J.G. (Ed.)
Handbook of organisations, Chicago: Rand McNally, pp. 1-47.
Chaganti, R. and Sambharya, R. (1987) Strategic orientation and characteristics
of upper management, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 393-
401.
Chan, Y. and Huff, S. (1991) Strategy: An information system research
perspective, Working paper, The University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario, Canada.
Chandler, A. D. (1962) Strategy and structure, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Channon, D. F. (1973) The strategy and structure of British enterprise, Harvard
University Press, Boston
Child, J. (1972) Organisation structure, environment and performance: The role
of strategic choice, Sociology, Vol. 6, pp. 1-22.
Child, J. (1974) Managerial and organisational factors associated with company
performance-Part I, The Journal of Management Studies, October, pp.
175-189.
Child, J. (1975) Managerial and organizational factors associated with company
performance, Part II: A contingency analysis. Journal of Management
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1.
Clover, Vernon T. and Balsley, H.L. (1979) Business research methods,
Columbus, OH.: Grid Publishing, Inc.
Cochran, W.G. (1977) Sampling techniques, 3rd edition, New York: John Wiley
& Sons.
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1972) A garbage can model of
organisational choice, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp.
1-25.
Cohen, P. (1969) Theories of myths, Man, Vol. 4, No. 33, pp. 337-353.
Collis, D. J. (1991) A resource-based analysis of global competition: the case of
the bearings industry, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 49-
68.
Conant, J.S., Mokwa, M.P. and Varadarajan, P.R. (1990) Strategic types,
distinctive marketing competencies and organisational performance: A
multiple measures-based study, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11,
pp. 365-383.
Conner, K.R. (1991) A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five
schools of thought within industrial organization economics: Do we
have a new theory of the firm?, Journal of Management, Vol. 17, pp.
121-154.
Cronshaw, M., Davis, E. (1990) Strategy: Between Two Stools, Accountancy,
Dec., Vol. 106, No. 1168, pp. 106-107.
Cronshaw M, Davis E and Kay J (1994) On being stuck in the middle or good
food costs less at Sainsbury's, British Journal of Management, Vol. 5,
pp. 19-32.
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G. (1963) A behavioural theory of the firm,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Davies, O.L. and Goldsmith, P.L. (1972) Statistical methods in research and
production, T. and A. Constable Ltd., Edinburgh.
Davies, S.W. and Lyons, B.R. (1982) Seller concentration: The technological
explanation and demand uncertainty, Economic Journal, Vol. 92, pp.
903-919.
Day, G. S. (1984) Strategic market planning: The pursuit of competitive
advantage, St. Paul: West.
Day, G.S. and Wensley, R. (1988) Assessing advantage: a framework for
diagnosing competitive superiority, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 52, pp.
1-20.
Denison, D. (1984) Bringing corporate culture to the bottom line, Organizational
Dynamics (Autuinn 1984) pp. 5-22.
Dess, G.G. and Davis, P.S. (1984) Porter's (1980) Generic strategies as
determinants of strategic group membership and organisational
performance, Academy of Management January, vol. 27, No. 3 pp. 467-
488.
Dess G.G., and Beard D.W. (1984) Dimensions of organizational task
environments, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 29, pp. 52-73.
Dessler, G. (1986) Organisation theory: Integrating structure and behaviour,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Devine, P.J., Lee, N., Jones, R.M. and Tyson, W.J. (1985) An introduction to 
industrial economics, George Allen & Unwin (Publisher)Ltd. London.
Diericicx, I. and Cool, K. (1989) Assets stock accumulation and sustainability of
(4.	 competitive advantage, Management Science Vol. 35, No. 12 pp 1504-
1514.
\\9 Dietrich, M. (1994) Transaction cost economic and beyond: Toward a new
economic of the firm, Routledge, London.
Dietrich, M. and Al-Awadh, M. (1993) Generic strategies and competitive
cpvaiti a A rgti pail old thern , Discussion Paper No.
93.36, Management School, Sheffield University, UK.
Dietrich, M. and Al-Awadh, M. (1995) Strategic coherence and competitive
advantage, Discussion Paper No. 95.15, Management School, Sheffield
University, UK.
Dillman, D. A. (1978) Mail and telephone surveys: The total design method,
New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Directory of Saudi Industries (1993), Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Saudi
Arabia.
Donaldson, L. (1987) Strategy and structural adjustment to regain fit and
performance: in defence of contingency theory, Journal of Management
Studies, Vol. 24, No 1, pp 1-24.
Dosi, G., Teece, D. and Winter, S. (1990) Toward a theory of corporate
coherence, mimeo, March 1990.
Drazin, R. and Van de Ven, A. (1985) Alternative forms of fit in contingency
theory, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 30, pp. 514-539.
Duncan, R.B. (1972) Characteristics of organisational environment and
perceived environmental uncertainty, Administrative Science Quarterly,
September, pp 313-327.
Eisenhardt, K. (1989) Making fast strategic decisions in high velocily
environments: Toward a midrange theory, Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 543-576.
El Mallalch, R. (1982) Saudi Arabia rush to development, Baltimore, MD: The
John Hopkins University Press.
Emory, C. W. (1985) Business research methods, Homewood, ILL.: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc.
Etzioni, A. (1961) comparative analysis of comple x organi ations, New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Fahey, L. (1989) Discovering your firm's strongest competitive advantages. In
L.Fahey (Ed), The strategic planning management reader, Englewood,
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 18-22.
Farjoun, M. (1994) Beyond industry boundaries: human expertise,
diversification and resource-related industry groups, Organization
Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 185-199.
Fiol, C. M. (1991) Managing culture as a competitive resource: An identity-
based view of sustainable competitive advantage, Journal of
Management, Vol. 17, pp 191-211.
Flynn, B., Sakakibara, S., Schroeder, R., Bates, K. and Flynn, E (1990)
Empirical research methods in operations management, Journal of
Operations Management, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 250-284.
Fredrickson, J.W. (1984) The effects of structure on the strategic decision
process, Academy of Management Proceedings, pp. 12-16.
Galbraith, J.R. (1973) Designing complex organisations, Reading, Mass:
Addison-Wesley.
Galbraith, J.R. and Nathanson, D. (1978) Strategy implementation: the role of
structure and process, West Publishing, St Paul, MN.
Geertz, C. (1973) The interpretation of cultures, New York: Basic Books.
Ghemawat, P. (1986) Sustainable advantage, Harvard Business Review,
September-October, pp. 53-58.
Ghemawat, P. (1991) Commitment: The dynamic of strategy, New York, NY:
The Free Press.
Ghiselli, E. and Brown, C. (1955) Personnel and industrial psychology, New
York, McGraw-Hill.
Gilman, G. (1962) An inquiry into the nature and the use of authority, In Haie,
M. (Ed.) Organization theory in industrial practice, New York: Wiley,
pp. 105-142.
Ginsberg, A. (1984) Operationalizing Organisational strategy: Towards an
integrative framework, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 3,
pp. 548-557.
Ginsberg, A. and Venkatraman, N. (1985) Contingency perspectives of
organisational strategy: a critical review of the empirical research,
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 421-434.
Glaister, K. (1991) International success: Company strategy and national
advantage, European Management Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 334-338.
Glover, J. (1966a) Innovation and evolution of environment. Part I. Teaching
note (8-367-020), Graduate School of Business, Harvard University,
Boston, MA.
Glover, J. (1966b) Innovation and evolution of environment. Part II Teaching
note (8-367-021), Graduate School of Business, Harvard University,
Boston, MA,
Goleman, D, (1985) Vital lies, simple truths: The psychology of self-deception,
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Goodenough, W.H. (1971) Culture. language and Society, Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
GooId, M. and Campbell, A. (1987) Strategy and styles: The role of the center in
managing diversified corporations, Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Goold, M. and Campbell, A. (1988) Managing the diversified corporation: The
tensions facing the chief executive, Long Range Planning, Vol. 21, No.
4, pp. 12-24.
Gordon, G. G. (1985) The relationship of culture to industry sector and corporate
performance, In R. Killmann et al. (Ed) Gaining control of corporate
culture, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Granovetter, M. (1985) Economic action and social structure: the problem of
embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 481-
510.
Grant, R. (1991a) The resource based theory of competitive advantage:
implementation for strategic formulation, California Management
Review, Spring, pp 114-135.
Grant, R. (1991b) Porter's competitive advantage of nation: an assessment,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, pp 535-548.
Grinyer, P.H., Yasai-Ardekani, M. and Al-Bazzaz, S. (1980) Strategy, Structure,
the environment, and financial performance in 18 UK companies,
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 193-220.
Grubel, H. G. (1967) Intra-industry specialization and the theory of trade,
Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, pp 374-388.
Gupta, A.K. and Govindarajan, V. (1984) Business unit strategy, managerial
characteristics, and business unit effectiveness at strategy
implementation, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp.
25-41.
Hage, G. and Aiken, M. (1970) Social change in complex organisations, New
York: Random House.
Hage, J. and Aiken, M. (1967) Relationship of centralisation to other structural
properties, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 12, pp. 72-92.
Hafiz, TK (1982) Technology transfer to the developing nations: the case of
Saudi Arabia. In El Mallalch, R. and El Mallalch, D.H. (ed.) Saudi
Arabia: Energy developmental planning and industrialisation. D.C.
Heath and Company, USA.
- 329 -
Hall, R.H. (1962) Inter-organisational and structural variation: application for the
bureaucratic mode, Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 295-308.
Hall, R.H. (1972) Organizations: Structure and process, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Hambrick, D.C. (1980) Operationalizing the concept of business-level strategy in
research, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 567-575.
Hambrick, D.C. (1983a) An empirical typology of mature industrial-product
environment, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp.
213-230.
Hambrick, D.C. (1983b) High profit strategy in mature capital goods industries:
A contingency approach, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 26,
No. 4 pp. 687-707.
Hambrick, D. C. (1983c) Some tests of the effectiveness and functional attributes
of Miles and Snow's strategic types, Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. 26, pp. 5-26.
Hambrick, D.C. (1984) Taxonomic approaches to studying strategy: some
conceptual and methodological issues, Journal of Management, Vol. 10,
No. 1, pp. 27-41.
Hambrick, D.C. (1985) Strategies for mature industrial product businesses, In J.
H. Grant (Ed.) Strategic management frontiers: New York: JAI Press,
pp. 320-356..
Hambrick, D.C. (1987) Top management teams: key to strategic success,
California Management Review, Vol. 30, pp. 88-108.
Hambrick, D.C. (1988) Strategies for mature industrial-product business: a
taxonomical approach, In Grant J.H. (ed.) Strategic management
frontiers. JAI Press, Greenwich, CT.
Hamel, Gary, Prahalad, C. K. (1989) Strategic Intent, Harvard Business Review,
Vol. 67, May-Jun., No. 3, pp. 63-76.
Hamilton, R., Shergill, G. (1992) The relationship between strategy-structure fit
and financial performance in New Zealand: evidence of generality and
validity with enhanced controls, Journal of Management Studies, Vol.
29, No. 1, pp. 95-113.
Hannan, M.T. and Freeman, J. (1988) Organizational ecology, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Harrigan, K.R. (1985) An application of clustering for strategic group analysis,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 55-73.
Hannan, M.T. and Freeman, J. (1989) Organizational ecology, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Harrigan, K.R. (1985) An application of clustering for strategic group analysis,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 55-73.
Hatten, K. J. and Schendel, D. E. (1977) Heterogeneity within an industry: firm
conduct in US brewing industry 1952-71, Journal of Industrial
Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 97-113.
Hawes, J.M. and Crittenden, W.F. (1984) A taxonomy of competitive retailing
strategies, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 275-287.
Hax, A.C. and Majluf, N.S. (1984) Strategic management: An integrative
perspective, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Hayden, C. (1986) The handbook of strategic expertise, New York: Free Press.
Hayes, R.H. and Wheelwright, S.C. (1984) Restoring mn competitive edge:
competing through manufacturing, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Hayes, R.H., Wheelwright, S.C. and Clark K. (1988) Dynamic manufacturing: 
Creating the learning organization, New York: Free Press.
Helfat, C. (1994) Firm-specificity in corporate applied R&D, Organization
Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 173-184.
Henderson, R. and Cockburn, I. (1994) Measuring competence? exploring firm
effects in pharmaceutical research, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.
15, pp. 63-84.	
.
Henderson, B.D. (1979) Henderson on corporate strategy, Cambridge, Mass.:
Abt Books.
Henerson, M., Morrise, L. and Gibson, C. (1978) How to measure attitudes,
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Hickson, D.J., Hinning, C., Less, C., Schneck, R. and Pennings, J. (1971) A
strategic contingency theory of intraorganisational power,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, pp. 216-229.
Hill, C. W. (1988) Differentiation versus low cost or differentiation and low cost:
A contingency framework, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13,
No. 3, pp. 401-412.
Hitt, M.A. and Ireland, R.D. (1985) Corporate distinctive competence, strategy,
industry and performance, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 6, pp.
273-293.
Hitt, M.A., Ireland, R.D. and Stadter, G. (1982) Functional importance and
company performance: Moderating effects of grand strategy and
industry type, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 315-330.
Hodder, J.E. and Riggs, H.E. (1985) Pitfalls in evaluating risky projects, Harvard
Business Review, January-February, pp. 128-135.
Hofer, C.W. (1975) Toward a contingency theory of business strategy, Academy
of Management Journal, Vol. 18, pp. 784-810
Hofer, W. and Schendel, D. (1978) Strategy formulation: Analytical concept,
West Publishing Co.
Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B. and Sanders, G. (1990) Measuring organisational
cultures: A qualitative and quantitative study across twenty cases,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, pp. 286-316.
Hrebiniak, L.G. and Joyce, W.F. (1985) Organizational Adaptation: Strategic
Choice and Environmental Determinism, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 336-49.
Hrebinialc, L.G., and Snow, C.C. (1982) Top management agreement and
organizational performance, Human Relations, Vol. 35, pp. 1139-1158.
Huber, G., and Daft, R. (1987) Information environments, In L. Putnam, K.
Porter, and Jablin, F. (Ed.) Handbook of organizational communication,
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Iles, Paul A. (1993) Achieving strategic coherence in HRD through
competence-based management and organization development,
Personnel Review, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 63-80.
Isenberg, D.J. (1987) The tactics of strategic opportunism, Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 92-97.
Issac, S. and Michael, W. (1990) Handbook of research and evaluation, San
Diego, CA: Edits Publications.
Itami, H. (1987) Mobilizing invisible assets, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Jackson, J.H. and Morgan, C.P. (1982) Organisation theory, 2nd edition.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Jauch, L.R., Osborn, R.W. and Gluck, W.F. (1980) Short-term financial success
in large business organisations: The environment-strategy connection,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 49-63.
Jennings, D.F. and Lumpkin, J.R. (1992) Insights between environmental
scanning activities and Porter's generic strategies: an empirical analysis,
Journal of Management, Dec., Vol. 18, No. 4, p791.
Johnson, G. and Scholes, K. (1993) Exploring corporate strategy, Prentice-Hall
International (UK) Ltd.
Johnston, R. and Lawrence P. R. (1988) Beyond vertical integration-the rise of
the value-adding partnership, Harvard Business Review, (July-August)
pp. 94-104.
Kahn, W.A. and Kram, K.E. (1994) Authority at work: internal models and their
organizational consequences, Academy of Management Review, Vol.
19, No. 1, pp. 17-50.
Karnani, A. (1984) Generic competitive strategies: An analytical approach,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 367-380.
Kassem, M.S. (1989) Strategy formulation: Arabian Gulf style, Int. Studies of
Management & Organisation, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 6-21.
Katz, D. and Kahn, R.L. (1978) The social psychology of organisations, 2nd
Edition, New York: Wiley.
Kay, John (1993) Foundations of corporate success, Oxford University Press.
Kerlinger, F. (1973) Review of research in education, Vol. 1, Itasca Ill.: Peacock.
Kerlinger, F. (1986) Foundations of organisational research, CBS College
Publishing, Third International Edition.
Khandwalla, P.N. (1974) Mass output orientation of operations technology and
organisational structure, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, pp.
74-97.
Khandwalla, P.N. (1977) The design of organizations, New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich.
Kiggundu, M., Jorgensen, J. and Hafsi, T (1983) Administrative theory and
practice in developing countries: A synthesis, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 28, pp. 66-84.
Kilmann, R.H., Saxton, M.J. and Serpa, R. (1985) Gaining control of the
corpo ate culture, Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Kim, L. (1980) Organisational innovation and structure. Journal of Business
Research, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 225-245.
Kim, L. and Lim, Y. (1988) Environment, generic strategies, and performance in
a rapidly developing country: A taxonomic approach, Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 802-827.
Klein, B. and Leffler, K. (1981) The role of price in guaranteeing quality, Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 89, pp. 615-641.
Klein, B., Crawford, R.G. and Alchian, A. (1987) Vertical integration,
appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process, Journal of
Law and Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 297-326.
Knight, F.H. (1920) Risk. uncertainty and profit, New York: Harper and
Brothers.
Koutsoyiannis, A. (1982) Non-price decisions the firm in a modern context,
Macmillan Education Ltd.
Krugman, P. R. (1980) Sales economies, product differentiation, and the pattern
of trade, American Economic Review, 70, pp. 950-959.
Lado, A.A., Boyd, N.G. and Wright, P. (1992) A competency-based model of
sustainable competitive advantage: toward a conceptual integration,
Journal of Management, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 77.
Lado, A.A. and Wilson, MC (1994) Human resource systems and sustained
competitive advantage: a competency-based perspective, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 699-727.
Lamont, B.T., Marlin, D. and Hoffman, J.J. (1993) Porter's generic strategies,
discontinuous environments, and performance: a longitudinal study of
changing strategies in the hospital industry, Health Services Research,
Vol. 28, No. 5, p. 623.
Lawrence, P. and Lorsch, J. (1967) Organisation and environment, Boston
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Learned, E.P., Christensen, C.R., Andrews, K.R. (1961) Problems of general
management, Homewood, IL: Irwin.
Learned, E.P., Christensen, C.R., Andrews, K.R., and Guth, W.D. (1969)
Business policy: Text and cases, Homewood, IL: Irwin.
Lenz, R.T. (1980) Environment, strategy, organisation structure and
performance: Patterns in one industry, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 1, pp. 209-226.
Lenz, R.T. and Engledow, J.L. (1986a) Environmental analysis units and
strategic decision-making: a field study of selected 'leading edge'
corporations, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 69-89.
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992) Core capabilities and core rigidities: a paradox in
managing new product development, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 13, pp. 111-125.
Lindblom, C.E. (1959) The science of muddling through, Public Administrative
Review, Vol. 19, pp. 79-88
Lippman, S.A. and Rumelt, R.P. (1982) Uncertain imitability: An analysis of
interfirm differences in efficiency under competition, The Bell Journal
of Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 418-438.
Loge, G. (1975) The new American ideology. Alferd Knopf, New York.
Lorange, P. and Vancil, R.F. (1977) Strategic planning systems, Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Lorsch, J. (1985) Strategic myopia: as an invisible barriers to change, In R.
Killmann et al. (Ed) Gaining control of corporate culture, San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Lovelock, C.H., Stiff, R., Cullwick, D. and Kaufman, I.M. (1976) An evaluation
of the effectiveness of drop-off questionnaire delivery, Journal of
Marketing Research, pp. 358-364.
Luqmani, M. & Yavas, U. and Quraeshi, Z. (1989) Corporate Strategy and
Public Policy in Saudi Arabia, Long Range Planning, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp.
79-88.
MacCrimmon, K.R. and Wehrung, D.A. (1986) Taking risks, Free Press, New
York.
Macmillan, I., Mccaffery, M., and Van Wijk, G. (1985) Competitors' responses
to easily imitated new products - Exploring commercial banking product
introductions, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 75-86.
Malhorta, N.K. (1993) Marketing research an applied orientation, Prentice-Hall
International, Inc.
Mancke, R. (1974) Causes of interfirm profitability differences: A new
interpretation of the evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 88,
pp. 181-193.
March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1958) Organizations, New York: Wiley.
Martin, Josh (1989) Big Business Still Looms Large in Saudi Arabia, Business
Month, Vol. 133, No. 2, Feb., pp. 22-23.
Mathur, S. S. (1988) How firms compete: a new classification of generic
strategy, Journal of General Management, Vol. 14, No 1, pp. 30-60.
McCarthy, D. J., Spital, F. C. and Lauenstein, M. C. (1987) Managing growth at
high technology companies: A view from the top, Academy of
Management Executives, Vol. 1, pp. 313-322.
McDaniel, S.W., and Kolari, J.W. (1987) Marketing Strategy Implications of the
Miles and Snow Strategic Typology, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 51, No.
4, pp. 19-30.
McKee, D.O., Varadarajan, P.R. and Pride, W.M. (1989) Strategic adaptability
and firm performance: A market-contingent perspective, Journal of
Marketing, Vol. 53, pp. 21-35.
Meyer, A.D. (1982) Adapting to environmental jolts, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 27, pp. 515-537.
Middle East Executive Reports (1991) 1991 Oil Survey: Saudi Oil Industry
Appears on Its Way to Another Banner Year - Part I: Structure, Policy,
Reserves, Exploration, Field Development, Crude Oil and Condensates,
Vol. 14 No. 9, Sept. pp. 9, 14-20.
Miles, R. (1980) Macro-organisational behavior, Santa Monica, Calif.: Goodyear
Publishing.
Miles, R. and Snow, C. (1978) Organizational strategy. structure and process,
McGraw-Hill, New York.
Miller, A. and Dess, G.G. (1993) Assessing Porter's (1980) model in terms of its
generalizability, accuracy and simplicity, Journal of Management
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 553-585.
Miller, D. (1986) Configuration of strategy and structure: Toward a synthesis,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 233-249.
Miller, D. (1992) The generic strategy trap, The Journal of Business Strategy,
January-February, pp. 37-40.
Miller, D. (1988) Relating Porter business strategies to environment and
structure: Analysis and performance implication, Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 280-308.
Miller, D. and Droge, C., and Toulouse, J. (1988) Strategic process and content
as mediators between organizational context and structure, Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 31, No 3, pp 544-569.
Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. (1982) Innovation in conservative and
entrepreneurial firms: two models of strategic momentum, Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 1-25.
Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. (1983) Strategy making and environment: The third
link, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 221-235.
- 336 -
Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. (1983) Strategy making and environment: The third
link, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 221-235.
Miller, D. and Friesen, PH (1984) Organisations: A quantum view, Englewood
Cliff, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. (1986a) Porter's (1980) generic strategies and
performance: An empirical examination with American data, Part I:
Testing Porter, Organizational Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 37-55.
Miller, D. and Friesen, PH (1986b) Porter's (1980) generic strategies and
performance: An empirical examination with American data, Part II:
Performance application, Organizational Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 255-
261
Miller, D. and Toulouse, J.M. (1986) Chief executive personality and corporate
strategy and structure in small firms, Management Science, Vol. 32,
No. 11, pp. 1389-1409.
Miller D. and Droge C. (1986) Psychological and traditional determinants of
structure, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, pp. 539-560.
Milliken, F. J. (1987) Three types of perceived uncertainty about the
environment: State, effect, and response uncertainty, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 133-143.
Ministry of Planning (1990) Fifth Development Plan Ministry of Planning. Saudi
Arabia.
Ministry of Planning (1990a) Achievement of the Development Plans 1970-
1990, Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia.
Ministry of Planning (1993) Achievement of the Development Plans 1970-1993,
Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia.
Mintzberg, H. (1990) Strategy Formation Schools of Thought', in JW
Fredrickson (edition). Perspectives on Strategic Management, London:
Harper and Row, pp. 105-235.
Mintzberg, H. (1978) Patterns in strategy formulation, Management Science,
Vol. 24, No. 9, pp. 934-948.
Mintzberg, H. (1979) The structuring of organizations, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
Mintzberg, H. (1983) Structure in five: Designing effective organizations,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Mintzberg, H. (1987) Crafting strategy, Harvard Business Review, July-August,
pp. 66-75.
Nath, D. and Sudharshan, D. (1994) Measuring strategy coherence through
patterns of strategic choices, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15,
No. 1, pp. 43-61.
NCB Economist (1993) The emerging Arab stock markets, The NCB Economist,
Economic and Financial Publication, Economic Department, National
Commercial Bank, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, No. 7.
NCB Economist (1995) Saudi Arabia's External sectors and the impact of
GATT, The NCB Economist, Economic and Financial Publication,
Economic Department, National Commercial Bank, Saudi Arabia, Vol.
5, No. 3.
Nelson, R.R. (1991)Why do firms differ, and how does it matter? Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 61-74.
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An evolutionary theory of economic
change, Cambridge, AM: Harvard University Press.
Nunnally, J. (1967) Psychometric theory, New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company.
Oldham G.R. and Hackman J.R. (1981) Relationships between organisational
structure and employee reactions: Comparing alternative frameworks,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 26, pp. 66-83.
Osborn, R., Hunt, J. and Jauch, L. (1980) Organization theory: An integrated
approach, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Oskarsson, C. and Sjoberg, N. (1994) Technology analysis and competitive
strategy; the case of mobile telephones, Technology Analysis &
Strategic Management, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 3-19.
Pavitt, K. (1991) Key characteristics of the large innovating firm, British Journal
of Management Review, Vol. 2, pp. 208-230.
Pearce, J. and Robinson, R.B. (1985) Formulation and implementation of
competitive strategy, New York: Richard Irwin, Inc.
Pearce, J. and Robinson, R.B. (1988) Strategic management: Strategy
formulation and implementation, New York: Richard Irwin, Inc.
Penrose, E. (1959) The theory of the growth of the firm, London: Basil
Blackwell.
Perrow, C. (1972)  omplex organisations: A critical essay, Scoot, Foresman,
Glenview, ILL.
Peter, T.J. (1978) Symbols, Patterns and setting: an optimistic case for getting
things done, Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 7, pp. 3-23.
Peteraf, M.A. (1993) The cornerstones of competitive advantage: a resource-
based view, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 179-191.
Peters, J. and Waterman, R. (1982) In search of excellence, Harper & Row,
London.
Pettigrew, A.M. (1973) The politics of organizational decision-making, London:
Tavistock.
Pettigrew, A.M. (1979) On studying organisational cultures, Administrative
Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, pp. 570-581.
Pettigrew, A.M. (1985) The awakening Giant: continuity and change in ICI,
Oxford, Blackwell.
Pettigrew, A and Whipp, R. (1994) Managing change for competitive success,
Blackwell Publishers, UK.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978) The external control of organisations: a
resource dependence perspective, New York: Harper and Row.
Phillips, L. W., Chang, D. R. and Buzzell, R. D. (1983) Product quality, cost
position and business performance: A test of some key hypotheses,
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 47, Spring, pp. 26-43.
Pierce, J. and Delbecq, A. (1977) Organization structure, individual attitudes and
innovation, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 2, pp. 27-37.
Polanui, M. (1967) The tacit dimension, Garden City, New York: Anchor.
Porter, M. E. (1980) Competitive strategy: Techniques for analysing industries
and competitors, New York: Free Press.
Porter, M.E. (1985) Competitive advantage: creating and sustaining superior
performance, New York: Free Press.
Porter, M.E. (1990) The competitive advantage of nations, Harvard Business
Review. Much-April, pp. 73-93.
Porter, M.E. (1991) A conversation with Michael Porter: International
competitive strategy from a European perspective, European
Management Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 355-360.
Porter, M.E., and et al (1987) Michael Porter on competitive strategy reflections
and round table discussion, European Management Journal, Vol. 6, No.
1, pp. 2-9.
Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel, G. (1990) The core competence of the corporation,
Harvard Business Review, May-June, pp. 79-91.
Prescott, J.E. (1986) Environment as a moderator of the relationships between
strategy and performance, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 29,
No. 2, pp. 329-346.
Price, J.L. and Mueller, C.W. (1986) Handbook of organisational measurement,
Marchfield: Pitman Publishing Inc.
Pugh, D.S., Hickson, D., and Turner, C. (1969) The context of organization
structure, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, pp. 91-114.
Quinn, J.B. (1980) Strategies for change: Logical Incrementalism, Irwin,
Homewood, IL.
Reed, R. and DeFillippi, R.J. (1990) Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and
sustainable competitive advantage, Academy of Management Review,
Vol. 15, No 1, pp. 88-102.
Reimann, B.C. (1973) On the dimensions of bureaucratic structure: An empirical
reappraisal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 462-476.
Reimann, B.C. (1974) Dimensions of structures in effective organisations: some
empirical evidence, Academy of Management Journal, pp. 693-708.
Rockart, J.F. (1979) Chief executives define their own data needs, Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 81-93.
Rumelt, R.P. (1974) Strategy. structure. and economics performance, Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press.
Rumelt, R.P. (1984) Toward a strategic theory of the firm, In Lamb, R (Ed.)
Competitive strategic management, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, pp. 556-570.
Rumelt, R.P. (1987) Theory, strategy, and entrepreneurship, In D.J. Teece (Ed.),
Competitive challenge: Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, pp. 139-158.
Sathe, Vijay (1978) Institutional verses questionnaire measures of organisational
structure, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 227-
238.
Sathe, Vijay (1983) Implications of corporate culture: A manager's guide to
action, Organizational Dynamics, pp. 5-23.
Sathe, Vijay (1985) How to decipher and change corporate culture, In R.
Killmann et al. (Ed) Gaining control of corporate culture. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Schein, E. H. (1985) Organizational and culture leadership, San Francisco-Bass.
Schein, E. H. (1990) Organisation culture, American Psychologist, Vol. 45, No.
2, pp. 109-119.
Scherer, F.M. (1980) Industrial market structure and economic performance,
Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934) The theory of economic development, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Schwartz, H. and Davis, S.M. (1981) Matching corporate culture and business
strategy, Organizational Dynamics, Summer, pp. 30-48
Segal, M. (1974) Organisation and environment: A typology of adaptability and
structure, Public Administrative Review, Vol. 35, pp. 212-220.
Segev, Eli (1989) A systematic comparative analysis and synthesis of two
business-level strategic typologies, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.
10, pp. 487-505.
Selznick, P. (1957) Leadership in Administration, New York, NY: Harper &
Row.
Shortell, SM; Morrison, EM and Robbin, S (1985) Strategy making in health
care organizations: a framework and agenda for research. Medical Care
Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 219-266.
Simon, H.A. (1957) Administrative behaviour, 2nd edition, New York: Free
Press.
Skivington, J.E. and Daft, R.L. (1991) A study of an organisational 'framework'
and 'process' modalities for the implementation of business-level
strategic decisions, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp.
45-68.
Sloan, A.P. (1963) My years in General Motors, London: Sedgewick & Jackson.
Smircich, L. (1983) Concept of culture and organizational analysis,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, pp. 339-358.
Snow, C.C. and Hambrick, D.C. (1980) Measuring organisational strategies:
Some theoretical and methodological problems, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 527-538.
Snow, C.C. and Hrebiniak, L.G. (1980) Strategy, distinctive competence and
performance, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 25, June, pp 317-
336.
Spiegel, M.R. (1972) Schaum's outline of theory and problems of statistics in SI
mnits, McGraw-Hill International Book Company.
Spital, Francis C and Bickford, Deborah J (1992) Successful Competitive and
Technology Strategies in Dynamic and Stable Product Technology
Environments, Journal of Engineering & Technology Management, Vol.
9, No. 1, Mar, pp. 29-60.
Starbuck, W.H. (1983) Organizations as action generators, American
Sociological Review, Vol. 43, pp. 91-102.
Steiner, G.A. and Miner J.B. (1982) Management policy and strategy, Macmillan
Publishing Co. Inc.
Stevenson, H. (1976) Defining corporate strengths and weaknesses, Sloan
Management Review, Spring, pp. 51-68.
Stopher, P. R. and Meyburg, A.H. (1979) Survey sampling and multivariate
analysis for social scientists and engineers, D.C. Heath and Company.
Tan, J.J. and Litschert, R.J. (1994) Environment-strategy relationship and its
performance implication: An empirical study of the Chinese electronics
industry, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 1-20.
Teece, D. J. (1980) Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 1, pp. 223-247.
Teece, D.J. (1984) Economic analysis and strategic management. California
Management Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 87-110.
Teece, D.J. (1986) Profiting from technological innovation, Research policy,
Vol. 15.
,
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (1990) Firm capabilities, resources. and
the concept of strategy, University of California at Berkeley, Working
paper No. 90-8.
Thompson, J.D. (1967) Organisation in action, New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co.
Tichy, N. (1983) Managing strategic change: Technical. political, and cultural
dynamics, New York; John Wiley.
Tornatzky, L., Eveland, J., Boylan, M., Hetzner, M., Johnson, E., Roitman, D.,
and Schneider, J. (1983) The processes of innovation: Analyzing the
literature, Washington, DC: National Science Foundation.
Tung, R. L. (1979) Dimensions of organisational environments: An exploratory
study of their impact on organisational structure, Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 22, pp. 672-693.
Tushman, M. and Keck, S. (1990) Environmental and organizational context and
executive team characteristics: An organizational learning approach,
Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, Graduate School of
Business.
Tushman, M., and Romanelli, E. (1985) Organizational evolution: A
metamorphosis model of convergence and reorientation, Research in
Organizational Behavior, Vol. 7, pp. 171-222.
Van de Ven, A.H. (1979) Review of Aldrich's (1979) book - organisation and
environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, pp. 320-326.
Van de Yen, A.H. (1986) Central problems in the management of innovation,
Management Science, Vol. 32, pp. 590-607.
Van de Ven, A.H. and Drazin, R (1985) The concept of fit in contingency theory,
In Cummongs, LL and Staw, B.M. (Ed.) Research in organizational
behavior, JAI Press, New York Vol. 7, pp. 333-365.
Venkatraman, N. and Camillus, J.C. (1984) Exploring the concept of fit in
strategic management, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3,
pp. 513-525.
Venkatraman, N. and Ramanujam, V. (1986) Measurement of business
performance in strategy research: a comparison of approaches, Academy
of Management Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 801-814.
Venkatraman, N. and Prescott, J.E. (1990) Environment-strategy co-alignment:
An empirical test of its performance implications, Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 1-23.
Wagner, R.K. and Sternberg, R.J. (1985) Practical intelligence in real-word
pursuits: The role of tacit knowledge, Journal of Personality
Psychology, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 436-458.
Weick, K. (1977) Enactment processes in organizations, In Staw, B. and
Salancik, G. (Ed.) New directions on organizational behavior, St. Clair
Press, Chicago, ILL.
Weigelt, K. and Camerer, C. (1988) Reputation and corporate strategy, Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 443-454.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984) A resource-based view of the firm, Strategic Management
Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 171-180.
Wernerfelt, B. (1989) From critical resources to corporate strategy, Journal of
General Management, Vol. 5, pp. 171-180.
Wernerfelt, B. (1994) A resource-based view of the firm ten years after, Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 16, pp. 171-174.
Whellen, T. and Hunger, D. (1986)  Strategic management, Addison Wesly
Publishing Company.
Whipp, R; Rosenfeld, R and Pettigrew (1989a) Managing strategic change in a
mature business. Long Range Planning, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 92-99.
Whipp, R., Rosenfeld, R. and Pettigrew, A. (1989b) Cultural and
competitiveness: Evidence from two mature UK industries. Journal of
Management Studies, Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 561-585.
White, R. (1986) Generic Business strategies, organisational context and
performance: an empirical investigation, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 7, pp. 217-231.
Whittington, R. (1993) What is strategy and does it matter?, Routledge: London.
Wilkins, A., and Ouchi, W. (1983) Efficient cultures: Exploring the relationship
between culture and organizational performance, Administrative
Science Quarterly, Vol. 28: pp. 468-481.
Wilkins, A. and Patterson, K. (1985) You can't get there from here, what will
make culture-change project fail, In R. Killmann et al. (Ed) Gaining
control of corporate culture, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Williams, Jeffrey R., Spring (1992) How Sustainable Is Your Competitive
Advantage?, California Management Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 29-51.
Williamson, O.E. (1985) The economic institutions of capitalism, New York:
Free Press.
Williamson, O.E. (1991) Strategizing, economizing and economic organization,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 75-94.
Winter, S.G. (1987) Knowledge and competency as strategic assets, In Teece, D.
J. (Ed.) The competitive challenge, Harpert Row, Publication, New
York, pp. 159-184.
Woodruffe, H. (1993) Stuck in the middle- the strategic position for multiple
retailers, University of Salford, Working paper No. 9323.
Yankelovich, D. (1982) New rules, Bantam Books, New York.
Young, Ian (1991) Petrochemicals: Calm After the Storm, Chemical Week, Vol.
148, No. 11, March 20, pp. 34-40.
Yule, G.U. and Kendall, M.G. (1950) An introduction to the theory of statistics,
Charles Griffin & Company Limited.












Mr G P Marshall
Professor DL Owen
Professor R L Payne
Professor S Holly
SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT SCHOOL
Department of Accounting & Finance
Department of Business Studies
Department of Economics
Dear 	
We are currently carrying out a research in the Sheffield University
Management School, UK. This research is about barriers to achieving
competitive advantage; we are taking some of the Saudi Arabia industries
as a case study for this research. We have chosen you to give us some
information about your organisation and its industry and environment for
the propose of academic research only. We can promise you that your
answers will be treated in the strictest confidence.
The results of this research will help organisations, especially in
Saudi Arabia, to understand the real barriers that may prevent them from
achieving their competitive advantage.
Your co-operation and careful answers to these questions is an
essential element for the success of this research which will form the basis
of Mr. Mohammed Al-Awadh's Ph.D. thesis. Thus your co-operation will
be appreciated. We hope that your organisation will benefit as well from
this study. Thanking you in advance for your help.
Dr. Michael Dietrich








Address: 9 Mappin Street Telephone: 0114 282 5282
Sheffield 51 4DT Facsimile: 0114 272 5103
I ritited Kingdom Direct Line: 0114 282
SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT SCHOOL
Chairman:	 Dr FA Fretwell-Downing
Director of Teaching:
	 Mr G P Marshall
Department of Accounting & Finance
	 Head of Department:
	 Professor DL Owen
Department of Business Studies
	 Head of Department:
	 Professor R L Payne
Department of Economics	 Head of Department:
	 Professor S Holly
	  j4.Lo 3.)1."..4
— 
-1"4.9 43151)0 dl I 32..)i r<:-.1A ?51....ii
kt.11 0-16 .0.1.0 .341.6.v..11 44.1 LAALA apyi 3,15 L) 44 elif d......J C.) .1.,..,...,1 1.1a c:A! ..‹.:ilst....1 -Lir
cr. Loy,.. L510 A....41j.lil 0.1-4 j....12.. 3 t.t!. c.....4.5 c JloPY LIJI.L4 j 3.... JUI c:Jii,.1 I j..jii. init. Ji.,-
..0.r...J1 c..slAI.L.,,211
‘)..0 cdtAiiftli 011—N pilipy	 ...1.0 jii ei .i.ab ibil ..‹..6-17::, 44 Ob. ,iali .13 di a.,,,At alc pl.:4i
L•13 kr-• JAR; Ji-, r<04 1-11 e: (A Lio .4.1)- ,y) J IA.P ;11 Lt.-. ! i ZAL,231 j
Aajii 44*31 ,t-4I jojali
J1,1* Al csill 4.4.;-1 Sli•JI t.ob LFLG , ao.r...J1 3.,,,,Lti c j4.c ;11 cir-t... o ..iLJ ji...) d....,,J1 We &l:-.:,
•4)! Vy..lat 4J1 at—ilvii
 'J
041_,A1 4-16 ci_ili c LiliJil /3.1A c#y Lila, ;1.41.0 4.11.41 olt 4.5.1c. 3.511.111 co_<:41.1.1.3 ..(; JIA.7 isato 111,
..jea.L.11 ..L.:,1 liao c 6:1:4 )n.! c r(ii i.e e.)),C,...1 c ,Aycli -L4A I yilia 011FSWI Ina)) dItit• NZ .4,,U1
.jblii li Ii ..(91.0 u..u.4 41 &Liu) .3...4)4 e.la ez; c74 43. t.t,;.4 .41—J c.)t Li.4:—,.. 1.4..<
13p ,j_Co..4 .	 ci..eil .1 IL
	
4.1,411,41;ijiyill.--.)t	 ajbyl a...I< c 01.13‘..di t,...1110
	
1-..J:1.6ii4 c -146.13AALI- c apyt 4, 1s-
	
Vilitii c 141 2A.°1-1"
iddress: 9 Mappin Street	 Telephone:	 0114 282 5282
Sheffield Si 4DT	 Facshnile:
	 0114 272 5103










.jef ....60, 40 vilf 
saltij	 e Ca 1.5j..ij 4111*.t... .1) r_<..4L r„Vu.,11
)1 - .445.1L! j1....a Ie j 1.11 t.....i ..'ul..-....'„ .s.a.1 ,LAyill 4.111.1,1c ..s......./ell to.i.,
a 1,13...t.ii
 
40..Nuiriti totlIe.-JI.A.9.61.I t....?..., .. Z...u10.2.i.41 4.1.A.t.1 ZuGL?.
..4u.ar-dliz,13:41"
Ile 41...wy.d1 ,.::,111.41 u..lz Lb.,..2.z.11 cra cac.L......; i <I , -tz; 1,)S1.4 1:13.51 .. 1.11
.. t-Ct4:1. la-,....) 41
 t Sii°
46
RIYADH 11451, P. 0.130X 2459 2 4,574350- FAX. 4674216 -Telex: 401019 KSU s.1 Le- . Let ji „rt. vs t.‘oi L,Si; vott y l et titi—su twtro. 0 Vioi u. ‘,.• Mal 0;611
t4)..)n...h.%41 I r L—a11 j—t .4,11 / Oz LI.,
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA






 111=IJI ad il-r1j1 ilil id I
CIA jalatiEj
..1.__,J I
:	 t._, j I_:J I
: c, L-Li j..4J I
4.5 LC j-q j a_U I ;i..4...,- j j
	
r )t_-_, I
L_. 3 )I--1 I ci L4 ,-1...ft..4J It.4...1‘,1 ti, j__*J I a_JJ I..L:s. ..L.-4...,...0 i'.` ..2- 1--:J I r ___
. " Z.4 3 j---*---J Ic.'J LC	 1 I Lri 2.....i 1_:-.1J I (3_5 I .3—c. " 6..c o I j j_:.S. -1___LI





I c, U 1_:_.
2 2.6.z..,- I 1 2--c LJ I	 2...4 j L.,_..---1 I 	 :Li ..,__.:J I Lfi ;t. t..c. 1.—:....a.J I 	 i i I 3 'I I
Lrj 4_,,p-..4J I ) t l_i_J I t_g___:.,../-1! I J 1.-;- 3L___: .,	 I 1 	 I ,D.--,4.0 T
.(A3iif10/1/1
r -5j J LA-5 r--'	 4-1 c.)-2 Js 1.-.1
L. 	 L.t...	0,2...1 1_,:,- j_l_:_i_.! I ..,.-L.a-L7 jc c c
A giV . 1 . Y:,r5li _ A . Tont : g, ,,-.<1;_ noV1111 : ,...))41; - i ii.,0 1 1 1:.7.,! - %,.t.le--11 Ze.,JI ;SJ-11_ r I t Y1 rla l
 _ V1‘ ':-' • Le
P.O. BOX 719- DAMMAM 31421 - SAUDI ARABIA - CABLE: ALGURFEH - TELEX 801086 - TEL. 8571111 - FAX: 8570607
ji hNigAta r!=v LIPP
IBM CRUM If MUM
le %mg „su-vp,1
 tv.l.reAr	 - In	 %TIC y.v.-111%4M..17.1.n
Tel :6515111 P.O Boa. 136416546121431 - Telex : 601059 GHeRFA




r 	 qJ J.:1 1AJI /
: 4.31-Sjqj 41_iI a.4jj	 1.N.J1
01---AJIA,511 c7.4q vajAJI 6dJ I	 1AAA / eA1.1-11
oL_S .AJI 03 a..11..LAJI a.sl jz ]	 eljj:SsIJ 4.1..%J.AV aAJNJI
. [
rjs:il JAL
4J4I.11 aijAJI 03 at.c.L.1..1.11 ej laVI 0-11 4ZaLcli
tj„....St1
	 01 011.4T d ;44









Each of the following statements is designed to help discover how you see your firm's
strategy. If the statement does not apply At all to your organisation, then circle #1. If the
statement accurately describes the situation in the organisation, circle #5. The numbers 2















situation in our firm
1 2 3 4 5
1- We try to offer the cheapest unbranded products/services in our market. 1 2 3 4 5
2- We always try to be ahead of competitors in product/service innovation. 1 2 3 4 5
3- We place a considerable emphasis on the control of operating costs. 1 2 3 4 5
4- We place major emphasis on advertising and promotion so that we can
charge an above-average price. 1 2 3 4 5
5- We regularly increase the research and development spending on
the line of products/services to offer new product/services. 1 2 3 4 5
6-We try to differentiate our products/services from the competition,
so we can charge premium prices. 1 2 3 4 5
7- We emphasise competitive price in our marketing communications. 1 2 3 4 5
8- We place major emphasis on prior analysis of market needs to
adapt our product/services to meet them if necessary. 1 2 3 4 5
9- There is a lot of pressure here to minimise overhead costs. 1 2 3 4 5
10- Products/services development is given top priority in our organisation. i 2 3 4 5
11- Because we offer very similar product/services to the
competition, we try to maintain competitive pricing. 1 2 3 4 5
12- We try to offer the best quality products/services in our industry. 1 2 3 4 5
13- We think that our customers are more concerned about price
than anything else. 1 2 3 4 5
14- We put more emphasis on product image in our marketing
communication than anything else. 1 2 3 4 5
15- The main competitive strategy in our organisation is based on
low price competition. 1 2 3 4 5
16- We think that our customers are more concerned about the
quality of the product/service than anything else. 1 2 3 4 5
17- We try to use process innovation to support the quality
of product/services. 1 2 3 4 5
18- We aim to be the lowest cost producer in our industry. 1 2 3 4 5
19- We try to maintain a highly trained and motivated sales force. 1 2 3 4 5
20- Top priority is given to the lowest cost suppliers. 1 2 3 4 5
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1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5















situation in our firm
1 2 3 4 5
21- Research and new product development capability is central
to our competitive advantage.
22- We try to offer similar products/services to our competitors
but with a lower price.
23- There is an ongoing plant modernisation program to keep the efficiency
of equipment comparable to that of our major competitors.
24- In order to offer a unique product we have more effective
equipment maintenance and replacement policies.
25- We try to put tight control on the cost of research and development
to offer low product/services prices.
26- We spend the highest percentage of our sales revenue on
marketing expenses (activities).
27- We try hard to maintain the maximum feasible utilisation of our
productive capacity.
28- We regularly use our core technological competencies to operate in
new markets.
29- We try to use process innovation to reduce costs.
30- We try to improve the process of operation to offer low price
products /services.
31- We try to maintain and improve the quality of our
product/service to maintain our good reputation.
32- We regularly have a tendency to operate in familiar markets,
and avoid any risk with new markets.
33- Cost minimisation is more important than high quality product/service.
34- We try to have a product portfolio to exploit synergism and then
reduce overall costs.
35- We try to put tight control on the marketing expenditure to offer
low price product/service.
36- We think that our customers are more concerned about the new
and innovative product/service than anything else.
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37- Please rank the following means of attaining competitive advantage in the
way most appropriate for your organisation. 1 is the first priority, 2 the
second, and so on.
[ ] Minimum cost	 [ ] Price competition




2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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2 3 4 5
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A. Organisational formal control processes
Each of the following statements is designed to help discover how you view your firm's
formal control processes. If the statement does not apply at all to your organisation, then
circle #1. If the statement accurately describes the situation in the organisation, circle #5. The















situation in our firm
1 2 3 4 5
1-All levels in our organisation are encouraged to put forward relevant ideas. 	 1
2- Top management in our organisation give more prominence to
short-term financial performance in assessing strategies. 	 1
3- Top management in our organisation try to place less emphasis on
short-term corporate control than building long-term advantage. 	 1
4- The prime profit responsibility, in our organisation, is pushed
down to the lowest level in the organisational structure.
	 1
5- Top management in our organisation is involved in details with
businesses strategies to build long-term competitive advantage.
	 1
6- Top management in our organisation place a heavy burden on the
technical and product related capability and knowledge of the
corporate management group.
	 1
7- Our company emphasises co-ordination amongst its different businesses
even though this complicates short-term financial control.
	 1
8- Top management in our organisation is trading-off between a wide
portfolio of interests, and long time horizons that some businesses require.
	 1
9- Top management in our organisation try to exercise tight control against
results achieved, while taking into account both financial & strategic objectives. 1
10- Top management in our organisation try to set flexible performance
targets to promote strategic planning.
11- Top management interventions in businesses activity is limited in
our organisation.
12-Top management in our organisation is primarily concerned with
short-term financial results and control against annual targets.
13- We frequently insist on business action plans to correct variances in
performance in our organisation.
14- We prefer to avoid overlaps between businesses in our organisation.
15- In our organisation, lower level units are required to work towards
inflexible short-term performance targets, which are directly
linked to ongoing corporate strategic planning processes.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5



















the situation in our
firm
1 2 3 4 5
Formalisation
1- Our organisation has a very large number of written rules and policies.
2- A 'rules and procedures' manual exists and is readily available within this
organisation.
3- There are complete written job descriptions for most jobs in this
organisation.
4- The organisation keeps a written record of nearly everyone's jobs
performance.
5- There is a formal orientation programme for most new members of the
organisation.
The use of structural liaison devices
1- We have interdepartmental committees which are set up to
allow departments to engage in joint decision making.
2- We have task forces which are temporary bodies set up to facilitate
interdepartmental collaboration on a specific project.
3- We have liaison personnel whose specific job it is to co-ordinate the efforts
of several departments for purposes of specific projects.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Delegation of authority
Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which the chief executive officer of the









1 2 3 4 5
1- Raising of the long-term capital. 1 2345
2- Selection of new investments. 1 2 3 4 5
3- Acquisitions. 1 2 3 4 5
4- Development of new products. 1 2 3 4 5
5- Marketing strategy. 1 2 3 4 5
6- Pricing. 1 2 3 4 5
7- Research and development. 1 2 3 4 5
8- Hiring and firing of senior management personnel.
356-
1 2 3 4 5
9- Changes in corporate policy. 1 2 3 4 5
-
B. Organisational informal control
Please use the scale below to show to what extant do you agree or disagree with each statement.
Strongly disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
1- In our organisation, using new untested methods to do the job always
leads to tragic errors.	 1
2- To be secure in his job, our managers must think carefully about their decisions.1
3- Managers, in our organisation, always ask higher
2345
2	 3	 4	 5
authority's agreement about their work even if it is not that important. 	 1 2 3 4 5
4- In our organisation, there must be clearly identified steps in the decision-
making process.	 1 2 3 4 5
5- Our decisions are always made without getting enough information. 	 1 2 3 4 5
6- Our management must depend, sometimes, on intuition when making decision. 1 2 3 4 5
Each of the following paragraphs describe different types of organisation. Please note that
none of the types listed below is inherently "GOOD" or "BAD", and none of them may
describe exactly your organisation. Please use the scale below to show to what extent these
paragraphs describe your organisation.
Strongly disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
This organisation attempts to maintain a broad range of
products/services and always tries to improve them. This organisation
responds rapidly to early signals concerning areas of opportunity, and these
responses often lead to a new round of competitive actions. This organisation
tries to be "first in" with new product and market areas even if not all of these
activities prove to be always highly successful.
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This type of organisation attempts to maintain a stable limited level of
products and services, and at the same time it moves out quickly to follow a
carefully selected set of the more promising new developments in the industry.
Therefore, it never tries to be first in new product or service, but by carefully
monitoring the actions of major competitors in areas compatible with their
stable products-market base, it can frequently be "second in" with a more cost
efficient product or service.
The attempt in this organisation is to locate and maintain a source of niche
in a relatively stable products or services area. In general, this organisation
looks for a secure market and it tends to offer a more limited range of products
or services than its competitors, therefore it is not in the forefront of the
developments in the industry. This organisation tends to ignore industry
changes that have no direct influence on current areas of operation and to
concentrate instead on doing the best job possible in a limited area.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
-
C. Organisational Environment
There are factors, in any business environment, which may affect a firm's ability to achieve it
competitive advantage. Below is a list of statements which represent some of these factors. Please
use the scale below to show to what extent you agree or disagree with each statement.
Strongly disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
1- The rich abundance of natural resources is the most significant
source of our competitive advantage. 1 2 3 4 5
2- We feel that domestic buyers are the world's most demanding
buyers for the product/service we provide. 1 2 3 4 5
3- Our competitive strategy is based on following the initiatives of the
market leader. 1 2 3 4 5
4- We try to have a close relationship with our suppliers to get a quick and
constant flow of information between us. 1 2 3 4 5
5- The basic physical infrastructure ( such as transportation and communication
systems) confers a unique competitive advantage for us. 1 2 3 4 5
6- Technical skilled labour is very important in our industry. 1 2 3 4 5
7- Financial institutions that we deal with are providing us with good
services to achieve our advantage. 1 2 3 4 5
8- Supplying industries deliver the lowest cost inputs to our need. 1 2 3 4 5
9- Managerial skilled labour is very important in our industry. 1 2 3 4 5
10- Local demand rarely gives us an early signal of the cust'omers' needs. 1 2 3 4 5
11- The absence of a stock market limits our ability to fully
achieve our competitive advantage. 1 2 3 4 5
12- To ensure the maintenance of high quality of inputs we have regular
contracts with supplying companies. 1 2 3 4 5
13- Government Development Funds provide us with great
opportunities to build our competitive advantage. 1 2 3 4 5
14- We feel that domestic competition promotes competitive advantage
in our industry. 1 2 3 4 5
15- It is strategically important that we are in the same geographical area as
our suppliers. 1 2 3 4 5
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Strongly disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
16- We try to have a close relationship with our customers to get a quick and
constant flow of information between us. 1 2345
17- We feel that domestic demand creates a competitive environment
in our industry. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
18- We feel that domestic demand is very sophisticated and anticipatory. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
19- It is strategically important that we are in the same geographical area as
our customers. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
Environmental uncertainty
1- Our firm must rarely change its marketing process to keep up with
the market and competitors. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
2- The rate at which products/services are getting obsolete in the
industry is very slow. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
3- If I were asked to describe the external environment, in general,
surrounding our organisation, I would say it is very simple, which
means that I need little information about the environment. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
4- Actions of competitors are quite easy to predict. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
5-Demand and consumer tastes are fairly easy to forecast. 1234
6- The production/service technology is not subject to very much
change and is well established. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
359-
7- If I were asked to describe the external environment, in general,
surrounding our organisation, I would say it is very stable, which means that
it has few changes and they are easy to predict. 1 2	 3	 4	 5
-
3. Organisation performance
Please use the scale below to show the level of performance of your organisation
comparing yourself with your major competitors.
Performance scale:
Bottom 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% Top 20%
0-20% 80-100%
1 2 3 4 5
Using the scale above, please circle the appropriate number which
reflects your organisational performance in each factor (criterion) below for the current year and
the last three years:
1- Sales growth
2- Return on assets
3- Market share
4- Return on sales
5- Overall performance
Current Year
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1234  5
Last three years
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
To what extent are you confident about the above answers:
[ ] Very confident
[ ] Confident
[ ] Not confident
- 360 -
4. Descriptive information
1-Name of the company 	
2- Main activity (activities) 	
3- What is your organisational position? 	
4- What is the approximate total number of employees in your organisation?
[ ] less than 100
	 [ ] more than 1,000 but less than 1,500
[ ] more than 100 but less than 500 [ ] more than 1,500 but less than 2,500
[ ] more than 500 but less than 1000
	
[ ] more than 2,500
5- What is your level of education and/or training?
[ ] High school or under	 [ ] Master's degree
[ ] Bachelor's degree
	 [ 1 Ph.D. degree
6- How long you have been in this organisation?
[ ] less than 5 years 	 [ ] more than 15 but less than 20
[ ] more than 5 but less than 10	 [ ] more than 20 but less than 25
[ ] more than 10 but less than 15	 [ ] more than 25 years
7- How do you see your experience in this activity?
[ ] above average
[ ] average experience
[ ] inexperienced
8- What proportion of your organisation's activities are directly related to the government.




[ ] 80% or more
9- Does your organisation have a joint venture (formal written) agreement with
a foreign company?	 [ ] yes	 [ ] no
10- Would you be willing to participate in follow-up interview?
[ ] yes
	 [ ] no
11- How many people are directly reporting to the CEO:
	
12- If you wish to have a summary of the overall results of this
research please write your address:
-361-
13- If you have any comments about this survey, please write them:
,
Thank you for making this study a success.
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